The Kerry-Lugar Bill
05 Nov, 2009 · 2998
Priyanka Subramaniam analyses the debates surrounding the Kerry-Lugar Bill
The ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009,’ more commonly called the Kerry-Lugar Bill, named after the two American Senators – John Kerry, a Democrat, and Dick Lugar, a Republican, who crafted the final version, was passed unanimously by the United States Congress on 24 September and signed by President Obama on 15 October.
This bill provides Pakistan with a non-military aid package of US$1.5 billion annually, for the next five years with an option to extend aid for another five years. This measure is neither extraordinary nor unfamiliar. From 1953 until 1961, nearly US$2 billion were directed to Pakistan when the country allied itself with the West, against the former Soviet Union. In 1981, a five-year US$3.2 billion package was given to Pakistan to allow it to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and for five years after 2002, about US$10 billion were given to Pakistan under General Musharaff, while the US fought its war against the al Qaeda and Taliban.
The bill sparked off a controversy in the upper echelons of the Pakistani government. The News described it thus: “Army, people, parliament on one side, president on the other.” While President Zardari may see the Bill as a ‘victory for democracy,’ opponents have taken exception to the strings that come attached. The Bill will essentially establish civilian authority over the military by preventing the Army from interfering in political and judicial processes. The Army will also have to ensure that militant groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are not given support on Pakistani territory. The opposition to the bill stems from a fear of ‘micro-management’ by the US.
Official American reports say that an expansion of the American ‘security presence’ is necessary to monitor expenditure, providing some justification for fears regarding the impingement of sovereignty. The US Embassy has publicized plans for a new building in Islamabad for about 1,000 people, with security for some diplomats, provided by a Washington-based private contracting company, DynCorp.
Writing for the Washington Post, David Ignatius sees the Pakistani military’s manipulation as being reflected in the ‘popular anger’ in Islamabad and suggests that the military should have better sense than to ‘ toss a match in the dry tinder of the US-Pakistani relationship.’ Another reason for the fallout, according to Ignatius, is ‘Pakistani political immaturity’.
The dictatorial language of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Howard Berman, has also set Pakistani teeth on edge. For instance, the Bill declares that aid would be revoked unless Pakistan ‘demonstrate[s] a sustained commitment’ against terrorism. Pakistani political analyst Hasan-Askari Rizvi said that the language in the legislation could have been “more diplomatic and softer.”
Berman, who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee has said that even though ‘billions have gone down a rat hole in the past’ in Pakistan, he had no intention to ‘micromanage’ Pakistan’s spending of the money and apparently it took a ‘massive demonstration of self-restraint,’ for Congress to impose ‘no earmarks’ on the bill, but ‘only accountability to make sure it’s getting to the Pakistani people.’
Lugar and Kerry have also tried to assuage some of the concerns regarding the bill. Kerry’s office for instance, has released statements to counter the impression of the innocuous nature of the bill. The supposed ‘myth’ that the bill impinges on Pakistani sovereignty is countered with – “FACT: Nothing in the bill threatens Pakistani sovereignty. Period.” The expansion of the embassy in Islamabad is a ‘logical step’ and requires to be understood through ‘common sense’ as the embassy is going to take up an ‘enormous responsibility’ in monitoring the spending of billions of dollars .
In another press report, summarizing the bill, Kerry says that in the past the US has sent ambiguous messages to Pakistan as assistance to it fluctuated with political events, resulting in the belief among Pakistanis that the United States would ‘cut and run’ when its purpose had been served. This belief challenges the US’ ‘long-term efforts to defeat extremists, foster democratic change, and support transparent and accountable institutions that promote security and stability in Pakistan.’ The Kerry-Lugar bill therefore, aims to dispel this belief and deepen relations between the two countries.
The Zardari government is keen to show its unwavering support for the bill. The State is in dire need of the money and the military compliance conditions will establish some measure of civilian superiority over the military which is a constant, even if subtle threat to political longevity. The protection of national sovereignty and independence depends entirely on the Pakistani government. In spite of the escalation of terrorist activity within the country, evidenced by the sharp rise in bombings in the last month, the government has shown signs of being capable of dealing with core problems. Since assuming power in March 2008, it has resolved the then prevailing wheat crisis by importing stocks and raising farmland price of wheat. The trade gap has also been narrowed by 55 per cent as imports fell faster than exports. The government has taken steps to deal with the electricity and sugar crises and results are expected by early to mid 2010. Additionally, the army has made significant progress in dealing with the Taliban within Pakistan. Foreign aid is never free of strings. It remains to be seen how the Pakistani government can keep itself clear of knots.
