Pakistan - SEMINAR REPORT

Chair: PR Chari, Research Professor, IPCS

Speaker: Dr Suba Chandran, Deputy Director, IPCS

 

Chair’s Introductory Remarks

Any meaningful debate on Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader, Baitullah Mehsud’s alleged death must take into account some of the following points. First, is he really dead? In light of the contradictory statements issued by the Taliban and Pakistani state, it seems the likelihood of his death exceeds that of him being alive.  Nevertheless, there is no evidence, neither material nor physical, to prove this. Secondly, we need to ask certain important questions about the man himself. Was Mehsud an ideologue, a mere murderer, or both? Did he come into power because of his personal charisma or because some external factors facilitated his ascent? This question is essential if one wants to prevent the rise of more Baitullah Mehsuds in the future. Also, will his death affect the al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadist groups present in Pakistan? And what does it mean for the US Af-Pak policy?

Finally, the last issue is a more philosophical one. It concerns the ethics of drone attacks and the lessons that should be learned from Mehsud’s targeted killing. Is this the result of a US-Pakistani joint military operation or that of a CIA-ISI intelligence gathering? The relative success of the drone attack against Mehsud especially raises the question of collateral damage. Is it acceptable at any cost when major jihadist figures are targeted and can the tactic be extended to all the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)?

Dr Suba Chandran

Baitullah Mehsud was born in the 1970s in the Bannu district of the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) from where he later moved to South Waziristan. He did not take part in the jihadist movement against the Soviets in Afghanistan and was not a recognized leader before the mid-2000s, always acting under the shadow of charismatic leaders such as Nek Muhammad Wazir and Abdullah Mehsud until the latter died in 2007. He then took the lead and started challenging the state, seen for instance, in his kidnapping of Pakistani soldiers and being the suspected hand behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Presently, Baitullah Mehsud’s non-availability to the press is the most important indicator, cementing suspicions regarding his death. Even if he is not already dead, it is only a question of time before he is taken down, especially with the constant betterment in the sophistication of the drones. Moreover, the news bears four major implications for the Af-Pak strategy, Pakistan, the TTP itself and the FATA and NWFP provinces.

First of all, Mehsud’s death might not affect the Af-Pak strategy substantially. The Afghan Taliban will continue to support the TTP, for they have an intrinsic interest in the group’s survival. But the question of the fate of the Uzbek militants who were pushed out of Waziristan by the Waziri tribe might arise, for Baitullah was the one who succeeded in recruiting them in 2006-07. They are now well-settled in South Waziristan and depending on who is taking the lead in TTP, the group might lose some of those fighters. As for the US, the news of Baitullah’s death will encourage their targeted killing strategy, and it is likely to pursue new strikes in FATA. Such attacks are specific and limit the risk of collateral damage. The only question is what risks the executive is willing to take if it can eliminate a top Taliban figure?

Within Pakistan, some observers fear that Mehsud’s killing might engender a blowback effect. It has usually been observed that following the violent killing of a leader, there is a subsequent increase in the number of suicide attacks. On the other hand, the TTP might be unable to coordinate its efforts for quite some time due to internal divisions, so as the aftermath of Baitullah’s death might benefit the state. Yet there is a risk that the TTP might decide to go back into the Punjabi cities if it is injured, in which case we might witness a resurfacing of sectarian violence in Karachi. Also, it remains to be seen whether Mehsud’s death was a means to an end or merely a goal in Pakistan’s strategy against the TTP?

It is evident that the TTP is not united, especially after the two important claimants for its leadership, Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur Rehman, were reported to have been caught in a shootout not long after Mehsud allegedly died. With the latter out, an influential leader such as Maulvi Nazir might want to reassert the primacy of his Waziri tribe over the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan and within the TTP. In the end, there is much cause for worry in the northern agencies, where the TTP, under the impulsion of figures such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur, might realign its network at the expense of the South Waziristan warlords. After all, the tribes in FATA have never allied for more than a few months against the government, and Pakistan is unlikely to change its strategy of weakening the TTP from below.

Discussion

Comments

• Did Baitullah Mehsud appear in a vacuum? Did he become what he was only due to external factors? Mehsud was regarded by Time magazine as worth placing among the 100 most influential people in the world.
• Why would the tribal elders and other major Taliban figures risk allying with the Pakistani government? The targeted killing of Mehsud may be interpreted as a sign that once the state does not need them anymore, they will meet the same fate as Mehsud.
• The drone attack would not have succeeded if there was no human intelligence available. Was the success of the attack a consequence of an ISI movement or merely the CIA that would have developed ground intelligence? And if the tactic proved to be valid, why would the US not launch such attacks in cities like Quetta where al Qaeda leaders are believed to be hiding?
• The US should put pressure on Pakistan to make some legal improvements in the tribal areas more than ever, and work towards improving the daily life of the inhabitants and sustain its development initiatives. 
• At the broader level, isn’t the achievement of the targeted killing of Mehsud a sign that the Pakistani security strategy, long criticized for being inefficient, was actually successful? Does it confer the Pakistani state the kind of legitimacy it was hoping for?
  

Responses

• Baitullah Mehsud benefited from the rivalry between the Mehsud and Waziri tribes. Owing to ethnic reasons, he rose to become the strongest and most influential among the TTP ranks. Besides, he enjoyed the support of the Afghan Taliban, as Mullah Omar was personally interested in having a strong organization beyond the border. Yet, it is true that Mehsud was not well-known for being an orator as he did not contribute to any substantial construction of a framework of thought.
• There is a clever game being played by both the TTP leaders and Pakistani state, where the pro- and anti-Taliban lines are not clear if not completely blurred. Yet monetary and armament concerns do not really command leaders like Maulvi Nazir to engage the state in a long, protracted fight.
• All the houses of major tribal and TTP leaders are being watched constantly. According to Taliban sources, Mehsud was supposed to have visited his father-in-law’s house to receive a kidney treatment. As such, his death could be the consequence of an error of judgment as much as a technological success. Yet, the US cannot allow itself to bring drone attacks in localities where the Pakistani state has some kind of authority. The implicit deal between the US army and the government being that the latter would complain but not condemn the incursions as long as they take place in FATA.
• Most of the educated elite have demanded greater democratization inside the agencies, but the Taliban have slowed down the ongoing process of secularization. Yet the people from the Tank district that are going away from NWFP to study in Pakistani cities are the first ones to ask for democracy and an increase in the development process.
• UNHCR reports indicate that the refugees in Swat did not receive any funds when the government asked them to rejoin their localities. There won’t be any real turn around in the fight against the Taliban unless the state actually moves into FATA, with all the infrastructure and funds required.

Jérémie Lanche
Research Intern, IPCS