Any new leadership that comes to power prefers to leave behind a legacy of its own while introducing changes. Does Hu harbour such desires? He had acquired the two top leadership posts, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and President of the Republic, in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Jiang Zemin however retained the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which barred Hu from taking complete control. Will the present change in leadership in China mark a clear break from Jiang's legacy or would things remain the same? Jiang managed to pull China out of its isolation and conservatism China had withdrawn into after the Democracy Protests with his "Three Represents" thought that catered to both the conservatives and the reformers. Hu Jintao, likewise has propagated reform and enhancing internal supervision of the party as his agenda while at the same time maintaining that western form of democracy is a "blind alley" to be abhorred.

China has displayed an uncanny ability to hold to its past and introduce new changes. Deng did it, so did Jiang. Hu's conservative credentials were displayed when he was party chief in Tibet, and imposed martial law in March 1989, three months before the Tiananmen crackdown in Beijing. Hu moved up the party hierarchy due to his conservative leanings, since China was wary of the West in the 1990's and its brand of democracy. After the Belgrade bombing of the Chinese embassy, Hu is said to have been the first Chinese official to condemn the US in a televised speech.

After he came to power, Hu emphasized China's 'independent foreign policy of peace', which is reminiscent of Hu Yaobang's similar policy framed to oppose US and Soviet hegemony. In the present scenario, it could be directed against the US, given China's posture in the Iraq war, calling for a larger UN role, preference for a multipolar world, and opposing US sanctions on Sudan. On the 50th anniversary of the founding of the National People's Congress of China (15 September 2004), Hu reminisced about the "invasion by western powers" and oppression by "imperialism". This suggests that China might be headed towards a more antagonistic relationship with the US under Hu's leadership. Jiang is known for improving China's relations with the United States. Hu has shown more interest in developing relations with Europe, Asia, the African nations and Russia. As Vice President, Hu has traveled to Russia and Western Europe in 2001.

Nevertheless, China has also acquiesced to the US, by remaining absent when voting on Iraq war and sanctions on Sudan took place in the UN Security Council. During the third International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) in Beijing, China emphasised "regional security and multilateral cooperation...political party building and national development". Though China identifies itself with the developing countries, and a policy of "good neighbourliness", it has not done much to extract their goodwill, thereby, acquiring for itself the title of a "status quo power". Therefore, mixed signals are emerging from China regarding its foreign policy priorities.

China is increasingly moving towards a functional relationship with countries with which it has territorial problems. At the same time, Hu's latest pronouncements ("Hu says China can crush Taiwan independence" on 23 August 2004, Daily Times) suggests that China will maintain a tough posture on issues concerning its sovereignty. This provides an element of continuity from the past as China equates territorial integrity with sovereignty. Hu cannot be expected to act any differently here, despite his commitment to domestic economic development, controlling the overheated economy, alleviation of poverty, social security, achieving "all round affluent society" and the much touted "peaceful rise" or hepin queqi. In fact, the latter has been criticised as more of a tactical move to gain leverage by projecting China as being peaceful and tough at the same time.

Domestically, Hu must tread with caution by restraining unbridled political reform (for which he has shown interest), keeping in mind the fate of earlier reformers like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang; it was his past conservative credentials that enabled him to move up the party hierarchy. The presence of Jiang's associates in the Politburo Standing Committee might present hurdles in Hu's exercise of absolute authority, but he can establish his paramount leadership by appeasing the conservatives while satisfying the reformers simultaneously.

China's projection to the outside world will be judged by its handling of the Taiwan issue that would reveal where China is headed - towards a peaceful world environment or an assertive rising power. The world would do good to understand that the moment Hu begins appeasing the conservatives unnecessarily, it will be an "assertive China" that will have to be dealt with.