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Sri Lanka - SEMINAR REPORT

 
#326, 28 October 2010

Sri Lanka: Priorities of Reconciliation

Report of Seminar held at IPCS on 20 October 2010

Chair: Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee, Director, IPCS
Speaker: Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, Member of Parliament, Sri Lanka

Chair's Introductory Remarks

Post-conflict Sri Lanka is on a strong upward curve of growth. However, despite the commendable development activities that the current government is currently engaged in, the phantom of past conflict lingers. It is thus essential to comprehensively address the concerns that come in the way of progress in Sri Lanka. 

Prof. Rajiva Wjesinha

The agenda for national reconciliation in Sri Lanka can be facilitated by examining the factors that sustained ethnic tensions within the country and nearly caused its disintegration. The first of these was the neglect of areas where minorities resided which led to an inequitable distribution of wealth. Second, the government implemented discriminatory policies which contributed to the growing rift. For instance, the language policy made Sinhala the official language of the country, effectively sidelining Tamil speakers. In addition, monolingualism in schools ensured the lack of community cohesion in a primarily bilingual society. Similarly, biased university admissions led to further embitterment. A third cause was violence encouraged by the state. With the Indo-Lankan Accord of 1987, all insurgent groups with the exception of the LTTE abandoned militancy. The LTTE were indulged by successive governments and supporters in the West until their eventual defeat.

Measures for National Integration

Although Tamil has now been made an official language implementation has been slow. Further, a monolingual policy also meant that the teaching of English too fell behind. In recent times, however, the government has made significant progress through initiatives such as English-medium classes to improve communication skills. It is imperative that these policies are fast forwarded, by involving private investors to improve human resource development and physical infrastructure. Private investment for provisions such as higher vocational training programmes with an emphasis on soft skills hold the promise of prosperity, as developments in the East testify.

Conflict Resolution

Consensus on conflict resolution in the past was prevented by relying on excessive and obsolete structures of theorizing, without adequate attention to the dynamism of politics. For example, this perspective is qualified by the changing motivations for self-determination. Initially, self-determination was suggested only as a means to overcome the sort of regional problems detailed above; later, with the LTTE’s refusal to compromise or negotiate, it became an end in itself until they were unwilling to settle for anything less than a separate state. 

Delegation of Decision-Making

The Liberal Party (LP) argued for devolution in the 1980s based on the premise that the best way to empower neglected areas was by delegating decision-making to the smallest units of relevance. In essence, the LP favoured strengthening of community power structures to ensure a balance of power within the country, as opposed to the supremacy of one particular unit. On the basis of this argument, it was against the merger of the North and the East because it granted recognition to Tamils and Muslims on the premise of a homeland and carried with it the threat of majoritarianism. Such a policy would have been justifiable on the grounds of a discriminatory language policy; but was unnecessary in light of the Indo-Lankan Accord. The merger first saw the expulsion of Muslims by the LTTE in 1990 and later, a split within the LTTE itself, with the Tamils of the East declaring their distinctive identity. Hence, any effort to resurrect the concept of excessively distinct units is likely to raise questions about the sort of exclusivist majoritarianism demonstrated in the past. This is indicative of the role federalism might take on if implemented in Sri Lanka, which may negate local empowerment and act instead as a catalyst in the disintegration of the country. Addressing the concerns of the country as a whole has the potential to restore stability in the wake of the LTTE defeat. However, the country’s decision-making mechanisms require considerable restructuring. Until human resources management and the public services are properly equipped, it will not make sense to speak of devolution.

Executive Presidency

The main Tamil opposition party’s promotion of Sarath Fonseka as a candidate for the Presidency and their perceived hostility to the incumbent President indicated an espousal of the abolition of the Executive Presidency. This has also been expressed by the proposals of the All Party Representatives Conference (APRC), which was tasked to work out suggestions regarding the further sharing of power. Chandrika Kumaratunga did propose constitutional change to empower Tamil politicians who were working with the LTTE at the time. However, these proposals were rejected on the grounds that they were inadequate and racist in nature. As things stand, the Tamil opposition is now making demands to resurrect these erstwhile proposals. It has been suggested that the Opposition ought to instead work alongside the President to improve the provisions of the 13th Amendment. By using the proposals suggested by the APRC as a starting point, they could look into the powers currently conferred by the 13th Amendment on the various levels of government and attempt to strip it of its ambiguities. For instance, there is at present a Concurrent List which seems to suggest that provinces do not work at all. It would thus be wise to prioritize areas in which the province should be given precedence; which should then be transferred to the Provincial List.

DISCUSSION

The Question of Historiography
•There have been major problems with the writing of text books and the history syllabus in the last 10 years. Sri Lankan history texts do not dwell on the modern period thereby negating debates on the depiction of the conflict in Sri Lanka. However, it must be acknowledged that there has been support for a more comprehensive historiography.

Integration of Former Combatants
•The recruitment of ex-LTTE members in the army was suggested but not taken up because of the fear of infiltration.
•Their enlistment of Tamils as English teachers in the Cadet Corps was a viable option but the Education Department repeatedly hindered the process for a year and a half. However, even before the war ended, the first Tamil batch of officers was commissioned into the Sri Lankan armed forces.
•Recruitment into the Police was also a suggestion but until the LTTE were defeated there was a conspicuous lack of applications from Tamils which, it has been conjectured, was because of the threat of the LTTE.
•A Truth and Reconciliation Commission as established in South Africa and Cambodia is not advisable because a majority of the LTTE were forced into combat. In both the above instances, such commissions were instituted to allow former victims of injustice to forgive their perpetrators. The comparison with Sri Lanka is misplaced because the Army is being asked to apologize for perceived war crimes, for which there is no evidence.

Infrastructure Development between India and Sri Lanka
•Transport plans between the two countries, range from the Sethusamundaram bridge proposal to resuming ferry services and railways.
•India is likely to help with the rebuilding of the Sri Lankan railway system. There is controversy regarding Chinese assistance in the Hambantota port but it must be noted that this occurred only because India was not in a position to offer help.
•India is very keen on implementing the Sampur Coal Power Plant project as soon as possible, the MoU for which was entered into in 2006. However, it is currently being held up at the Sri Lankan Attorney General’s Office.

Executive Presidency
•Post conflict, the demand for abolishing the Executive Presidency is not irrelevant. The problem however is that from a Sri Lankan perspective, this demand is associated with the politics of envy against President Mahinda Rajapakse.
•The Executive Presidency should not be made redundant because it will stand by many minorities and has the potential to work better in a system of proportional representation.

JVP without the LTTE
•The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) is unlikely to be too powerful a political entity now because a section of the less dogmatic membership of the party has been co-opted into the mainstream by the President to collaborate on matters of privatization and expansion of the economy.
•The only fear is whether the opposition United National Party (UNP) will make overtures to the JVP, allowing them enormous leverage against the privatization of education.

Chair’s Concluding Remarks

There have been significant efforts by the government to rehabilitate and reconstruct the country after the defeat of the LTTE. An era of intensely destabilizing conflict characterized also by the lack of development is now over, and the policies that have been implemented thus far will illuminate the way forward. For this purpose, good India-Sri Lanka relations are vital.

Report by Ruhee Neog, Research Officer, IPCS

 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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