Andrew Scobell categorized his presentation into:

The 'Use of Force'

War does not necessarily have to be "formally declared" or involve combat to qualify as 'use of force'. The testing of missiles, holding military exercises, or constructing of military facilities are also a use/demonstration/show of force. The case of the South China Seas and the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-1996 can qualify as examples.

4 lessons China learnt

• Drawing upon the Chinese Communist movement, and the Korean War victory over the US, China learnt that even a weak and poorly armed "fledgling" state can prevail over a strong and powerful adversary through struggle. Though economically and militarily successful, China today sees itself as "relatively" inferior to the United States and thus feels the need for preparation or to "be up against" the United States.

• The use of military force, though considered as a last resort, is completely acceptable to the Chinese as one of the options. Confucianist emphasis on harmony over conflict attributed to China is misinterpreted as a "pacifist strategic culture". However, through deeper reading, one will learn that Confucianism is "not completely opposed to use of force". Another cultural tradition that would disprove China's pacificism has been identified by Ian Johnson as 'parabellum' which is hard real politik. Another important philosophy in China is 'legalism', which advocates punishment and harsh dealing with adversaries. Ian Johnson's 'parabellum' can thus be seen as an extension of the real politik strand of 'legalism', though "surprisingly", Johnson does not talk about it.

• China believes that the 'use of force' has had a 100 percent success rate since 1949 and therefore does not regret its decision to use force in the past. It believes so on the premise that non-action on its part could only have worsened things. The lack of debate within China on past actions, the unwillingness to consider the failure of the State and the belief that China had to act, suggests that China might be more willing to use force in future.

• The decision to use force must not be taken lightly as an operational goal alone but seen as a strategic goal, arrived at only after careful analysis of the strategic environment and the overall situation. For example, in the case of Vietnam it was done to send a message and teach a lesson. The use of force is to be kept limited, contained and the potential for escalation controlled; thus the overall goals are to be kept limited. This reflects a cold, calculated and deliberate use of force.

2 lessons China has not learnt

• While China does not take the use of force lightly, it displays the propensity and willingness to take risk by using force based on the "dangerous" assumption and confidence that the conflicts will remain limited and not escalate, and that they can control it. It's presumption that its adversaries will understand its "clear signals", and recognise its limited aims and goals, could in turn lead to an accidental escalation. Some of the conflicts that could have escalated are the 1969 Ussuri border conflict with the Soviet Union, the 1979 Vietnam war and the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis. There is thus ample room for uncertainty and error.

• The Chinese believe that they adhere to rational policies and actions which they assume are unambiguous and which all countries can see and understand. Chinese proclamation to use force only in self defense can be termed as "covert defense" because they advocate "active defense" which could also include 'preemptive strike' that is equivalent to an attack. This is not mere propaganda but something they actually believe. Therefore, the inability to understand how other countries perceive China or how the other countries may not always understand the limited nature of China's use of force eludes them.

2 Observations from Andrew Scobell

• Despite the lack of women officials, the Chinese military profession is no different from its counterparts in other countries. Voicing harsh words like "we'll crush the Taiwanese" by the military leaders are part of appeasing their political superiors and also a show of nationalism. Otherwise, they are no war mongers or "itching to go to war with Taiwan"; they can be best described as 'hawkish', ready to act on command of their political superiors.

• China's 'paramount leader' has been the key decision maker in China's use of force, be it Mao on the Korean War or Deng on the Vietnam War. Even during use of force internally, paramount leaders played the most important role. Deng Xiaoping for example, was the key decision maker during the Tiananmen incident, and while Deng was ill, Jiang was in charge of the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis. Therefore there have been three paramount leaders. Today, Hu Jintao might be called the fourth paramount leader, however with an incomplete transition as Jiang Zemin is still the CMC Chairman. Though he does not hold any other position in the party or the state. There has been some indication from the military for a change of this ambiguous and "too power centric" situation, which however, might take a few years to clear. This incomplete transition poses problem for China's position whether to use force or not, thus triggering a crisis situation.

Questions and Comments

• Is there a cultural dimension to their thinking which believes that weak can win over the strong? Is the inability to perceive its adversaries' views a result of lack of internal debate?

• The weak, in seeking to overcome the strong has become the strong itself. China today is aware of its 'comprehensive power' and its goal of 'catching up' which has changed the rules of the game entirely. Has China reached a point where it will no longer use force from a point of weakness?

• What would China do to restrain or limit its use of force?

• Many scholars within China today prefer to posit China as a responsible power and its 'peaceful rise' as non-belligerent and without threat and assume China would use force only in a limited context when its sovereignty is at stake. Once the Taiwan issue is solved, they will turn to the South China seas and then after that, to India. In this context do you see a change in the old concept of using force only after cold calculation?

• China's military modernisation took place after the Vietnam war. In your definition of all wars fought by China as 100 percent success, how do you think the war was discussed in China?

• Aren't the adversaries that China encounters while using force, of a varied nature? Your perception of China was that of a weak one. Today, it is behaving more like a great power. What makes it uniquely Chinese?

• The existence of asymmetry has been a fact. Even if we grant that China achieved success earlier despite being weak, the paradigm has shifted today where it is not "sanguine" enough to use force. The country is in a state of "hesitancy" trying to leverage its comprehensive power while grappling with issues. It's "disputed periphery" will remain so. The use of force as an option would emerge only in 10 years.

• The presentation had very general overtones. A comparative study of China with one or more countries would probably bring out the uniqueness of the lessons learnt by China in its use of force. Otherwise the study will be an exercise of anthropological exploration.

Selected Responses

• China does not have independent and autonomous think tanks like in India or US, and therefore, their debates are confined within official think tanks. Sun Tzu's emphasis on asymmetrical warfare has shaped China's strategic thinking in cultural terms.

• No state has said that the use of force is unacceptable. China's adherence to this line is the reflection of its brand of realism. It has clearly conveyed the message that it is willing to use force.

• Deng knew the poor state of the PLA and thus used the Vietnam war to drive home the point for the need for reform.

• Though China is not using its 'peaceful rise' in a senile way, its past legacy and baggage cannot be completely shaken off. Aware of the internal as well as external threats, the mature and confident China of today, still suffers from insecurity.

• On the issue of Taiwan and China's sovereignty, China perceives itself in a situation where it cannot but use force. Though it is troublesome, it is still Chinese.

• For China, the West is the other, the polar opposite, from whose actions it tends to draw the implications for itself. Therefore, even though the Chinese might be thinking in new ways, they are still influenced by traditional thinking.

The seminar ended with the agreement on the need for understanding China's strategic thinking and its mode of communicating its thinking in a new era of nuclear deterrence. Above all, the most important thing would be to decipher who wields the decision making power to command use of force in China? The question is about - who has the ultimate say?