

IPCS Conference Report  
October 2010

## Long View from Delhi

### Defining India's Grand Strategy


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# THE LONG VIEW FROM DELHI

## DEFINING INDIA'S GRAND STRATEGY

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**Report of the IPCS Conference held on 11  
August 2010**

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### INTRODUCTION

**DIPANKAR BANERJEE, DIRECTOR,  
IPCS**

Till recently there was no concept of strategic thinking in India or the need for scenario based analyses of threats and challenges facing the country. There is a distinct shift and a greater awareness at present and hence studies from Raja Menon and Rajiv Kumar such as the '**The Long View from Delhi: Defining India's Grand Strategy**'. Moreover the project is supported by the MEA, reflecting greater awareness even in official circles in the Government of India.

In the increasingly globalized world of today, India's future will be shaped and affected by factors outside the nation. Policies that optimize our options will need to be formulated and therefore, India's security environment will have to be assessed through a network-centred analysis. India will not matter to the world or emerge globally if it remains constrained merely by thinking on China and Pakistan.

Today's discussion will be divided into two parts. Some aspects of the study will be presented by a small group of experts first and later three specific issues raised in the book will be discussed.

### I

**THE LONG VIEW FROM DELHI:  
DEFINING INDIA'S GRAND STRATEGY**

**REAR ADMIRAL RAJA MENON**

The title of the book, 'Long View from Delhi' has been taken from the classic on scenario writing which was written by Peter Schwartz, 'The Art of the Long View'. Scenario writing is one part of net assessment. Andrew Marshall sent a team in early 2000s to India from his office of Net Assessment. Net assessment was initially done by the US to assess the competition between the former USSR and the USA, and in that it was a stunning success. The office of Net Assessment said in the 1980s, when the power of the former USSR was at its peak, that USSR would collapse and that was frightening.

This book only deals with part 1 of the Net Assessment which is the scenarios. Part 2 would be to project India. Part 3 would interface scenarios with projections of India and make it into a total net assessment. Thus, there is a great deal of work that needs to be done in this area. That would mean writing a strategic trilogy.

This book recognizes that foreign policy is not always about countries but about issues. Issues that affect all countries are arms control, global warming, nuclear issues, water, space etc. The only issue that is looked at from only India's perspective is the demographic profile. It could be a demographic milestone or a demographic dividend. At this point, it is unclear, what way it would progress. It could manifest itself in many ways like finding 12 million jobs in a year, technical education for 200 million in the coming years. It is a gray area so it was impossible not to reflect on it. Experts have been consulted for each issue and their opinions have been turned into scenarios.

The need for countries to have grand strategies is necessitated because large countries have large interests. To prevent those interests from degenerating, they need support of friends and allies, in such a way that they can affect favorable choices in the capitals of other countries, which is essential for the survival of large countries. India's success story is based on its economic story that is the 9 per cent growth rate.

India might not be that important today but it will be in future, so it needs to have a grand strategy, so that it can influence decisions in other countries. One thing that is striking is that whether it is Myanmar, Central Asia or Iran, the way that scenarios shift in countries depend on how the hegemon turns out. How China ensures its energy supplies etc depends upon its power relations with the United States. These factors are scenarios defining issues and countries. On the basis of the way their predictability changes, macro scenarios have been created.

This book does not advise government on policy; that is the job of the government. Government consists of large bureaucracies. Policy cannot be addressed in a scenario, policies must emerge from 'a particular' scenario. Writing scenarios and writing net assessments is a very complex thing as it involves millions of things-society, religion, inequality, society, economics, religion, demographics etc. It is hard to write policies without having scenarios. The book does not advise the government, it merely presents it with various scenarios.

Net Assessment is important and an example of this is the Conference of US War College that was held before the Iraq invasion in 2003. A Gentleman from the US Office of Net Assessment said that everyone knows that Iraq is being ignored. He said that the Office of Net Assessment had said that it needed six months to let the US government know what the end state would be in Iraq but the government said that they did not have that much time and they invaded Iraq.

