The first George W Bush Administration

The approach of the first George W Bush administration (2001-05) to fighting proliferation was a radical departure from previous US policy. It was outlined in two key documents released in 2002, viz. the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The policy was heavily influenced by the experience of the September 11 attacks. Its key elements were:

• The WMD threat primarily comes from terrorist groups and hostile regimes.

• It is a grave mistake to wait for WMD threats to become an unambiguous imminent threat.

• Traditional arms control arrangements are inadequate to deal with an untrustworthy state - a more reliable strategy is to target the regime itself.

• Multilateral regimes are often effective, but the US must be prepared to act alone, if required.

This policy was initially dominated by conservatives, but later softened by moderates in the Iraq war's aftermath.

The second George W Bush Administration

Some indications offer an insight into the approach that will be adopted by a second George W Bush administration (taking office in January 2005):

• President Bush has claimed a clear political mandate to pursue an assertive foreign policy.

• The appointments for the second term suggest that advocates of a tough line (Rice, Rumsfeld, Hadley, Cheney) are on the ascendant, while moderates (Powell, Armitage) are departing.

However, several significant real-world constraints will shape its policy, that will serve to narrow US options and limit its freedom of action:

• Pre-occupation with Iraq will sap US attention and energies.

• US military forces are stretched thin across many regions.

• A burgeoning budget deficit will make Congress less willing to spend extravagantly.

• A loss of credibility and good-will will make other powers less willing to cooperate.

In both the current proliferation crises - North Korea and Iran - the US does not wish to deal with the present regimes. But without real military options, a strategy that relies on regime change may only be wishful thinking.

North Korea

In its first term, the Bush administration was split between those who preferred to negotiate with Pyongyang, and those that sought a regime change. The outcome was a compromise whereby the US agreed to participate in the Six-Party talks, but refused to grant any concessions until North Korea complied fully with its demands.

With no flexibility being shown by the US or North Korea, the outlook is for a continued stalemate. At some point, conservatives in the administration will try to increase pressure on North Korea. Japan may be willing to help the US, for example by cutting off remittances or restricting trade, but other countries involved, like South Korea and China, will be reluctant to pressure North Korea. The ultimate objective would be to either extract North Korea's capitulation or force a regime change, but this may not be a sound strategy.

Iran

The EU3 (UK, Germany, France) has been doing most of the "heavy lifting" on the Iran issue. They brokered an interim deal in November 2004, whereby Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment programme in return for delaying IAEA and UN Security Council action. Iran is determined to retain control over its fuel cycle, and now claims that the suspension of its programme will end in about 6 months.

The EU3 is convinced - and Mr Einhorn agreed - that the US must become involved in this process if there is to be any real prospect of a permanent solution. The best chance (but by no means a certain chance) for Iran not going nuclear is a comprehensive resolution that also deals with the wider regional security issues. US Secretary of State-designate Rice has said that US policy is to isolate, not engage, Iran. Its policy will be shaped by the progress of the EU3 deal and by Iran's actions in Iraq.

South Asia

Washington has two main priorities in its approach to proliferation in South Asia:

• To encourage Indo-Pak reconciliation to reduce the likelihood of conflict.

• To minimise the risk of South Asia becoming a source of further proliferation. This applies to Pakistan - concern over its control over material and expertise. The AQ Khan affair constitutes "the most egregious act of proliferation".

The US is concerned about the reported links between al Qaeda and Pakistani scientists. More generally, the Bush administration has been dissatisfied with Pakistan's cooperation in information-sharing, and remains concerned over the government's control over its own people and physical infrastructure.

The US approach to India is focused on export controls. While there are no fundamental systemic problems, there have been occasional lapses, which would be addressed in the dialogue on Next Steps as part of the strategic partnership initiative.

Multilateral regimes

The Bush administration's approach to multilateral arms control regimes has been inconsistent:

• It remains opposed to the CTBT and a verification regime for the BWC, but has supported a FMCT without verification measures.

• But it does support other institutions like the NPT, the NSG, and the MTCR.

The regimes it supports are seen as a necessary but not adequate instruments to curb proliferation. They must be augmented by other specific measures, especially for dealing with non-state actors:

• Assistance programs, such as the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs, especially in the former USSR. European powers are starting to assume more responsibility here, for example with a G8 agreement in 2002 to pledge funding.

• Interdiction of illicit transfers, through the PSI and CSI. These are not recent innovations - the US and India have cooperated on maritime interdiction - but the PSI serves to formalise these actions.

• Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, designed to address sub-state proliferation, which places the responsibility for action on individual states.

