Chairperson: Amb Vijay Nambiar

Speakers: Gp Capt Steele

                Col C A Pithawala

                Mr A Mace

Welcome Address: Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee

Gen Banerjee opened the session by welcoming all participants and highlighted that it was a part of the ongoing consultations between the British and Indian governments to discuss and deliberate on issues concerning contemporary peace operations. The discussion being of an informal nature, he urged the participants to convey their thoughts in a free and frank manner.

Opening Remarks: Amb Vijay Nambiar

Speaking on the political perspective of peace operations, Amb Vijay Nambiar said that contemporary peace operations have come a long way from their 'blue helmet operation' image. They have evolved from one stage to another over the years. Initially they were seen as inter-positionary forces. Subsequently they grew into a robust operation with global participation. Now they are seen as the 'coalitional of the willing' or an effort by regional parties. Thus one can see a fair amount of mutation that has occurred in the process. The moot question that one needs to address at this stage is how far has the transition affected the credibility of the United Nations (UN) as a body to initiate and supervise peace operations? Response to the above question is of vital importance following the Brahimi Report which has cast serious doubts on the efficacy of contemporary peace operations as an instrument of preserving collective security.

Some of the issues of significance and concern that this seminar will have to look into are:

Studying the impact of peace operations on the overall image of the United Nations is perhaps the most important aspect of this brainstorming session especially in the wake of the impact it has on popular reaction to the organization and its activities.

The second crucial aspect that needs to be deliberated upon is the impact of outside parties like the great powers and regional organizations on the overall design and execution of peace operations. The fluctuations in the preparation of major powers with regard to peace operations and the lack of security consensus among them, makes it pertinent to discuss the issue.

Finally, one needs to understand the changing nature of peace operations itself, which goes beyond the use of military (forces) to cover critical aspects of civilian, police and humanitarian functions.

Doctrine of Peace Support Operations: Gp Capt Steele

Group Captain Steele began his presentation after thanking the chair and the house and laid out for discussion the fundamental principles of the British doctrine of Peace Support Operations (PSO). The doctrine of PSO strives to incorporate the dramatic changes in international politics in terms of the complexity and number of actors while also factoring in the experiences of peacekeeping operations. Briefly each situation has its conflict cycles and these conflict cycles need to be broken into.

Three Fundamentals

The Group Captain laid down the three fundamentals of the new doctrine which the British Army has been working upon. The first fundamental was the Campaign Authority. The second and the third fundamentals are the use of force and perseverance respectively.

The long term success of a PSO is predicated on the creation, enhancement and sustainment of a high level of Campaign Authority. The first was the perceived legitimacy of the mandate, the second the legitimacy of the Campaign Authority. The issues related to Campaign Authority were the degree to which factions in the conflict subjugated themselves to the Campaign Authority and the degree to which the PSO met the expectations of the local population.

The use of force in a PSO should always be circumscribed as it affects the Campaign Authority and on the other end force must be credible so as to make the enforcement of the mandate possible. The last fundamental was the factor of perseverance. This demands that the actors identify campaign objectives and pursue them with a complementary and a resolute attitude. The PSO should be approached across issues by the various departments civil and military.

Five Guiding Principles

Steele then enumerated five guiding principles of PSOs. These guiding principles were its basic rules which incorporated the experiences of the past and enable the operations to be better equipped to deal with conflict and peacemaking.

The first principle involved a comprehensive and complementary campaign. This essentially meant that a campaign should be planned in its entirety and with enough preparations to cope with the dynamics of the situation. The aim is to exploit the synergistic effects through the coordinated activation of each instrument of the state. The second was that of preventive action. Preventive action should be taken as a response to an emerging threat. The third principle was the principle of sensitised action. Sensitised action meant the PSO actors should make all efforts to respect local world and culture. This point was considered extremely important as disrespect or tensions with the local population while immediately affecting the campaign at the tactical level also has a negative influence at the strategic level.

The fourth guiding principle was security. All military personnel involved in PSO must recognize that a balance must be struck between hard force protection measures and soft measures that can significantly contribute to overall force protection. The fifth and probably as important if not more than the others was the principle of transparency. Transparency in itself should be seen as the strategic aim of the campaign. The comprehensive campaign planned ahead should be followed to its logical end, by all actors and institutions. This understanding of the campaign should be regularly transmitted to the locals to generate a sympathy or understanding for the campaign.

Britain, Peace Support Operations and Africa

In his concluding remarks Steele talked of the experience of peace support operations in Africa. The British have made efforts to help the African Union as best as possible to bring about peace and help stabilize conflict situations. The British government recognizes the issues of African politics and a conclusion of sorts has been reached to apply African solutions to African problems. Such a course of action, while inherently more mature and reflective, has been due to the lessons of bad experience of Peace Keeping in Africa. The British government is seeking to help the African Union at the strategic level and there is no effort to create a NATO in Africa. The African Union does not have a Peace Support Operations doctrine.

Operations: A Military Perspective: Col C A Pithawala (Director, UN Cell, Army Headquarters)

Contributing to the exchange of ideas and sharing of experiences between the two sides, Col Pithawala presented an overview of India's participation in peacekeeping operations since 1950. He said that India has so far participated in around 35 operations in fifty years of UN peacekeeping. He opined that India's participation has evolved into one of the finest contribution in peacekeeping under the UN. In the 1950s, India participated in missions in Korea and Indo-China. In the sixties, about eleven thousand troops were sent for peacekeeping in Congo. The number of missions stood at ten till the 1980s. There was a sudden surge of operations in the 1990s and India's participation ranged from Africa to Southeast Asia. In the fifties, about 5 thousand troops were deployed for peace keeping operations whereas in the eighties, India's participation was predominantly in the form of observer missions. Some of the countries where India contributed to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s are Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sierra Leone.