## RAJIV KUMAR

Net assessment is important for two reasons. First, it forces one to face facts and address them. Also, it helps to reduce the downside risks and the expected value of outcome becomes significantly larger. Second, it forces one to think laterally, and to cut through silos. One might be weak in each of those, but to become leaders, it is imperative to cut across silos. It is important to be aware of consequences in the other disciplines. For example in Pg 134 India and China's growth rates are compared. According to the scenario, in 2020, Indian GDP is one-third of China, in the best case scenario and in the worst case it is one-sixth of China. In 2050, in the worst case scenario, India is one-fourth of China and in the best case scenario China is just 1.27 times more than India.

The scenario is built to assess whether India's defense allocation should be increased or not. Scenario building also helps in understanding that what might look as a given might not be a given. Another example is the chapter on demographics called 'the failed rocket'. When the democratic dividend becomes a democratic nightmare, it becomes an internal security threat. There would be around 842 million working people in 2020 and around 962 million in 2050. There is a need to look and study these figures and the implications that flow from them e.g. Jobs, housing etc.

Another scenario states that India has neighbours like Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Muslim population in these countries, including the Muslims in India in 2050, would be around 1.3 billion, larger than the entire current population in the region. Would a country like India be able to handle that? From Iran to Myanmar, in 2050, there will be 2.88 billion people in the region, which is one-third of the population of the world. At that time, the East Asian populations will be much less; China, Korea and Japan would have stabilized. India must spend extraordinary time to plan developing this region.

Another example is the fact that every PM has tried to address the Pakistan issue but

has always failed. Pakistan's own agenda of keeping the region, far from stable, has however, succeeded wonderfully. The chapter on Pakistan states that Pakistan regressing would lead to a fragmented caliphate, which would not be a good situation for India. Unless a net assessment is done, it would be hard to assess the implications of an imploding Pakistan. There is a need to divert the attention from Rawalpindi to Lahore.

### **K SUBRAHMANYAM**

If India's demography rises as expected, it could either be a disaster or make India the most populous state in the world and the largest pluralistic secular democracy. What would the impact of that be? If India executes innovative policies, e.g. the right to education, then India by 2050 would become what a Tamil poet wrote, an "incomparable polity; unique in the world". At the same time, such a process won't occur without resistance.

Countries like the US, Canada, EU and Russia would support it. The opposing camp would be of the fundamentalists and those who believe that harmony is more important than pluralism. Fundamentalist and communists believe that harmony is more imp than pluralism. India has both of them in its neighbourhood; Muslims and China. If they also make their net assessments, they would see India rising in this way, they will do everything possible to stop that.

Would it be possible to invoke the forces that support us globally? The book has looked at that. The hegemon right now is the US and is being challenged by China. But are policies in place to deal with this? Is India in a position to develop policies that would influence this outcome?

The US has recognized that India is indispensable in shaping the world order. India needs to recognize this as well. India has the potential to be the largest knowledge pool if it educates its people, but this vision has to be there. This book is thus a step in the right direction and urges India to think strategically.

The rise of India is not causing concern in the rest of the world. Rest of the world rising is a concern but India rising is not a concern because, all other powers rose and then became democratic but in India's case, it became democratic as a poor country and then rose as a democracy and is now trying to sustain that democracy.

### **LALIT MAN SINGH**

The book acknowledges the short attention span of the policy makers in India. There is also an absence of strategic thinking in India. Responsibility is compartmentalized through the desk system. There are a few suggestions for the book. First suggestion is about the policy makers and second is about mechanisms.

#### **Policy Makers**

Policies are essentially made by the PM of the day. Nehru laid down the basic framework and it has been followed. Indira Gandhi, made relations with neighbors a priority, started the nuclear programme and made India a strong state. Rajiv Gandhi changed relations with China; Narasimha Rao undertook economic reforms and began the Look East Policy and normalized relations with Israel. Vajpayee championed the nuclear tests, worked on enhancing relations with Pakistan and the US. This book can be made more effective in the following ways.

