Srikanth Kondapalli, a Research Fellow at the IDSA has been studying China's armed forces, military and defence posture and national security related issues for many years. Reviewing the state of China's armed forces in the past year, Kondapalli took the participants through a whirlwind of data gathered over the years, his assessment and the implications for India. His presentation was informative and articulate. The Rapporteur will refer to the draft paper wherever need be.

Kondapalli looked into the major dynamics of the Chinese armed forces (PLA) in 2003, by analyzing "the status of strategic thinking of the civilian and military leadership, reform of force structures, military equipment plans, and related issues in a broad outline."

Sources

It was noted at the outset that certain caveats hinder the absolute efficacy of his assessments owing to the non committal nature of some of the sources he has used for referral:

• Pentagon Annual Reports proved helpful but cannot be taken at face value as it is aimed more at the 'containment' of China.

• The official and semi official sources that come from within China also need to be treated with caution because often the Chinese deliberately release information that they want others to believe.

The international Strategic environment as assessed by China in 2003

• The year 2003 can be assessed as another new beginning for the PLA. China sees the current strategic environment posing challenges as well as opportunities for its rise. It therefore emphasised on "gaining strategic initiatives in dealing with major powers, neighbouring countries and developing countries."

• The US War on Iraq, North Korea, Taiwan, Japan, India and efforts to counter terrorism were the major issues that received focus. While Sino-US relations in 2003 began with a sour note due to Chinese dislike of US unilateralism (Iraq War), late 2003 saw tables turn in favour of China, especially on Taiwan, owing to the significance of China's mediatory role in the Korean peninsula. In the Asian front, China sought to discourage efforts at formation of an "Asian NATO" which it saw as directed against it.

• Towards India there are two views: the civilian establishment advocates "good neighbourliness" while "the Chinese military analysts paint a somewhat alarming picture." "They have noted the continuing military modernisation programme of the Indian armed forces" and noticed India's "rise", however "suitable accommodative responses are yet to emanate from Beijing."

The PLA in 2003

• The 'new security concept' traced to July 2002 and the 16th Party Congress of November 2002's emphasis on working for "strategic opportunities for the next two decades", guided the strategic thinking of the PLA in 2003.

• The PLA is increasingly moving towards "intensifying mechanization and Information Technology applications in its modernisation drive and restructuring the organizational as well as training methods for preparing and fighting for future warfare needs."

• China's military strategy and modernisation efforts are motivated by the PLA's desire to "fight local wars under high tech conditions." Such is, however, "limited in the short term" due to limited human resources, technology, budget and external constraints.

• To a large extent, the Iraq War's effectiveness reinforced the PLA's belief in RMA warfare. It was in fact propagated at a session of the CCP Politburo in late May 2003 to "promote RMA with Chinese characteristics."

• China "issued a clarion call" for "transit from mechanization to informationisation of the armed forces", which however, Srikanth opines, proved too demanding, as the year progressed.

• 2003 saw the launching of manned space flight Shenzhou 5 in October, and positioning of Beidou series of satellites over West Asia. The one major setback was accident of No. 361 Ming-class submarine.

• "Initiating multilateralism in military field, the PLA conducted joint operations with Russia-Central Asian Republics, Pakistan and India.

• China also issued a White paper on non-proliferation in an effort to project an image of "a responsible power".

• There was an increase of 9.6 percent in the defense budget in 2003.

The Military Regions in 2003

• Force restructuring is a part of the modernisation process. The ground forces were reorganized in the form of demobilizations, reductions in Military Regions, Group Army structures and by raising crack troops. These were replenished with modern equipment like tanks, armored personnel carriers, self propelled artillery, and missiles. "The mechanization levels of Beijing, Shenyang and Jinan Military Regions are higher comparatively."

• In Chengdu and Lhanzhou MRs, a lot of infrastructural developments are taking place. Out of the four highways in Tibet, the Qinghai-Tibet route has replaced the Karakoram highway in significance for India. There have been 11 military exercises and even missile tests in the Chengdu MR.

• In the Eastern seaboard, Taiwan, South China Sea and North Korea have received focus. The military exercises in Guangzhou MR (focus on South China Sea instead of earlier focus on Taiwan) have intensified.

Power Projection

• "The air force (PLAAF) and the navy (PLAN) were singled out for greater defence outlays for modernisation."

• Developments in strategic force modernisation programme "include miniaturization of nuclear weapons, solid fuel propellant ballistic missiles and MIRV capabilities."

• "China is also believed to be developing its own BMD system...and global surface monitoring net." "The 2003 Defence budget increase is expected to further enhance allocations to new missiles like the DF-31A and MIRV programmes."

• "China is planning to launch 30 satellites during the 2001-2005 period covering 15 different categories including communications, positioning, meteorology, and earth resources observation and space exploration, unmanned and manned spacecraft-the Shenzhou series."

• Citing Shen Dingli, Srikanth notes that the launch of Shenzhou 5 shows "that China has the capability to breakthrough the missile defence system."

• Development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, micro satellites and efforts in acquiring of HS-702 satellites (which can eavesdrop on about 20 Asian countries), are expected to further enhance Chinese reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities crucial for RMA warfare.

Srikanth concluded by saying that the present leadership appears to be following Deng's strategy of "biding time", which "sets its sights for the next two decades." The new emphasis on counter terrorism operations by China and its possible branding of the Tibetan Youth Congress, (an organisation based in India, which calls for total independence from China and uses public demonstrations and hunger strikes as its method of voicing dissent), Srikanth opines, could have policy implications for India.

Discussion

• With the growing availability of information on the PLA, it is time to separate study of armed forces from study of national security.

• It is also important to understand the politico-military-strategic aspect of the command structure of the armed forces. Who and what motivates the fighting spirit of the PLA despite the fall of the Communist system? The core leadership needs to be studied for this and replicated by Indian armed forces.

• Though the Communist system has collapsed in China, it is still authoritarian, which plays a major motivating role.

• Analysis of the strategic thought which led to the build up of Chinese armed forces is important.

• There should be a more focus study of PLA's power projection capability.

• China's emphasis on RMA, navy and air force reflects the shift from defensive to offensive strategy; the desire to make a "quick entry and exit", without major power intervention - a limited war strategy.

• The modernisation of PLAAF is entirely aimed at countering Taiwan's air superiority. That is why China is opposed to deployment of TMDs in the region.