China’s Grand Strategy and Military Capabilities Development
Report of Seminar held at IPCS on 8 November 2010
Chair: Brig (retd) Arun Sahgal
Speaker: Prof Ma Cheng-Kun, Director, Institute of PLA Studies, National Defense University, Taipei, Taiwan
Events in early 2010 indicate the rise of an assertive China which is gradually developing military capabilities to safeguard its core national interests. China’s economic and political footprints in the garb of regionalism are also increasingly evident in Southeast Asia. The most significant question then for the global community is how to deal with this China? While it is easier for Taiwanese analysts to understand China’s conduct in the international arena due to cultural similarities, Western observers are often at a disadvantage in comprehending China’s intentions and hence unable to construct proper response to its strategies.
China has developed economically and militarily at a rapid pace in the past few decades. However, the contradiction between its increased military acquisition and its discourse of peaceful intentions and “harmonious society” makes it hard for the international community to distinguish between China’s real and symbolic goals. Meanwhile, it has to be recognized that it is an indispensable consideration of the Chinese Communist Party leadership to keep symbolic value and real interests in balance while taking significant decisions.
Earlier, in Mao Zedong’s stratagem, symbolic values were prioritized over realistic goals, as evident in China’s posture during the Korean War and the Sino-Indian border conflict and later also in the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict in Deng Xiaoping’s time. However, after China ushered in reforms and initiated its opening-up policy, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were able to strike a symmetric balance between the two factors in the foreign policy domain. In more recent times, China’s integration into the international community has forced China to adopt realistic goals. In this regard China’s grand strategy has also been shaped massively according to its perception of the international political system and security environment. This understanding is reflected most perceptibly in three areas:
Impact I: Eastward Strategy “Confrontation without conflict?”
Under this strategy China has changed its approach in the Western Pacific Ocean; from competing with the US in terms of maritime power to acknowledging the latter’s dominance in the region and thereby exhibiting a cooperative stance. It has however, retained firmness on sovereignty issues in maritime territories and wants to maintain its control and dominance west of the first island chain including the Senkaku and the Spratlys. The approach maintains that deterrence would serve as a better strategy in the South China Sea and for protecting other maritime concerns instead of offensive posturing.
Impact II: Southward Strategy “Domain Establishment”
China has expanded its comprehensive influence on the Southeast Asian region by way of providing to the countries of Indochina loans for national development, military ordnance, technology transfers and joint/combined military exercises. It has also provided support to states facing political problems in the international community. China is also heavily engaged in developing infrastructure, such as transporting energy in projects like the East-West corridor.
The main incentive for this engagement comes from the Malacca Dilemma which China wants to overcome at any cost. 80 per cent of China’s trade traverses through the Malacca Straits which is a high-risk zone in terms of piracy. Land transport provides a safer alternative which explains China’s extensive funding support for the East-West corridor. Moreover, historically China has never been recognised as a strong maritime power and its strength lies in land-based communications, hence these projects are very important for China.
Impact III: Westward Strategy “Energy transportation and China’s Imposed Assurance”
China has been able to extract military, political and economic cooperation from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members. For instance, the PLA Ground Force attends the “Peace Mission” joint exercise annually, the PLAN convoy fleet to Gulf of Aden has become routine and the PLAAF has also been active in several international exercises. However, the main motive behind these activities is not immediate military development but the larger goal of ensuring safety for energy transportation and stability for China’s western regions, including Xinjiang, as well as cooperation with the Central Asian countries. It is also important to mention here that China has shown no military ambitions with respect to India and wants to maintain status quo since it gains little from initiating military conflict on the Indian border.
However, these immediate concerns do not necessarily help in predicting the future course of Chinese actions. In the longer run most decisions would be made based on the country’s national interests. For this purpose China is improving the accuracy, penetration and survivability of its nuclear missiles and focussing on medium-range missile development including ballistic and cruise missiles. It has transferred SRBMs to the ground forces and has removed some SRBMs opposite Taiwan to the Northwest and Southwest regions. It is also developing capabilities of amphibious operations, has become unyielding in its maritime periphery and decreased the construction of warships to focus on submarine capabilities. To enhance its air force capacities, China has extended its activity range from the land territorial air zone to the airspace of China’s maritime periphery and is focussing on development of electromagnetic operation capabilities.
China’s approach has thus shifted from “regional defence” to “trans-regional military” mobilization. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to delineate whether a China that emphasizes symbolic value or a China that looks to achieving more realistic interests would be more friendly and beneficial to its neighbouring countries.
DISCUSSION
• For the international community the immediate concern is how to deal with China’s assertiveness in context of the South China Sea issue. China’s insistence of sovereignty over these islands is related to issues of national integrity and due to nationalism, it is hard to make China accept that the Senkaku Islands were controlled by Japan historically. While earlier, the nature of these claims by China was symbolic, now there as a tacit recognition that relinquishing its claim on one island would have a cascading impact on other disputed territories. Thus, to withdraw from its present position would lead to loss of sovereignty and of support within China; in this sense China’s interests in these regions are now more realistic and tangible.
• Furthermore, the economic and political stakes are also very high and thus China is facing a dilemma of how to categorize these claims. For instance, it had escalated the South China Sea issue to a matter of ‘core interest,’ along with Tibet and Taiwan some time back, but of late has retracted to declare the South China Sea as ‘not being a core interest.’ This again reflects the primacy of realistic assessments which is – ‘to avoid military conflict with other countries in which ever manner possible.’
• It is also important to reflect at this juncture, on how China visualizes itself as a rising power – an aggressive dominating power in Asia or as a harmonious, accommodating neighbour which wants genuine peace? Meanwhile, for China the question is not ‘about rising’ but ‘recovering’ as China has been a great power since ancient times and it sees its rise as legitimate. In case the neighbouring countries fail to take this factor into account, they are construed to be a part of the ‘Western conspiracy’ against China.
• There seems to be a contradiction between China’s Southward and Eastward strategies. If China is going to be increasingly assertive on sovereignty claims west of the first island chain, how can it also push a Southward strategy of expanding its influence in Indochina? Vietnam has substantial political sway among its neighbours and might be expected to counter China in this region. Next, if the South China Sea is no longer a core interest then how does the Chinese government justify increasing aggressiveness on sovereignty claims in the South China Sea?
• China puts a lot of emphasis on the “century of humiliation” which it uses to legitimize all sorts of claims including its claim on Taiwan. China’s claim to Taiwan was largely symbolic earlier, since Taiwan has never been ruled from Beijing at any point of time in recent history. However, it is possible that with China’s integration into the global order, it might not emphasize that Taiwan was always a part of China. This might open a window of possibility of accepting the status quo between the two.
• China’s negation of its ambitions to be a superpower is also in contradiction to its assertiveness. How is it possible that with so much power China will not act contrary to the interest of other countries?
• It would not be wrong to speculate that in the near future China’s national interests might force it to become increasingly assertive and define its strategies more sharply. China is already emerging as a key player in Southeast Asia through its economic investments like the North-South-Rail corridor, and similar trends are likely to be witnessed in its interface with other countries.
Report by Bhavna Singh, Research Officer, IPCS
