Clausewitz may be out of fashion and less relevant today but no one can question his evergreen noting, “Each age has had its own peculiar forms of war.... Each, therefore, would also keep its own theory of war.”

As someone who had to learn, understand and practice war as a career for over four decades, I could also add, “Except for the background of a conflict, war circumstances and war situations are seldom alike.”

Comparing current strategic situation on the subcontinent with nuclear theology of the Cold War to bring out an intended message, howsoever noble that may be, is neither objective nor sound. There is a need to understand the strategic reality of South Asia and the circumstances under which a limited war has been considered likely or possible.

After conducting nuclear tests at Pokharan and Chagai in May 1998, political establishments in India and Pakistan thought that we could now usher in an era of security and stability on the sub-continent. Unfortunately, the tests and overt nuclear capability had an opposite impact on the proxy war already initiated by Pakistan. Contrary to expectations, the covert war intensified on the ground.

It was apparent that nuclear optimists, who believed in nuclear deterrence theory, had not taken into account the stability-instability paradox or a proxy war. I do not blame them. Nuclear deterrence was an established and a rational concept. Use of terror and proxy war in the spectrum of conflict to destabilize the adversary was neither an established concept nor rational. The West realised this lower end of conflict spectrum only after 9/11. We have been facing the music for a long time.

In November 1998, while addressing National Defence College of India, I had stated, rather warned, “ If terrorism/militancy/proxy war grows too big, both the ‘initiator’ and the ‘affected’ nation are tempted to go into a conventional war fighting mode. ‘Initiator’â€â€