Nuclear -
SEMINAR REPORT |
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| #298, 28 July 2009 |
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Prospects for Ratification in the Remaining Annex 2 States
Chair: Amb Arundhati Ghose, Former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament
Speaker: Dr Christine Wing, Senior Fellow, Center for International Cooperation, New York University
Amb Arundhati Ghose
The change in the disarmament discourse in the US is evident from the renewal of START negotiations. This change in policy was evident from the election campaign of President Obama that clearly stated ‘Nuclear Disarmament’ as a priority. In Prague, Obama put forward his vision of Disarmament where he declared to push the US senate for an early ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Two bi-partisan panels have been constituted in the US to take forward the various debates emanating from the renewed efforts of the administration for CTBT ratification. Whereas one of the panels supported the engagement, the congressional panel on US strategic review has not agreed with the administration in this regard.
Amidst intense debate within the US domestic political circles and persistent concerns regarding the attitude in the Senate, the implications of US ratification on the rest of the world will be immense. For India, the lesson which it can draw from the ongoing debates is very crucial. Today, the CTBT has attained an ‘iconic’ stature in India where it is being considered as an untouchable, the treatment which Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also received. It is therefore important to see, as events unfold, how the debate shapes up within India.
As far as India is concerned, the global situation has changed considerably. Reflective of the change in the environment is India’s positive move towards abstentions in UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the question of CTBT, whereas earlier India always voted against any resolution on CTBT. Apart from abstentions, however, India has not said anything over CTBT. India of 2009 is a globalized economy with multiple levels of interactions and taking unilateral measures such as nuclear testing is a highly obsolescent phenomena. The question that needs to be answered is why India in not willing to sign and ratify the CTBT if it is not going to test. However, this is very much a political decision.
Dr Christine Wing
It is very important to understand how the CTBT is understood in the Annexe II states. There are still nine countries which have not ratified the CTBT. Out of these, six have signed but not ratified and the other three have not even signed the treaty. With the CTBT back onto the US agenda, and assuming that US ratifies the treaty, its ratification will certainly change the disarmament dynamics. It is therefore important to understand the internal discussion and debates which are going on in other Annexe II states in order to broaden the debate on the CTBT.
The US discourse has been clear from President Obama’s Prague speech. It is also more or less reflective of the US think tanks and the civil society especially the NGO’s. Obviously, the CTBT would be a very important step towards nuclear disarmament but it is also equally important to get a hint of what other states think of nuclear disarmament. For the US it is important to go into the 2010 NPT Review Conference with the debate being settled on CTBT and this is the time frame within which the US would like to work towards this end. Also, the renewed emphasis on CTBT will have to be looked through the disenchantment of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States with the NPT and without any perceptible actions on the disarmament front; it is really not very hard to conceive an eventual collapse of the NPT regime.
While it is not a very good argument to link ratification of other states with the US ratification (one cannot say that other states should not ratify until US does), however the political realities make US ratification the cornerstone of an early Entry in to Force (EIF) of the CTBT. Indonesia, for instance, has said that it will follow the US. As far as China is concerned, voices from inside as well as outside suggest that China will follow the US. However, better would be a situation where the US rejects ratification since then China would not have to take any steps in this direction. Other countries such as Israel may ratify, at least the possibility cannot be neglected. However it is clear that if the US ratifies, there will be tremendous pressure on other countries to ratify and a linkage can be made between ratification by US and subsequent ratification by other countries. The Perry-Schlesinger report’s recommendation lays out the reasons why the US should or should not ratify the CTBT. What is interesting is that there are reports that if an EIF of the CTBT could not happen, then at least the P-5 should have a mechanism where they can enforce the treaty among themselves.
It will be interesting to observe the positions different governments will take in this regard. What sort of balance, whether it is technical or military in nature, is required and what role such a balance will play in the ratification process? What are the conditions under which India would be willing to sign? What would ratification mean for different countries in light of the given course of global politics? These are some of the questions which a debate concerning CTBT needs to answer.
Discussion
Comments
- Both the task forces which looked in to the CTBT ratification issues have emphasized the need of the US to maintain its deterrent capacities. Also, the new discourse on CTBT ratification indicates the influence of the NGO community on the new US administration. Earlier the community had lost its voice to a large extent.
- What is distinctly noticeable is that the scientific community in the US is very much convinced that stockpile stewardship program can be carried ahead without any real tests being conducted. However, such a possibility has engendered fears among other states that lack the necessary technical expertise to upgrade their weapon stockpiles and there appears to be a continuation of a scientific asymmetry.
- The nuclear situation in South Asia has its own logic. It is not necessary that if the US ratifies the treaty, China and Pakistan would do the same. Moreover, the Indian technical capabilities are not potent enough to carry out sub-critical testing or for that matter computer simulation. Since there are no assurances from our nuclear neighbours in this regard, the Indian situation is quite unique.
- Is ratification of CTBT an end in itself? Or is the US ratification of the CTBT a means to a higher goal – the goal of a nuclear free world? For India and China Nuclear disarmament is a higher goal and CTBT a step in this direction. Until and unless, CTBT appears to be step towards a global zero, it is very hard to envisage a smooth sailing for the treaty. Also, as far as India is concerned, its main concern is not the nuclear weapons of US but the weapon acquisition by Pakistan and China. US efforts in making China and Pakistan to ratify the treaty will be very important.
- Chinese participation in the CTBT regime will be highly dependent on its relations with the US. China never liked the idea of on-site inspections and it has made clear its cooperation in this regard is highly contingent on the nature of its relationship with the US.
- The question of CTBT ratification also includes the problem of Article 14 which made India quit from the CTBT process. It was illegal since it stipulated a state to accept provisions of the treaty against its sovereign will.
- The real question which needs to be put up in the CTBT discourse is the question of more countries undertaking nuclear tests. The tests conducted by the North Koreans have put the cat among the pigeons especially considering the increased security threats which Japan faces. These actions pile up pressure over countries such as Japan to conduct their own nuclear tests. The situation is also similar in the gulf region where Iran is gearing itself to gate crash in to the nuclear club.
Responses
- In the US, contentions regarding the CTBT are more technical in nature. Questions are primarily directed towards the reliability of the weapons and robustness of the verification regime.
- Ratification and EIF of the CTBT. The perceptions in China augur well for the CTBT if the US ratifies. Several people in China argue that China has already earned what it wanted to and there are not many concerns perturbing China at this point in time. Moreover, the nuclear force structure of China is very much different from other Nuclear Weapons States. The demands from its force posture are not much. But if China feels that the changing external environment is not suitable to its security needs, it may not ratify the Treaty. As far as China is concerned the debate is more political in nature. The Chemicals Weapon Convention has shown the way with regard to concerns over the verification problems. It has made it easier for the Chinese to envision disarmament. Technical issues are not paramount. The issue is more of political in nature.
- The urgency of the CTBT is unlikely to die down after the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It is very hard to forebode the administration’s strategy after the 2010 NPT Revcon but the way the administration is pursuing the agenda, the disarmament discourse is likely retain its importance.
Yogesh Joshi, Research Intern
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