A panel discussion chaired by former member of the National Security Advisory Board and former chief of Air Staff, SK Mehra was held on 8 February 2003. The panelists were Mr PR Chari (Director IPCS), Admiral Raja Menon (policy analyst) and Dr WPS Sidhu (academician). The speakers discussed different aspects of the nuclear doctrine, the nuclear command authority and the formation of the strategic forces command. They highlighted the implications of these developments if they are implemented in its present form.

PR Chari

Giving an account of the features of the Nuclear Command Authority, the speaker highlighted the various grey areas that need to be addressed. 

• The chain of command: There would be a Political Council headed by the Prime Minister, the composition of this would probably be the same as the Cabinet Committee on Security. To execute the decisions of the Political Council there would be an Executive Council under the National Security Advisor. The Commander in Chief of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) will control, manage and administer the nuclear forces. In the present dispensation it is unclear if the SFC would function under the Chiefs of Staff or the Executive Council.

• Though various features of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine published in 1999 have been retained, No First Use has been redefined by holding that it would not apply if CBWs (Chemical/Biological weapons) are used by the adversary. This seems highly unlikely in the South Asian setting.

• No First Use of nuclear weapons is beset with problems about how India would respond if it was attacked with CBWs by a Non State Actor, given the volatile situation in South Asia.

• Moratorium on Nuclear tests has not addressed tests in laboratories.

• While there is need to have some level of transparency about command and control, some remanant of ambiguity could strengthen deterrence. The non-identification of the chain of political and military succession brings out the issue of its positive/negative impact on nuclear deterrence in South Asia.

• A pivotal role has been accorded to the National Security Advisor (NSA), who heads the Executive Council (EC) and would function as a conduit between the political and military wings of the NCA and also function as the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. He remains busy tackling both domestic and international crises. Additionally he travels a lot.

• Other options also need to be explored. The Kargil Review Committee called for a full time National Security Advisor, and grooming a second line of leadership, which as anathema for New Delhi’s bureaucracy, driven by personality factors.

• An important question that remains unclear is who will exercise military control over the Strategic Forces during peacetime – Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee /SFC or some other committee. The Strategic Forces Command will perforce have to be a tri-Service command. The real problem is that the Nuclear arsenal might be weaponized, but not deployed thereby reflecting a de-mated status. Nuclear weapons assemblies are with the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), the weapon cores are with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and delivery systems are with the Services.

• How these dispersed assets would be brought together and the system worked in a wartime situation when communications could get affected and quick decision-making is needed, has not been clarified. The issue of how the SFC would integrate the nuclear weapons with the delivery vehicles during a conflict situation remains unanswered, but greater transparency would have implications for the stability of Indo-Pakistan ties. 

• The establishment of the NCA/SFC will directly impact on Indo-US relations as it indicates another step towards the deployment of nuclear weapons. The US perceives deployment as a sign of India’s defiance of its carefully crafted global approach to inhibit the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). 

Rear Admiral Raja Menon

Assessing the implications of the announcement, he called for measures to smoothen the functioning of the Nuclear Forces Command.  

• The Political Council, Executive Council do not conform to a command structure hence it raises doubts about its efficacy during a nuclear attack.

• The Civil bureaucratic structure has diffused accountability, and does not reveal who is accountable to whom, or what would be the line of succession if a decapitating strike succeeds.

• The Command Authority must be transparent, and the chain of command for the use of nuclear weapons should be made transparent. An increased level of transparency strengthens credibility and has implications for stability in South Asia.

• India should streamline its NCA to deter the adversary and convey a message of preparedness. There are far too many committees. In a crisis situation, when quick decision-making would be the need of the hour, such a committee structure will only waste time.

• The National Security Advisor should be an advisor to the Prime Minister, but the CDS should be next to him in the chain of command. The Executive Council is only there to emasculate the CDS and usurp his powers.

• Nuclear weapons have a certain dynamics to their development due to their inexorable trajectory of technology.

WPS Sidhu

While calling for greater transparency, he was of the view that the present developments augur well and indicate steps towards the institutionalization of a Nuclear command. This increases credibility.

• Talking of checks and balances, Dr. Sidhu said divided control over the nuclear arsenal is a necessary precondition to deter any group or individual from having total control over the launching of Nuclear weapons.

• No First Use is a step in the right direction particularly when the adversary is skeptical about our policies, suggesting a dealert of forces. It also conveys a message that concerns regarding First Use can be verified.  This arrangement would help in increasing the response time.

• Joint Services Command over nuclear weapons requires an incredible leap of faith and ignores the reality of inter services rivalry.

• One can play with numbers regarding credible minimum deterrence. Who will determine what should constitute minimum deterrence remains unresolved between the scientific and strategic community, while no requirement seems to have been forwarded by the armed forces.

• There have to be clear ‘red-lines’ or thresholds to launch a nuclear strike or retaliate or to cross the LoC. There was no response, except to deploy the troops after the attack on the Indian parliament. There has to be a clear message regarding an assured response or retaliatory strike, which needs to be provided for.

• The threat of use of CBWs will generate an ambiguous situation if there is an outbreak of disease like plague. Should India respond with a nuclear strike? If it does not, then what would be the implications for its credibility as a nuclear power? There are additional questions on verifiability of a suspicious outbreak of disease.   

Discussion

The presentations were followed by a discussion, which focused on the following issues.

• In the Indian case deterrence requires guesswork that primarily relates to the scientific community. There has to be some correlation between the nuclear weapons and the official doctrine.

• The benefits of No First Use outweigh its drawbacks; yet it is fraught with dangers as Pakistan does not adhere by it, and the use of CBWs is not easy to detect.

• The concepts of NSA & SFC are based on western models, which should take the South Asian situation into account. The inputs of the National Security Advisory Board are negligible and its utility as an institution has diminished. It can be done away with.

• There were arguments about the role of Inter services rivalry in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some participants argued that Inter services rivalry is not as big a factor as it is being made out. An increased level of transparency increases the credibility of our deterrent and should deliver a psychological message to the adversary.

• When deconstructed the GOI mantra of ‘Credible minimum deterrence’ raises three pertinent points – credibility raises the issue of transparency versus ambiguity and the question of survivability; minimum is a function of numbers-minimum against China might exceed the maximum for Pakistan, since deterrence is a psychological game. The requirement of a triad is a maximalist response in this situation and will be viewed as such in the neighbourhood.

• A limited war under the nuclear shadow should be confined to limited objectives. Limited war cannot remain limited as it carries the seeds of escalation. A losing side will always want to use all the weapons at its disposal. As a concept this doctrine has been discarded in the west but has found adherents in India.

• Security in the present context is being discussed from the state-centric viewpoint. In this perspective Human Security has been relegated to the background and internal security not given any significance. It does not take into account the emergence of non-state actors. Nuclear deterrence is futile against terrorists and religious extremists.

• The issue of nuclear stockpile numbers remains problematical, as it is dependent on the strategic calculations of the adversary. What deters is a state of mind. India needs to formulate a policy, whilst its adversarial state is run by an autocratic, risk-taking, adventurist regime.

• Non-proliferation is now a lost cause, as no nuclear capable state will forgo nuclear weapons. Additionally, nuclear weapons will continue to play a central role in the security architecture of states like Pakistan. 

• Smaller nuclear forces require less complex command and control arrangements.

• India has been regarded as a responsible and trustworthy country in regard to handling its nuclear arsenal, especially in the post Kargil phase.