NDFB: Talking For a Truce, Then What?
13 Nov, 2004 · 1555
Wasbir Hussain recommends caution and sensitivity to the situation arising out of the proposed talks with the NDFB as two rival forces might fall into a fight
It's a breakthrough of sorts in so far as the Assam Government is concerned – the outlawed National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) responding positively to Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi's 30 September call for a ceasefire. After the NDFB formally intimated the State Government, things swung into action, starting with Chief Minister Gogoi announcing that offensive operations against the rebel group has been 'slowed down', if not put on hold.
An offer for 'safe passage' to NDFB leaders followed to enable the group to nominate and send its representatives to meet authorities in the State and the Centre and then formulate and agree to ceasefire ground rules. Gogoi went a step further to push the peace process by declaring that his government was ready to free some of the detained NDFB leaders if any of them were chosen by the outfit to participate in talks with the authorities.
It is now clear that a ceasefire will be in place soon, and NDFB cadres would be asked to stay in 'designated camps' like cadres of the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland. Once a truce comes into effect, the NDFB would have to enter into peace negotiations, either directly with the State Government or with the Centre, with the State authorities acting as facilitators. The key question that arises, once the two sides reach this stage of talks, is the outcome, or the possible package that would enable the 18-year-old dreaded rebel group giving up its sovereignty demand and settling for a solution within the ambit of the Constitution.
The NDFB seeks to represents the Bodo ethnic group, and, therefore, the matter has become all the more significant. Already, the Government had signed an agreement with another Bodo rebel group, the Bodo Liberation Tigers on 10 February 2003, in terms of which a 40-member elected politico-administrative structure has been created with an annual budgetary allocation of Rs 100 crore. The BLT was disbanded and its commanders transformed into political leaders. BLT chief, Hagrama Mohilari, is in fact now the Chief Executive Member of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), the new administrative structure that has been formed. In fact, the Assam Government has already handed several departments to the BTC for their day-to-day administration. A delimitation of the Bodo-dominated areas has also been effected and three new districts have been created.
Now, what can the government give to the NDFB, representing the same ethnic group and having influence over roughly the same areas in western and northern Assam? The problem really is the overlapping of interests, pulls and pressures. Already, the erstwhile BLT leadership, its former chief Mohilary included, had warned the Government against proceeding with the peace talks with the NDFB, without involving them in the process. Mohilary has also warned the government against permitting armed NDFB cadres to stay in designated camps, for fear that old animosity between the two rival Bodo groups could resurface, leading to violent incidents.
The real question is on the solution that the NDFB could accept. Is the group going to make a demand for elevation of the Bodo areas, now under the BTC, to an autonomous state within Assam? Would the group claim a share in the existing political structure? Now, according to present arrangements, 1,000 of the 2,600 former BLT cadres are to be inducted into the paramilitary forces, the process for which is on. Will the NDFB too make a similar demand for the rehabilitation of its cadres once a possible solution is reached?
Possibilities are many, but the stage now seems set for a new battle, that of a hard bargaining by the NDFB and the ex-BLT rebels. It is the former BLT militants who have the backing of the mainstream Bodo groups like the influential All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU), that had supported the Government-BLT peace process resulting in the 2003 Bodo Accord. Contrary to general perceptions that the NDFB's decision to come forward for a truce will further ease the security situation in Assam's Bodo heartland, the chances of the rival forces competing with each other has increased. If the government fails to handle this situation in a sensitive manner, the situation in the Bodo areas could again go out of hand, and its consequences will certainly be disastrous. It is indeed a Catch 22 situation for both the Centre and the Assam Government.