• Stronger verification regimes, such as the IAEA Additional Protocol. But, unsure of their effectiveness, Washington has sent out mixed signals on these programs.

US WMD program

The Bush administration assesses - and Mr Einhorn agreed - that the US nuclear arsenal is not the motivating factor for would-be proliferators. But the US also sends out a signal that nuclear weapons are critical to national security by its development and testing programs, for example on low-yield weapons and deep earth penetrating weapons. This increases the salience of nuclear weapons, which seems self-defeating for the US, which possesses an unambiguous conventional superiority.

International (especially Russian) opposition to plans for ballistic missile defences was less than expected, but the US public's sense of vulnerability has been increased since September 11.

The current BMD programme remains technically dubious.

Conclusion

In its second term, the Bush administration will adhere to the principles codified in its 2002 strategy documents, but it will be constrained by external factors that will impose pragmatic imperatives. Its approach to the proliferation crises in North Korea and Iran will remain ideologically driven, seeking to coerce rather than deal with these regimes, making a successful resolution of these crises difficult.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

Questioner

Would the US public become more sceptical towards the US WMD program, especially given the expense of untested technologies and the weakness of the (unverifiable) BWC?

Einhorn

There are anomalies in the US programs. Low-yield "bunker-busters," for example, are of dubious military value and may be politically unusable. September 11 created a powerful sense of vulnerability that, no matter how irrational, now translates into public support for missile defence. Regarding biological warfare, the policy focus now is on managing an attack - especially public health and emergency responses - to deal with the threat and thereby deter it.

Questioner

Isn't there very little legitimate expectation that the Iranian regime will respond on the lines desired by the US?

Einhorn

The presumption is that, if Iran is determined, it will succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons - our policy can only influence their calculations so that acquiring nuclear weapons becomes a less attractive proposition. Unlike North Korea, Iran needs to integrate with the international community for its strategic interests - it is therefore more susceptible to pressure. The US and Europe must work together to reduce the benefits and increase the costs for Iran pursuing its current course of action. The support Iran gets from the Non-Aligned Movement, including India, is counter-productive - New Delhi could be more helpful.

Questioner

The US nuclear program may not influence rogue regimes, but it has influenced powers like Russia and China, by reinforcing the salience of nuclear weapons as war-fighting tools, and increasing their incentives for acquiring more sophisticated arsenals. At the same time, US counter-proliferation measures like the PSI are even more discriminatory and less legitimate than the NPT, and thereby increase the demand for nuclear weapons among non-weapon states.

Einhorn

The Bush administration has been very careful and scrupulous in defining the legality of the PSI. Moreover, joining the PSI does not require or imply assent to all interdictions - it is a case-by-case program. Einhorn agreed that the US must, out of self-interest, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, and its current nuclear program has the opposite effect. Unilateralism is more acceptable if it is sparingly used - it lacks credibility when it becomes a policy norm.

Questioner

Is it possible that "bunker-buster" bombs have a non-military purpose - that is, to provide justification for increased research funding to weapons labs?

Questioner

What are the secondary effects of "bunker-buster" bombs? Are they known?

Einhorn

There is scientific dispute over the effects - and therefore the military utility - of "bunker-busters". They are currently a "weapon without a mission."

Questioner

Military coercion is not enough to stop proliferation, as shown by the Iran case. Won't the continued disregard for Article 6 of the NPT [the requirement of nuclear weapons states to disarm] weaken the entire NPT and lead to more proliferation?

Einhorn

Yes, ignoring Article 6 weakens the regime - not because it provides a strategic incentive for other states to acquire nuclear weapons, but because it reduces the inclination of all actors to strengthen verification regimes, export controls, safeguards, etc.

Questioner

Recent US policy does not address the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear technology - what can the US do to advance the use of nuclear energy while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons?

Einhorn

Loopholes in the NPT allow the spread of fuel-cycle capabilities, which can have weapons implications. The US should offer fuel-cycle services, from providing fresh fuel to disposal of spent fuel, to other states. That would allow access to nuclear energy, while restricting the spread of sensitive fuel-cycle facilities.

Questioner

Doesn't the Iran crisis require a regional mechanism for resolution like the Six-Party talks in the North Korean crisis?

Einhorn

If there is any chance of dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons, some regional security guarantees will be required. The US has pursued only bilateral security relations in the Persian Gulf, inhibiting the development of a regional architecture. That would be a necessary, but not sufficient, measure for resolving the crisis. North Korea has demanded US security guarantees, and the Six-Party mechanism may evolve into a regional security institution even if it does not prevent or reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons acquisition.