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US & South Asia - SEMINAR REPORT

 
#312, 19 January 2010

Towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference

Speakers:

Prof. R Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Rear. Adm. Raja Menon, Former Chairman, Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation, National Security Council
Amb. Arundhati Ghose, Former Permanent Representative of India to the UN Conference on Disarmament

Introductory Remarks: Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee

In the run up to the 2010 Review Conference, the IPCS will be initiating a series of discussions that will help us understand what the developments are likely to be; where the discussions might be heading; what may be the outcome, and most importantly how these developments would impact the Indian policy and its security concerns. 

Setting the Doomsday Clock 2010: Prof. R Rajaraman

The Bulletin is a semi-technical periodical, founded in 1945 soon after the atomic holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A key feature of the Bulletin has been the “Doomsday Clock,” appearing on the cover of every issue since 1947. This symbolic Clock conveys how close humanity is to catastrophic nuclear destruction. The recent Clock setting had to reflect the overall change since the last setting in 2007. In this perspective the Board found many reasons for hope have emerged in the last three years. However it also noted that some of these have not fructified as fast or as fully as one might have wished for.

There has been some see serious cooperation between the US and Russia to negotiate a new START treaty and bring down their deployed strategic warheads from more than 2,000 to about 1,500 warheads each. President Obama has also removed a major obstruction to starting FMCT negotiations by making a strong call for a ‘verifiable’ treaty. He has also promised to push for ratification of CTBT by the senate. The UK has further reduced its number of deployed warheads to about 160, with only 3 Trident submarines as delivery vehicles, of which only one will be at sea at any given time. France has also announced an unspecified cut in its arsenal. The P5 powers are continuing their moratorium on fissile material production (although China has not formalized this).

Because of all these heartening developments, if the Clock setting had been changed a year ago, it would probably have been pulled quite a bit back from midnight. But more recently, further progress on some of the promising initiatives has been slow or discouraging. Some of Obama’s political capital within the US has been used up in dealing with the economic recession and the health care reform bill. The task of pushing the CTBT ratification through the US senate has become harder and may be delayed by a year or more. Negotiations at the CD on FMCT are still to begin. Although the START Treaty expired on 5 December 2009, its replacement is still not ready, despite strenuous negotiations. It too will have to be approved by the US congress. This is unlikely to be completed before the NPT conference.

Obama’s initially conciliatory approach to Iran has not worked and problems with North Korea continue to fester. Over a thousand weapons in the US and Russia are still on a launch-ready status. The US Nuclear Posture Review document, originally due at the end of January has been delayed and the status of Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program is unclear. Both these will affect the mood at the NPT review conference. Finally, the arms race in South Asia is still on. Both India and Pakistan continue to produce fissile materials and presumably assembling them into weapons. An assessment of developments on both the nuclear and climate change fronts led to the decision to move the minute hand of the Doomsday Clock back from five to six minutes before midnight. By shifting the hand back by just one additional minute, which has never been done before, the board wanted to acknowledge the many new initiatives that have emerged since 2007, while at the same admitting that much more needs to be done.

India’s Disarmament Decision-Making Structure and Policy Formulation: Rear. Adm. Raja Menon

The 2010 Review Conference may be an above-average conference. There has been no serious attempt to undermine the agenda even before the conference commences, as a result of which there may be some great changes. Can India deal with changes on the nonproliferation front as well as other crucial issues such as climate change and energy security?

A study done by the ICRIER on the kind of the situations India is likely to face in 2020-2025 points out that a number of issues will become as important as geography-based foreign policy. Many of these issues will be as important, if not more, than regions. The issues include nuclear weapons, arms control, global warming, food scarcity, water issues, alternative energy and energy security. What this posits is that, relationships between states will be seriously affected by the positions adopted by the countries on these issues, which will then become drivers of relationship between states. Therefore, merely dealing with these as part of the region and having no expertise on the issue would prove detrimental.

India is not structured to deal with this kind of situation and nuclear issue may not even be the biggest concern. A good example for this is the likely fallout of the Copenhagen conference. What is expected to arise from this is that the US could be facing two scenarios. One is that the US reinvents itself and the second is where it does not reinvent itself. The consequences are very clear. If it reinvents itself, it continues to be the world hegemon. Reinventing means, whatever lead the US had over rest of the world in 1914 increased because of the industrial revolution. Likewise the gap between the US and the rest of the world increased with the internet revolution. Will this happen again? It can happen as a result of the decisions taken at Copenhagen which will drive government policies to make alternative energy cheaper. However, if alternative energy is going to be cheaper, it will be at the high-end of technology. Almost 20-40 per cent of the scientists in the US in the high-end of technology are Indians. Therefore, India has an opportunity to be the manufacturing base of the change in the way the world is going to view energy. The transit is from global warming to a new industrial revolution. Can India therefore participate in the revolution that will occur there from?

India should not wait for future scenario to evolve for it to formulate a proactive 20-year policy; rather it should influence the scenario. This of course has connotations of great risk, despite which, if India does engage itself in influencing the scenario, everything boils down to structures and mechanisms. Looking at the NPT issue however, it is only India, Pakistan and China that are still building new nuclear weapons. The rest of the world is building mechanisms to dismantle the weapons. The three countries has to adjust to this scenario and the biggest of the three i.e. China has decided to build a modest arsenal. The pressure therefore may not be on China, it will be on India even if it does not conduct any further test. CTBT ratification, therefore, may not affect India. It will most certainly be affected by the FMCT, not in relation to the number of bombs built but because India needs plutonium for the Fast Breeder Reactor which requires enormous reprocessing facility. How will India handle this issue? The arms control desk is not in a position to make policies and this will have to be handled at a bigger level. This along will other issues require mechanisms to deal with the changes that will occur in the international system. 

