Of late, a number of trial balloons have been floated on resolving the long simmering Kashmir tangle. It ranges from the Andorra model to replicating negotiations based on the Northern Ireland peace talks. However, it has to be remembered that for achieving durable peace in the sub-continent, both India and Pakistan have to agree on the modalities of a structured dialogue at the earliest. This may include the following in terms of both policies and processes:

Firstly, there is a compelling need to formalize a structure  in terms of mechanisms such as initiating composite dialogues at the Heads of Governments to Foreign Secretaries levels and also in terms of issues ranging from bilateral trade and cultural contacts to opening up travel managements between both parts.

Secondly, there has to be formal recognition by both India and Pakistan that military solution to the Kashmir dispute does not serve their national interests either in the short, intermediate or even the long term.

Thirdly, however unpalatable it may sound to some leaders at the power corridors in both New Delhi and Islamabad, the wishes of the Kashmiris or Jamhuriyat, representing various constituents and faiths of J & K on both sides of the LoC, need to be effectively involved in the negotiating process.

Fourthly, there has to be a tentative timeframe and endgame strategies for structured dialogue on the Kashmir issue. An open-ended dialogue is likely to aggravate and induce mistrust rather than ameliorate the already strained ties between the population of Kashmir and the governing elite in both countries.

Fifthly, the ultimate solution on Kashmir must be based on the principle of ensuring self-respect and dignity to the people of Kashmir in a manner that is at least broadly acceptable to both the people and the governments of India and Pakistan.

Sixthly, an asymmetrical approach around a zero-sum solution has to be avoided at all costs. Such a package is impossible to sell to any of the constituents and parties to this long, historical animosity filled problem.

Finally, unofficial dialogue channels through Track-II should be encouraged and continued by both governments to assist official-level talks between India and Pakistan. This is necessary in order to identify and work further on points of commonality and least divergence within the broad parameters of give and take and without jeopardizing or compromising the vital national interests of both the countries.

On the more immediate issue of de-escalation along the Line of Control, some of the more specific and focused CBMs can also be pursued. One, there has to be immediate relocation of artilleries and heavy weapons which are considered a major cause of tension-escalation across the LoC due to their role as active instruments of escalation. It includes not placing either Agni or Ghauri or Saheen line of missiles that could be construed as too provocative acts by either side. Two, as part of a minimal acceptable format, there has to be a firm commitment by New Delhi and Islamabad not to violate airspace across the LoC/Working Boundary and allow the open sky policy for civil aviation unhindered. Three, there is need to have uninterrupted and unscheduled visits to forward areas in the LoC on both sides of the border by members of the mass media including journalists, representatives of various national and international human rights organizations, diplomats, and UN personnel. Four, military exercises along the LoC are to be banned by both sides and only a token non-combatant division may be present for routine tasks of checks and border patrolling. Five, free movement of people and ideas can be realised if easing of visa restrictions and related regulations can be mutually undertaken by the governments of India and Pakistan.

Although it may sound bit ambitious, yet there is no reason to believe that these modest CBMs can not be given at least a honest try. After all, in the aftermath of the 1999 Lahore summit, both India and Pakistan agreed on more tangible steps that included providing each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, maintaining unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side decided that extraordinary events had jeopardized its supreme national interests. For peace to have any chance of blossoming in Kashmir, let all parties to the conflict provide a conducive environment and accept a common, minimum program geared toward workable CBMs.