The capture and release of three Indians after 42 days in captivity has highlighted the serious issue of hostage-taking in Iraq. Interestingly, 'hostage-taking' is a new trend there, though not new to the Middle East. It was wide-spread during the Lebanese civil war and extensively followed by the Palestinian groups in their resistance against Israeli forces. Iranian hostage crisis involving nearly 70 American hostages for 444 days is still fresh in mind.

In Iraq, it all started with personal kidnappings in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 and the subsequent breakdown of law and order. A "new economy" emerged in the form of hostage-taking as the suddenly dismantled Iraqi Army had nowhere to go for their bread and butter. Some of the unemployed youth, very large in numbers, also found this tactic conducive to keep them gainfully employed. Hostage-taking was later picked-up by Iraqi resistance forces as yet another tool in their arsenal, along with suicide bombing, ambushes and urban terrorism. It was preferable because it was more traumatic and enduring than any other terrorist tactic. According to Bruce Hoffman hostage-taking is "effective because it's a prolonged drama, unlike a terrorist event which is over after the bomb explodes or the bullet is fired and the bodies are taken away and the shattered glass is swept up and the buildings repaired. A hostage story takes on a life of its own. It's the apotheosis of terrorist theater."

There are three categories of groups which are involved in hostage-taking in Iraq. To name a few: 'Lions of Allah', 'Black Banners', 'Ansar al-Sunna', 'Islamic Response', 'Green Brigade', 'Islamic Army', ' Mujahedeen Squadrons', ' Khalid bin al-Walid Bridage', Death Squad of Mujahedeen of Iraq, and so on. In the first category, there are groups that represent purely nationalistic sentiments; their objective is to get the coalition forces out of the country. By influencing the world public opinion, they wish to continuously reiterate that foreign involvement in Iraq has only created disorder rather than order. Secondly, there are groups with strong religious over-tones influenced by al-Qaeda; they have wider anti-US anti-West agenda and their motive is to create a "climate of fear" in those who are conniving with the coalition forces. Third category consists of purely criminal gangs that fish in troubled waters and use the messy situation for financial rewards. They sell the hostages to a bigger gang of bandits or to the first two categories. Their only aim is to fleece as much money as possible. The opportunistic nexus between these three categories of groups has created a "circle of hostage-taking" placing in jeopardy not only those who are involved in restoring normalcy, but also those responsible for reconstruction of the ravaged nation.

Many of the international hostages are kidnapped while driving to Baghdad from Jordan, through the so-called "Sunni triangle". Majority of those kidnapped so far do not have anything to do with US policy in Iraq. Even people from Muslim countries are not spared. Ironically, more Iraqi's are taken hostage than foreigners. Before hostages are killed, they are usually dressed in orange jumpsuits resembling US prisoners in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. As of end August 2004, there were 10 foreign hostages killed; 61 freed by negotiations or otherwise; two missing; two escaped; and 10 still under captivity. The corresponding figures for local Iraqi hostages are not available. Interestingly, most of those foreign hostages freed are through 'professional' mediators, who are mostly tribal chiefs.

Since there is no coordinated approach among countries involved in Iraq on hostage issue, the crisis continues. Differences persist over whether to negotiate or to launch a rescue operation; in case of negotiations, whether to meet the demands of the hostage-takers partly or fully; in case of rescue operation, on the type of operation to be conducted. Policy differences depend upon the pressure from public opinion within the particular country to which the hostage belongs and the kind of leadership that could resist. Some countries give in to the demands of the captors thus encouraging the phenomena. The Philippines case is a good example to cite. The US policy is never to give in to the demands of the kidnappers; but it has maintained flexibility on the issue in the past. Coming to India, its policy perceptions on hostage-taking are characterized by adhocism, ambiguity and inconsistence evident by its past handling of hostage crises. The present release can be attributed to KGL, the employers of the hostages, meeting the demands of the hostage-takers rather than any systematic approach by the Indian Government.