On 4 October 2004, a private, advisorial body to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, submitted a report titled "The Vision for Future National Security and Defense Capabilities". Consisting of corporate heads, diplomats and academics, the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, stated that the international security environment in the region had changed since 9/11 and that the Japan-US alliance remained "a major pillar of Japan's defense and also an indispensable stabilizing factor" in East Asia.

Calling for "multifunctional and flexible defense capability" to respond to various threats, the report  advocated a restructuring of the SDF and asked for permanent legislation to govern the dispatch of the SDF abroad and review Japan's ban on arms exports. There appears to be an interest also in the doctrine of pre-emption with the focus on the missile threat from North Korea. The Council's report has predictably aroused concern in the region as it might form the basis for Japan's new National Defence Programme Outline, due at the end of the year, on which the Mid-term Defence Build-up Programme 2005 - 2009 will be based.

Asahi Shimbun pointed out, "[t]here has been no consideration of whether this progressing integration of Japan and the United States will contribute to Japan's peace. The only talk is about strengthening the Japan-US alliance." In China, an opinion piece in China Daily, was resigned to the fact that the Japan-US alliance remained the most important consideration for the Japanese government. The report had picked on Chinese military manoeuvers to question whether Japan had not fallen behind in its self-defence capabilities. More interesting was the article's conclusion, "[a]s an influential country in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan has the right to play a military role in the international community. But this should be subject to constitutional and international legal constraints." This seemed to imply that there was no stopping the Japanese progress towards assuming a more prominent military role and that China had to find other ways to deal with Japan.

One of the cards that China holds is its consent that is essential for Japan to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The Japanese renewed their efforts in September with Koizumi calling for reforms in the UN and repeatedly harping on this theme, particularly at the ASEM summit held in Hanoi in October. In an apparent snub to Koizumi, however, Premier Wen Jiabao held a surprise meeting with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun on the sidelines of the summit while turning down a meeting with Koizumi. A week later the South Korean Foreign Minister declared that "countries vying for the [permanent] seats must be evaluated based upon whether that nation is trusted and supported by other neighbors in the region" - this despite the fact that the Koreans are votaries of UN reform and plans are also afoot for a FTA between the Japan and South Korea. While Japan was elected to a non-permanent UNSC seat for 2005-2006, the South Korean position emphasizes to show the continuing weight of history in the region.

However, there is a danger in pushing things too far, which China seems to be learning. Reports of Japan hosting a US Army command in future, subsequently denied by the Japanese, and the recent "Team Samurai" PSI drills in Japanese waters have set the Chinese on edge. The Japanese have also expressed displeasure regarding China's perceived interference in their domestic affairs. Koizumi once again rejected Chinese demands to stop his visits to Yasukuni while a commentator in The Japan Times noted that China was "increasing military expenditures and has produced weapons of mass destruction and missiles" and that it "reacted coolly when Koizumi announced Japan's intent to seek permanent membership on the UN Security Council … The situation indicates that Japanese ODA to China has become a complete waste."

There is a momentum to current Japan's foreign policy despite its perils - civilians being kidnapped in Iraq, and reports of no WMDs being found there. The UNSC bid, the Foreign Minister's visits to Central Asian nations in August, the competition Japan is putting up against China for gas pipelines from Siberia, while at the same time reminding Russia that the dispute over the Kuriles is still outstanding, reflect a new-found confidence. Militarily, the Japanese seem disinclined to let Chinese military buildups go without a response, while also showing increasing willingness to take up  serious matters of disagreement with the US with respect to their mutual security treaty and sharing responsibilities in the region. Add to all this, the fact that with an economy in the doldrums for years, Japan requires new ways to rejuvenate itself.

Will Japan embark on a "peaceful rise"? In East Asia, that is as important a question as the peaceful rise of China.