The Current Environment

The political situation remains murky. The King compares his role to a stand-by generator; required in an emergency and which will switch off the moment electricity returns. But, there is no real chance of an early return of democracy. Politicians have lost credibility; the political parties continue to squabble and are unable to shed their petty differences to come together in national interest. In the early period of counter-insurgency resolute political leadership is necessary. Yet, continued power with the King is powerful ammunition to Maoist propaganda and undermines the counter-insurgency strategy, which is after all only partly military.

India would like to see an early return of multi-party democracy and a monarchy restricted to its constitutional role. The essence is in the timing. It appears that India would prefer an earlier return of parliamentary democracy than other supporting governments recommend. Nobody is aware of the King’s timetable. It is in this context that the political strategy to counter militancy is formed.

India’s policy towards Nepal is currently on track absolutely and reflects the matured stand it has taken in relations with its neighbours in recent years. It has promptly responded to the request to supply Nepal with necessary battle tested military equipment ideally suited for local conditions. This is a response that other countries cannot hope to match. Recent seizure of Maoist leadership in India and their handing over to Nepal has been much appreciated in the Kingdom. There needs to be sustained reciprocity in this matter.

The rise of communist insurgencies in Asia concerns Washington deeply and it is prepared to support Nepal with money and equipment. This should be welcomed if it comes after suitable consultation with India. External weapons in a region is always destabilising as recent devastations in Africa has demonstrated years after the Cold War. Sophisticated weapons with the Maoists and their possible spread to their counterparts in eastern India can have enormous implications. US troops in the region to counter insurgency is neither required nor necessary. It is neither troops nor the will that Nepal lacks, but economic and hardware support from appropriate quarters. US presence only creates uncertainty and is likely to yield greater hostility and provide ammunition to Maoist propaganda, undermining, in turn, the overall counter insurgency effort. 

The battle against Maoist insurgency will be long and tenuous and likely to last for some years. Though much may be wrong with governance in Nepal, it is no body’s case that Maoists provide the answer. In this day and age they represent an ideology and an option that has long gone and can only create trouble and misfortune to the entire region. This insurgency must then end. Indian states around Nepal are not among the better governed in the country. Particularly Bihar, eastern UP and north-west Bengal have high communist insurgent presence. Any meaningful link-up between them cannot but affect the entire region terribly. At the same time, it should be remembered that this insurgency, more than any other, will have to be fought as much with development, economic revival and effective governance as with military force. India’s support to counter this will be crucial and Nepal knows it. The real challenge is to ensure this without treading on each other’s sensitivities and through genuine and meaningful cooperation.