India and the NPT: Amb. Arundhati Ghose

It has been suggested that both India and Pakistan are the only one increasing their arsenals but the countries like Iran and China are involved in production of fissile material and delaying the FMCT further. Why is the international community so worried about India and Pakistan when countries such as the United States are developing RRW (Reliable Replacements Warheads) in the name of modernization? Is that so because India and Pakistan are not the members of NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty)?

Looking at the facts on India and NPT, India has been allergic to NPT for decades. India has never discussed the negotiations at the NPT Review Conferences. There have been occasions when India, through NAM (Non Aligned Movement), tried to influence the negotiations at the Review Conferences. The situation however started changing since 1998, where India started referring to itself as a nuclear weapons state (NWS) which was evident from the statements of the former External Affairs Ministers in the Parliament on India’s compliance with the objectives of NPT as a nuclear weapons state.

The first major issue is the importance of the Review Conference to India. At one level entire the process (of Review Conference) does not have any norms which control proliferation. On the other level, India is facing a different kind of situation as the restrictions placed on non-parties to the NPT in terms of nuclear commerce have been waived for just for one of the three outliers, which is not acceptable to everyone regardless of the NSG (Nuclear Supplier Group) waiver.

The other issue is India’s firm stand on being recognized as a nuclear weapons state. India has clearly declared to the international community, through its ambassadors, that it will approach the negotiations on the fissile material treaty or the NPT as a nuclear weapons state only. India is now vocal on this issue. India, however, will not be invited as a nuclear weapon state to the NPT nor will India join any parallel arrangement of the NPT by assuming the same obligations and getting the same privileges such as nuclear commerce.

Should India attend the NPT Review Conference as an observer or even at a NGO level? Today it is important for India to think in terms of a grand strategy. India objected to the NPT because of its security concerns after the Chinese nuclear test of 1964. In the present context India is a nuclear weapons state. Therefore, NPT would be a right place for India to deal with its concerns or should India try to create another forum to address these issues?

Discussion
Comments/Questions

Fissile Material and the Fast Breeder Reactors
  • How critical would the fast breeder reactor be on technical grounds? Has India overcommitted itself on the development of fast breeder reactors?
  • What would be the status of fast breeder reactor if thorium does not work? 
  • What is the scope for commercial power generation through fast breeder reactors?
Doomsday Clock and Climate Change
  • Was the concern of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of non-state actors discussed during the Clock Setting?
  • What was rationale for factoring climate change during the Clock setting?
India and the NPT
  • India’s main contention vis-à-vis the NPT is that the treaty overlooks India’s security concerns. The softening process, however, took place through the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbot dialogue. The NPT as an issue soon disappeared because the Americans were convinced that India would not sign the NPT, yet it would adhere to the spirit of the treaty despite being a non-signatory. On the other hand, India’s allergy to the NPT seems to be gradually disappearing with the Prime Minister statement that India would enter the NPT regime as a nuclear weapons state. If India is not going to take part in the 2010 NPT Rev Con, it must then be represented at least by a NGO to voice its concern as a nuclear weapon state.
Responses
  • France, Japan and Russia have been using fast breeder reactors for commercial purposes. Therefore, discussions and collaborations with these countries are now possible. The only concern is that of thorium as far as the commercial scale reprocessing is concerned. India has not overcommitted itself on the FBR. The Phoenix reactor in France was operational till the end of its life. Russia is building FBRs of 750 MWe in Kazakhstan. India’s FRB capacity is 500 MWe.
  • On the issue of power generation, India must keep the breeder process going with more emphasis on building conventional reactors as Uranium is going to be available. It is important to note whether the breeder is for civilian energy or as the current breeder, which is for military purpose. For the current breeder, the plutonium and its separation processes have to be done and it is allowed under the Indo-US nuclear deal. The reprocessing would undoubtedly be allowed for any future breeders for civilian purposes but under IAEA supervision.
  • The question of nuclear weapons falling in hands of non-state actors in Pakistan was indeed raised at the meeting for Clock setting, there is, however, difficulty in quantifying it to make a sensible statement. Further, the threat by the Taliban is undoubtedly serious but India is facing greater dangers pertaining to climate change. The nuclear attack by the Taliban on India in the near future seems to be some what lower.
  • Climate change was factored in the Clock setting as it was felt that it is a global danger, although, the major question that was raised was regarding how to quantify climate change problem with that of nuclear problem.
  • As far as the negotiations on the START treaty is concerned, the international community is worried as the discussions are not converging. Reduction in Missiles and warheads must go hand-in-hand. Therefore, the Russians are very keen that there should be missile disarmament rather then just warhead disarmament. 
  • If the NPT cannot be amended, it is because of the different motivations of the states involved. If India gains in terms of its security or in terms of elbow room for negotiations on other issues, then India can consider a parallel arrangement like PSI without actually calling for the NPT.
Report by
Ms. Rekha Chakravarthi and Mr. Jasbir Rakhra
Research Officers, IPCS
e-mail: rekha@ipcs.org; jasbir@ipcs.org

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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