It can be made simpler for the policy makers. For instance, instead of giving policy makers too many options, the most likely one should be identified. There is a disjoint between section 1, 2, 3 and section 4. Section 4 is too brief. It hints at a strategic thinking but it is too short. Maybe at the end of each chapter, alternatives should be given so that the desk officer, the most influential functionary, can make a better choice.

#### **Mechanism/structure**

63 yrs after independence India does not have a designated platform within the government where foreign policy options can be discussed in a structured manner.

Most major countries have foreign policy departments or think tanks in their foreign offices. MEA has a foreign policy division but it is dysfunctional. There are many high level committees in the Cabinet, which work on issues related to foreign policy. But these are meant for quick decisions and not for discussions on foreign policy. It would be helpful to have a three tiered structure to think on foreign policy. There should be a stronger structure of foreign policy planning, and it should be independent of the MEA. Lastly, A long view from Delhi should also be really a long view, a way forward for the government. There should also be annual updates, or quadrennial updates of the book.

## **DISCUSSION**

- The military in India has been consciously kept out of the decisions making. Whatever mechanism will be advised by net assessments, military should be an integral part of that.
- Education is very important but it should not just be about numbers. Most of our engineers are unemployable. Quality of education is equally important.
- The book needs an index. It is important to recognize that a hyper active foreign policy can be dangerous as well. Choices that are made can sometimes become self fulfilling prophecies. There is a greater need to focus on internal problems like corruption, Naxalism, private sector performance etc.

## **II**

### **INDIA'S GRAND STRATEGY: SHOULD IT BE AIMED AT THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO AFTER IT HAS EVOLVED?**

#### **REAR ADMIRAL RAJA MENON**

When the first Net Assessment was written by Rand, the scenario was presented by Hermann Kahn to the Pentagon. The Pentagon was very skeptical because of the non-military background of Kahn, and therefore out of curiosity asked him how many people were involved in writing the scenario, to which Kahn replied "I know you

have 19,000 people, but we have two people more than you for writing scenarios". Governments don't write scenarios.

It is a task which requires detailed inputs and rigorous discipline. In commander's estimate, taught at staff colleges you teach the officers how to nitpick and then tell them how they got it all wrong, so that they do it again and again and again. That process is required when writing scenarios.

The U.S. was very keen that these non-military looking fellows who write assessments should not be brought in to write policy. There must be a firewall to stop these fellows from writing policy.

The government should make policy and the distinction between these roles should be clear cut. One cannot outsource government, though one can outsource scenarios. This is a contentious issue. Policy analysts need to assist the government but cannot replace the policy process. The hegemon is a very powerful and dangerous entity. It is one which makes things happen, and this was witnessed during discussions at the NSG for the Indo-US nuclear deal. The hegemon used its influence in the capitals of 114 countries to bulldoze the treaty through.

India is currently facing a strange situation, there is a rising power in India's periphery and there exists a possibility that this rising power may become a hegemon. No hegemon has been displaced without conflict, not necessarily conflict for the post of the hegemon but a conflict in which the equation of power changed and the hegemon changed. The British Empire collapsed paying its debt to the United States for World War I and World War II. Hegemons have changed throughout the ages, such as the Roman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and now the world is considering a possibility that the hegemon may change, but would this change be peaceful? Hegemons do not change peacefully.

It is not possible to portray the dangers of what happens when hegemons change. Of all the scenarios, the one scenario which is acceptable is the one where the United States reinvents itself, like it did with the IT



revolution. When the IT revolution happened, the best and brightest of college graduates from India went to the United States and became a part of the high-tech revolution which was occurring in the United States. Many of them returned to setup industries, which revolutionized the Indian IT sector on the coattails of the American IT revolution.