This bill provides Pakistan with a non-military aid package of US$1.5 billion annually, for the next five years with an option to extend aid for another five years. This measure is neither extraordinary nor unfamiliar. From 1953 until 1961, nearly US$2 billion were directed to Pakistan when the country allied itself with the West, against the former Soviet Union. In 1981, a five-year US$3.2 billion package was given to Pakistan to allow it to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and for five years after 2002, about US$10 billion were given to Pakistan under General Musharaff, while the US fought its war against the al Qaeda and Taliban.
The bill sparked off a controversy in the upper echelons of the Pakistani government. The News described it thus: “Army, people, parliament on one side, president on the other.” While President Zardari may see the Bill as a ‘victory for democracy,’ opponents have taken exception to the strings that come attached. The Bill will essentially establish civilian authority over the military by preventing the Army from interfering in political and judicial processes. The Army will also have to ensure that militant groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are not given support on Pakistani territory. The opposition to the bill stems from a fear of ‘micro-management’ by the US.
Official American reports say that an expansion of the American ‘security presence’ is necessary to monitor expenditure, providing some justification for fears regarding the impingement of sovereignty. The US Embassy has publicized plans for a new building in Islamabad for about 1,000 people, with security for some diplomats, provided by a Washington-based private contracting company, DynCorp.
Writing for the Washington Post, David Ignatius sees the Pakistani military’s manipulation as being reflected in the ‘popular anger’ in Islamabad and suggests that the military should have better sense than to ‘ toss a match in the dry tinder of the US-Pakistani relationship.’ Another reason for the fallout, according to Ignatius, is ‘Pakistani political immaturity’.
The dictatorial language of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Howard Berman, has also set Pakistani teeth on edge. For instance, the Bill declares that aid would be revoked unless Pakistan ‘demonstrate[s] a sustained commitment’ against terrorism. Pakistani political analyst Hasan-Askari Rizvi said that the language in the legislation could have been “more diplomatic and softer.”
Berman, who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee has said that even though ‘billions have gone down a rat hole in the past’ in Pakistan, he had no intention to ‘micromanage’ Pakistan’s spending of the money and apparently it took a ‘massive demonstration of self-restraint,’ for Congress to impose ‘no earmarks’ on the bill, but ‘only accountability to make sure it’s getting to the Pakistani people.’
Lugar and Kerry have also tried to assuage some of the concerns regarding the bill. Kerry’s office for instance, has released statements to counter the impression of the innocuous nature of the bill. The supposed ‘myth’ that the bill impinges on Pakistani sovereignty is countered with – “FACT: Nothing in the bill threatens Pakistani sovereignty. Period.” The expansion of the embassy in Islamabad is a ‘logical step’ and requires to be understood through ‘common sense’ as the embassy is going to take up an ‘enormous responsibility’ in monitoring the spending of billions of dollars .
In another press report, summarizing the bill, Kerry says that in the past the US has sent ambiguous messages to Pakistan as assistance to it fluctuated with political events, resulting in the belief among Pakistanis that the United States would ‘cut and run’ when its purpose had been served. This belief challenges the US’ ‘long-term efforts to defeat extremists, foster democratic change, and support transparent and accountable institutions that promote security and stability in Pakistan.’ The Kerry-Lugar bill therefore, aims to dispel this belief and deepen relations between the two countries.
The Zardari government is keen to show its unwavering support for the bill. The State is in dire need of the money and the military compliance conditions will establish some measure of civilian superiority over the military which is a constant, even if subtle threat to political longevity. The protection of national sovereignty and independence depends entirely on the Pakistani government. In spite of the escalation of terrorist activity within the country, evidenced by the sharp rise in bombings in the last month, the government has shown signs of being capable of dealing with core problems. Since assuming power in March 2008, it has resolved the then prevailing wheat crisis by importing stocks and raising farmland price of wheat. The trade gap has also been narrowed by 55 per cent as imports fell faster than exports. The government has taken steps to deal with the electricity and sugar crises and results are expected by early to mid 2010. Additionally, the army has made significant progress in dealing with the Taliban within Pakistan. Foreign aid is never free of strings. It remains to be seen how the Pakistani government can keep itself clear of knots.
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