India is presently engaged in sixteen missions mostly in Africa. India's linkages here started with Congo. There are missions presently in Ethiopia and Lebanon with 55 military observers in all. In Lebanon, India is holding strategically the most important area in the North.  The Indian mission has been successful in cooperating with the Lebanese government. In the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, India is the largest contributor. The Indian mission is accompanied by construction and engineering companies. In Ethiopia, India has now been given the Eastern sector apart from the Central sector that it has been responsible for. This now totals three-fourths of the area of responsibility. The Erar Bridge is being constructed by India.

Col Pithawala said that the main thrust of India's peacekeeping participation is its emphasis on winning hearts and minds of the local populace. Jobs undertaken by Indian peacekeepers include defusing bombs, conducting medical camps, providing mid-day meals, running schools. Participation in local festivals has formed part of the memory of the peacekeepers. Col Pithawala concluded by presenting a short film on India's peacekeeping operations.

Discussion

Uses of doctrine

• The purpose of doctrine is to establish key operating principles - to codify past experiences as a guide for future action. The application of these principles will differ for changing conditions and environment.

• India has no written doctrine for peace operations, but a wealth of experience. India's practice has traditionally been an outgrowth of its counter-insurgency doctrine - so it has always acknowledged the importance of winning hearts and minds and ensuring local empowerment.

Campaign Authority

• 'Campaign Authority' is a term coined in the new British doctrine, which stresses the need for a mandate which is legitimate and accepted by all key stakeholders. British experience in Sierra Leone and East Timor, among other places, suggests that a well-understood, legitimate mandate is critical for the success of a peace operation. But, the pertinent question that remains is who has given the mandate and to whom and who would execute this with regard to the Campaign Authority?

Use of force

• Force in peace operations must be used intelligently. In India's case, the emphasis has strongly been towards 'minimum force'. It must be used within the laws of armed conflict, it must be moderate, and it must be credible. In some cases it may not be necessary at all - security may be guaranteed through a solid and widely-accepted Campaign Authority. No preventive measure has been taken over a decade to check the flow of arms in conflict torn countries in Africa, which in effect is the reason for many conflicts in the region.

Importance of a holistic approach

• Peace operations encompass a wide range of actions from peace enforcement, to peacekeeping, to development assistance. Peace and security must be defined broadly, to include reconstruction, good governance, and capacity building. The Brahimi Report recognized the importance of "developmental peace-keeping", which seeks to address economic and governance issues.

• Narrow peace-keeping, as well as narrow financial assistance, are not sufficient. Britain has learned that development assistance must be a whole-of-government approach, which coordinates effort between different government agencies, NGOs, and institutions in the target country.

Local resistance to occupation

• An emerging body of thinking, rationalizing resistance to occupation, as well as technological developments such as the proliferation of light weapons, is making peace operations more difficult. The nature of threat to peacekeepers has changed, to include even suicide attacks. On the other hand, for the first time, with the current Darfur genocide, African states are now considering intervention in another African state, but their response has not been adequate or timely.

• Home grown democratic models or local solutions should be given priority as western democratic models results in negative peace. The anomaly concerning formation of peacekeeping force has generated skepticism due to selective yardsticks adopted by the western powers, wherein affected countries with vast natural resources are paid more attention and naturally not for the right reasons.

Preventative and Pre-emptive action

• The idea of preventative action to forestall complex emergencies that require peace operations may be viewed as more politicized and controversial in an age when states claim the right to pre-emptive action.

• Preventative action should not, however, be considered only as military actions. They can include diplomatic measures, developmental assistance, and coercive measures short of war. The actions taken to contain Iraq in the 1990s - such as sanctions and 'No Fly Zones' - could be seen as attempts to prevent a complex emergency. However, they may often be unduly coercive and hence counter-productive.

Exit strategies

• Ending a military phase of peace operation requires the transfer of control to local authorities - as the coalition is doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. The cycle of violence can only be broken with the active involvement of the indigenous population. Military operations are only a part of the broader peace operation, but the transition from military to civilian control of the peace operation has always been a critical process for the success of the operation.

Local ownership and foreign assistance

• The G8-OAU joint plan on peace operations is designed to coordinate and streamline international support to African states. G8 policy makers understand the importance of "African solutions to African problems", but also understand the need to provide vital assistance. The key is to build capacity in Africa, for example through programs that seek to "train the trainer" and thereby disseminate critical skills in the target country. This can also be done by partnering with regional organisations (such as the OAU), providing them with funding and expertise as required, but leaving them in control. Outsiders in Africa are forced to balance the impulse for local ownership of the operation, with the imperative to act urgently in emergencies such as the Darfur genocide.

Legitimacy and the role of the UN

• Legitimacy in peacekeeping operations depends upon the force being accepted by the local people as having the necessary authority. Interventions have traditionally been conducted under the aegis of the UN. Even in the absence of a UN mandate, the endorsement of the UN Security Council has been the yardstick of legality of interventions. But there is an increasing gap between legality and legitimacy (let alone justice).

• The UN Security Council faces a crisis of legitimacy, which the Secretary-General has acknowledged. The Council does not represent the developing world and their aspirations. It leaves out Africa, Latin America and much of Asia's populated countries. The developed countries today do not contribute to UN's peacekeeping forces. Unless these anomalies are corrected, the UN's efforts at peacekeeping will continue to suffer. It was noted that the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has publicly supported India's candidacy for a permanent seat on the Council to address this question of legitimacy. India must also accept the responsibilities that come with that position.