If the United States is to reinvent itself, it can only do so on the basis of technology. It is the one resource of the United States-Innovation and technology. Therefore, the United States should focus on innovation, which in turn would help India grow as well. This would be a high tech base, a vast technological base, which incorporates the American innovation and technological prowess. An area where the United States can help itself and India is in the field of alternative energy, and therefore, India should join the United States as opposed to waiting for the revolution to happen.

Should India be proactive? Allying oneself with one hegemon is bound to agitate the upcoming hegemon; however investing proactively now could provide results, which can allay fears. While this would look like a policy recommendation, which should be anathema to net assessment teams, the case here is not to wait for the scenario to emerge.

### DISCUSSION

- In the military there is the 'Papa, Quebec, Romeo' scenarios but what inevitably happens is that another, a surprise scenario develops. This needs to be factored into the net assessment.
- In reference to the downside risk relating to economy and national strategy; by 2050 India is expecting about USD 27 trillion worth of GDP compared to the one trillion it has right now. To achieve that, the strategy being recommended is that India might have to divest resources from the defense budget, which is already meager, onto other resources, in order to catch up with China or the fundamentalist and dictatorial regimes in the region. We are historically under pressure from China as a result of the military weakening of the Indian state.
- India punches above its weight in multilateral fora, but that is what one needs to do to influence or tweak global power rules. However, is it sustainable? If one cannot sustain it one cannot undertake it.
- China is a hegemon, which has nothing in common with India. However, the Chinese are using their new found power to tweak global power rules, which India seeks to do as well. Therefore, there are occasions where India could work with China.
- It is wishful thinking of India being proactive, and therefore, it can only be a limited proactive power. There is a need to be flexible to adapt, which one cannot find in India?
- India is already a global player. But it has a long way to go before it can become a global power; among the many things which would restrain it, is poverty.
- The West does not want to see the rise of China and would therefore prop up India as a counterweight. It should therefore, be seen that India is a tool in the hands of the West, and should this be acceptable to Indians?
- It is important to think not sequentially what India does, but concurrently. Often India takes a lead, and without any concurrency falls flat.
- India needs to develop area studies capabilities in order to understand the region and the world better. In administration the government is woefully inadequately staffed. It must make up these deficiencies through lateral entry, including from the private sector and to break out of its rigid compartmentalized and segmented thinking and from the mind set that the government knows best.
- Lifestyles are very important issue arising out of the global recession and concept of climate change and bring to fore the issue of needs verses luxury. There is conflict over resources, which are looming very large, including the scramble for land and minerals in Africa which would lead to new colonization and conflict.

- Before thinking in terms of new structures in reference to the suggestion of having a cabinet committee on foreign policy, it is important to take stock of those already created including the National Security Council and the National Security Adviser among others. There is a need to work towards strengthening these organizations into fulfilling their original role of expanding the horizons of dealing with the country's future interests.
- While defense expenditure is quite important, there is an even more important priority towards improving the quality of India's indigenous weapon systems, and having a better procurement process. The defense sector is in need of urgent reforms..
- Even before a grand strategy, these are issues of higher priorities – the need to improve governance and speed up economic reforms. There is an acute sense of setting one's own house in order before we embark on global polity, and therefore need better delivery mechanisms.
- There is a perception that the United States is a democratic and pluralistic society and therefore, India needs to have a closer partnership with the US to counter totalitarian and fundamentalist forces. However, it is important to note that multi-faceted great power engagement has been the touchstone of Indian diplomacy.
- To understand the reasons for American failures despite utilizing net assessment, it would be apt to use an American quote on the US strategy on Afghanistan policy "The policy is the most over researched and over killed strategy in the strategy making". 38 think tanks and 170 human beings have worked on the net assessment of Afghanistan and the results are there to see.
- There is a fragmentation, which causes an institutional problem. India does not need new institutions since institutions already exist. It is a question of working and investing in these and the national security adviser's institution came after due cogitation.

- Joint secretaries in the ministry do not want to share information. There is a cultural historical problem in the system- 'You have the knowledge and you do not want to share it.'

