Wajahat Habibullah, “The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict: Opportunities for Economic Peace Building and for US Policy,” USIP Special Report 121, June 2004.

The report falls into five headings – a short history of the Kashmir conflict, Kashmir as an obstacle in Indo-Pak relations, economic dimensions of the Kashmir conflict, economic opportunities for peace building in Kashmir, role of regional development and international financial institutions and, finally, a role for the United States.

In the first part, he tracks those causes that gave birth for violence in the 1990s. He needs to be congratulated for tracing these reasons objectively: Throughout the 1980s, as the Kashmiri people suffered from a stagnant economy and high unemployment, their government was scarred by corruption, riddled with nepotism and prone to blunders. After a series of missteps by the state and central leadership culminated in what appeared to be a rigged election, the Kashmiris’ anger boiled over. Violence increasingly marked the expression of their political demands. Finally in 1990, a revolt broke out.

In tracking the causes of ‘revolt’, the absence of Pakistan as a factor is noteworthy. Was the political unrest that India witnessed towards the end of 1980s due to our inefficiency, poor administration and bad governance? Or was it due to Pakistan’s decision to initiate an insurgency? Many in India believe Pakistan as the main factor for the growth of insurgency and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. This conviction has made us err in Kashmir on two fronts. First, we think that the problem in Jammu and Kashmir is one of terrorism aided by Pakistan; once the latter stops cross border terrorism, Kashmir will return to normalcy. Second, we ignore the reality that there are serious issues between Kashmir and rest of India in providing better governance, improving centre-state relations and devolving adequate autonomy to J&K. Even if the first issue is resolved, the second will continue. On the other hand, if India could address the second issue, the first would automatically disappear. Jammu and Kashmir is not a problem of terrorism, but of failure in governance.

Is Habibullah right in calling what happened in 1990 a ‘revolt?’ If it was indeed a revolt, was it political or military or both? The 1987 elections (Habibullah need not be apologetic) did not “appear to be rigged,” but were in fact rigged. Accepting this lacuna would reflect our maturity as a nation. The Valley boiled over and the JKLF only encashed the popular sentiments. No doubt, it was a political revolt, but it was soon hijacked by militant elements, initially led by the JKLF and, later, by the Hizbul Mujahideen. While India responded by deploying security forces, it failed to address the ‘political’ aspects. Once the ‘political’ aspect is addressed the ‘militant’ would have no space.

Ironically, we failed to learn from what happened in Kashmir in the late 1980s and history is being repeated in Manipur today. There is a serious political revolt in Manipur, by the Manipuris representing various sections and the underground movement is attempting to hijack this political movement. Would better sense prevail to address the ‘political’ aspects in Manipur, so as to undermine the ‘militant’?

It is ironic that the Kashmiris who revolted in 1990 were also the first to denounce terrorism. Understanding the sentiments of the people and the real intentions of Pakistan, the JKLF came over ground. What happened after, Habibullah writes: The insurgency quickly dissipated into a struggle for domination among different insurgent groups, and what had begun as an ethnic conflict was given a religious colour by the ISI which promoted religiously oriented outfits.

The formation of the Hurriyat was a clear indication of the failure of militant groups and Pakistan to browbeat India by inciting an insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Clearly, by 1993, as Habibullah has noted, the revolt started ‘flagging’. Which is why the rebel groups proceeded with the encouragement of Pakistan’s ISI, to bring in terrorists which had been engaged in Afghanistan to bolster the cause.

It was unfortunate that India then and even now failed to exploit this political space. The state refused to speak to the separatists. The results are clear. Habibullah states: (the) grievances (of people of Kashmir) continued to fester. The attitudes of the local population towards the imported terrorists (nicknamed “guest militants”) varied from resignation to tacit support to outright support. The human rights abuses committed by the Indian security forces sent to suppress the insurgency only increased local sympathy for the infiltrators. What had begun as a revolt increasingly lost that character, metamorphosing into a low-intensity war between India and Pakistan. And the Kashmiris found themselves alienated from the Indian state.