### RESPONSES

- The National Security Advisor's job is not to conduct border talks, but to analyze intelligence.
- It is better to be proactive to the extent possible, as opposed to only being reactive, since that leaves India behind the curve, which is not good for the country.
- The problem of information sharing is acute, and developing a policy is difficult without sharing with a core, which works towards national development. One way is to have working groups and discussions.
- On defense expenditure, no one is asking for a reduction on amount spent, but India shouldn't become like the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States during the Cold War., That is the worry.
- Domestic issues are paramount and this would be included in the next edition of the book. This is important especially for economic progress, left wing extremism and domestic security politics.

### REMARKS BY K. SUBRAHMANYAM

In 1962 when the decision was taken to buy weapons from the Soviet Union, there was a lot of opposition to it. There was fear on how could the Soviets support India against China? Similarly, in the 1990s, the amount of reforms India had gone through in the economic sector was unprecedented. Indians are carrying a lot of baggage and they need to liberate themselves from that, and this can only be done through education. The fear of being used is fallacious. India needs confidence, the lack of which is reflected in the absence of strategic thinking.

### III



**CONSIDERING THAT INDIA IS NOT A  
SIGNIFICANT POWER IN 2010, BUT  
MAY BE IN 20120, SHOULD INDIA'S  
STRATEGY CONCERN ITSELF ONLY  
WITH ITS TROUBLESOME  
NEIGHBOURS?**

**REAR ADMIRAL RAJA MENON (Retd)**

This scenario is to gladden the heart of the cautious and the conservative. If one did not want to be proactive this is something worth pondering. Stick to the neighborhood. In the discussions with the current National Security Adviser (NSA), the NSA disagreed with the gloomy forecast for Bangladesh. However, in the process of net assessment and scenario building one would come to results, which may not be liked. Bangladesh agrarian ratio is 13 people per hectare compared to 4 people for India. Its geography is against it, demography is against it, climate changes are against it. There are however a very smart bunch of people in Dhaka. They have recognized that something is wrong and they have to do something. That's a great step.

Interestingly Dhaka's rupee is stronger than Pakistan. Catastrophes allow us to revisit policy. There is no denying the fact that our neighborhood is in deep trouble and Pakistan stand as the living example. The question was put up earlier as to why should India punch above its weight but not punch just according to its weight? Why not bother with just the neighborhood? There are so many issues which need to be dealt with.

The human rights situation in Sri Lanka, Maoists in Nepal and the issue of extremists in Bangladesh all need India's careful attention. Should India not look only at its neighborhood? However, if the world is globalized then how can you separate regional with the global? If the world is globalized then how can one restrict India within its neighborhood? It would mean that a country 6000 miles away does not affect India. There are clear choices to make over here.

**DISCUSSION**

- India need not be caught up solely with its neighborhood but it can't ignore it. India cannot ignore its neighborhood because regional issues divide India and they feed into its domestic politics. Therefore, SAARC is extremely important and India has to take this into account. Second, the real problem with Pakistan is 'military and mullah' both of which are essential for its identity. U.S. has accentuated this identity crisis. It is part of the problem and the solution. It has allowed the military and Muslims to fight the communist. Now they have taken over completely. What has happened unfortunately is that the soft Sufi Islam of South Asia has been invaded and overcome by the orthodox Wahabi Islam. This is of fundamental importance. Water issues also need to be tackled and there is need to cooperate with Pakistan on this issue.
- The basic problem with these kinds of studies is that with the change in one or two drivers, the whole thing can change. What is needed is an overarching framework in which one can think about questions such as these. What is China's Grand Strategy? China wants to be a number one global military and economic power. What will be India's response? Prime Minister Nehru gave India a strategic framework- non alignment was a strategic framework. Nehru's policy was based on three D's – Democracy, Development and Defence. In case of democracy India has come a long way. It has made moderate progress in the case of development. However, it is the third component- defence- where India is abysmally unprepared.
- The way the questions have been posed and the way the arguments are proceeding, it seems like the conclusions are already drawn and discussion is redundant. What is India's grand strategy? Can the policy makers make clear choices? India's grand strategy as opposed to its strategic thinking or is the same as its foreign policy. Why should one choose between being proactive and being reactive? Does India not need both? Why should one choose between looking around the

neighborhood and being global in perspective? Does India not need both?

- The simple answer to the question whether India should be concerned only with its neighbors is 'No'. The reason is that one cannot discount the rise of China and the shadow of it will be cast on India's neighborhood policies.
- One clarification is that Indian defence budgets are growing. Since GDP is growing the defence budgets are also growing. It is bigger than the whole national budget of Pakistan. Countries which became great powers had a strong plan for development, to prosper intrinsically. If domestic problems are solved India will obviously become a great power. So the question is what India should do to solve its internal problems.
- Unforeseen catastrophes either natural or man-made are possible like the September 9 or the tsunami of 2004. How does this study take account of such diversions?

#### IV

### HEDGING AGAINST A GALLOPING CHINA

#### RAJIV KUMAR

India's grand strategy scenario has to be framed keeping in view China's declared intentions of gaining the numero-uno position in global politics. Since China looks at the South Asian periphery in terms of a contested space, there are many alternatives by which the Indian state fits into China's scheme of things. The most complex issue for the Indian policy makers is to define India's strategic interests and then hedge against the aspiring hegemon. India's autonomy is paramount and there is no need for looking at the global politics in terms of searching for partners or entering alliances considering China as a rising power. Thus, India's grand strategy needs to take into account the following issues –

- Does India adopt a defensive posture vis-à-vis China's intentions in South Asia and unnecessarily siphon off

disproportionate assets to the larger Indian periphery (Yangon to Kabul)? South Asia should be India's responsibility.

- Does India deal with its domineering neighbor in a 'co-operative' or 'competitive' manner in the realms of industry, research and development and trade? (Since India lacks the institutional and geographical capacity for industrial self-reliance at present). Intra-industry trade with China could actually open up scope for co-operation while inevitable conflict in defense realms would take a longer time.
- How do the two countries work together on the global stage to overcome the dilemmas posed by common threats like climate change and human security?

The Pax-Americana days are gone- and the world is now being governed under a well laid out set of rules and normative frameworks. It is striking to see the 'waning (USA)' and the 'aspiring (China)' hegemons working together under these frameworks, which more or less substantiates the notion that in future power transitions might occur without the actual involvement of military conflicts. Keeping this in view, China is attempting to increase its influence in the global politics and rework its domestic paraphernalia.

Although, it is questionable that China will actually be able to make a transition from the middle-income society to a middle class society and become a rich country before becoming an old society. India needs to take advantage of its young population and its much-resented 'honeymoon' with the US. Since it is already far behind China in terms of technological breakthroughs and indigenous research capabilities, which are actually fuelling China's rise. Development should be adopted as the primary anti-dote for this lack-luster behaviour of Indian industries.

It is not imperative that India competes with China all over the world in the garb of investing in land, such as in Africa and Southeast Asia. India needs to realize that its biggest asset lies in the sphere of enterprise. India has the largest pool of

entrepreneurs who have world acclaimed status and can help in the 'Research and Development Wings' by providing investment capital as well as independent research. A survey by scholars on the Chinese and Indian sector-analysis shows that the sectors unhindered by government dilettantism performed better and many a times the Chinese observers refused to believe that the government was not involved in the affairs of the business community. Hence, India should concentrate on building its trade potential.

India also has to bear in mind that historically the Chinese visionaries had foreseen China to be emerging as a great power and laid down their policies accordingly. Deng Xiaoping stressed on the need of 'keeping your head low' or biding for time and strengthening the resources before leaping on to influencing world politics. The young generation in China today also believes strongly in the manifest destiny of their nation and is swayed by the historical notion of '*zhong guo*' (China as the middle kingdom). Thus, for India to be competing with a civilizational state like China, it needs to beckon all historical and present resources for hedging China and make its mark as a global player.

### DISCUSSION

- There is a need for hedging against other countries as well. Just because India is a secular, pluralist democracy, it does not mean that countries which share these values would necessarily stand by India's side. India needs to build a strategy which can provide answers to its Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran dilemmas.
- A global power status needs to be earned through constant strengthening of the material and soft power resources of a country and India should avoid throwing around more weight than it can sustain. Before India can strategize in terms of becoming a global power, it needs to catch up with the GDP levels of the developed countries and lessen its reliance on imports from other countries. Though China is facing a backlash from the slowdown in imports to US given the 22 million job loss-situation, it has the option to redirect its manufactures to other countries. Since India relies on its service industry, it needs to find takers for its products.
- It would be a better strategy for India to help USA balance its imports from China so as to counter-effect the dependence it has on China. India's interests seem to be at a loss due to the unrestricted access that Wal-Mart is getting in the Indian domestic market. India needs to take into account the opportunity and industry-loss through foreign intrusions.
- China might have declared its intention to be the *primus-inter-pares* and its view of South Asia as a contested space, but India also needs to look at China's weaknesses. Though the Communist Party is trying to weave a thread of nationalism to legitimize its rule, there is an increasingly conspicuous youth category which is hyper-critical of the government's policies in spheres like price-rise, agricultural impediments et al.
- There is an inherent problem in comparing the two countries and their needs for recognition on the global stage. The two countries have political systems, which are at completely different wavelengths and elicit completely different opinions from global powers. While one would have an advantage in some fields due to its streamlined delivery approach the other might have an advantage of popular support.
- A linear trajectory approach of China's growth can create misnomers. India does not really have a choice to 'not deal' with China. There is a need for revision of the terms 'rise' and 'power' so as to allow the differentiation of policies in a largely interdependent and globalised world.
- There is a need for caution while dealing with the statistical information provided by Chinese sources. A naïve assumption of a galloping China could lead to disastrous conclusions for analysts. The Uyghur and Tibetan opposition against the brutal regime could in future find supporters elsewhere and drive the state to a

standstill with its minorities. Moreover, there is a lot of pressure for political change within China and environmental issues (like- the advancing desertification of Gobi), which are not accounted for properly.

- It is also necessary for India to take a larger view of the politics behind economics in China. India should reject the phraseology of hedging against China and not visualize the policies of other countries as static within a frame of reference of 2020 or 2050. It is equally possible that the other countries, which are facing problems of ageing populations and loss of hegemony might bring about policies which help them in retaining their positions (USA).
- India's neglect of its neighbouring countries has actually facilitated China's consolidation of influence in the region since many countries found ASEAN a more reliable political and economic entity over SAARC. So, if India's vision for itself in the near future needs to accommodate its smaller neighbours to counter China which is currently positing itself as the responsible policeman of Asia.
- China's middle-kingdom syndrome is actually its weakness and ideologically it has nothing to offer to the world. Whereas India has traditionally been an exporter of ideas and could provide vision and leadership to the world and should build on its human resource potential to gain soft power on the global arena.
- India's national interests are neither articulated nor is there a clear understanding of the nation's cultural politics. The citizen's awareness of their government's approach is muddled and intelligence activities are mired by lack of institutional capacities.

could adopt for tackling them when and if they arise.

Making a net-assessment helps in evolving the larger policy though it does need timely revision and updating. India has to make a decision between who are going to be its allies and who the opponents if it has to make policy decisions which can deliver to its aim of being a 'global power' and not only a 'player.'

'Rapid and inclusive growth' is necessary for India to evolve as a nation without fragmentation, in case of its non-alliance some players might try to take advantage of its position and shortcomings.

## RESPONSES

It would be futile to wait for institutional mechanization to take place before the grand policy can be implemented. Though not all the scenarios envisaged in the India-China relations may emerge but it is important to reflect on what methods India