Indo-Japan Relations
Report of conference held at IPCS Conference Room on 17 February 2011
Session I
Chair: Maj Gen (Retd) Dipankar Banerjee, Mentor, IPCS
Indo-Japanese relations are moving forward with a strong momentum and in the last six years many steps have been taken to strengthen the process of bilateral engagement. However, this process needs to be continued further and hence it is the responsibility of think-tanks to show the way forward, and set the agenda for the Indo-Japanese relationship.
Prof. Takako Hirose, Senshu University, Tokyo
Japan’s Nuclear Policy and the prospect of Japan-India Nuclear Agreement
Japan’s nuclear policy towards India aims to foster civil nuclear cooperation such as building reactors and other technological knowhow. In the domestic realm, Japan’s reliance on nuclear energy for power generation has remained low until recently. For instance, only 54 Light Water Reactors (LWR) operated by 10 electric power companies have continued to supply 30 per cent of domestic energy needs. Unfortunately, the number of plants under construction has fallen off sharply after the 1990s because of paucity of human resources as on the one hand, most of the leading nuclear scientists are at the verge of retirement and on the other hand, there is a lack of interest among young students to learn nuclear technological skills. Nevertheless, Japan has managed to preserve its nuclear knowledge and technological skills so far through the traditional way of learning on the job. As far as nuclear reactors exports are concerned, Japan has so far exported only four reactors or nuclear power plants to Pakistan, Taiwan, Switzerland and the US, respectively.
The global nuclear market is changing because of the growing demand for nuclear energy by many developing countries worried of the consequences of global warming and climate change. Japan has three major nuclear industrial corporations: Mitshubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba, and some of these companies have strong collaborations with the French Areva and the US-based General Electric (GE) and Westinghouse, respectively. However, Japan cannot build or export nuclear plants independently despite the growing demand because of waning human resources and its rigid nuclear policy. The recent India-Japan nuclear agreement would facilitate more cooperation on this front. The other big problem for Japan’s nuclear policy is spent fuel management. Although Japan tries to aid fuel cycle facilities, it cannot do so on its own. At the moment, Japan requires its spent fuel to be recycled and reprocessed by France, the UK and the US, and there is more cooperation required with India regarding this issue.
Japan’s nuclear export policy has also remained static until recently because export was not the main concern of either the government or companies. But, a worldwide ‘nuclear renaissance’ generated by climate concerns has actually accelerated the demand for nuclear energy. The change of trends in the international nuclear market especially after the path-breaking Indo-US nuclear deal and growing global climate concerns have changed the minds of Japanese officials who now realize the importance of having a new nuclear policy that would promote domestic nuclear power generation and nuclear exports. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has formulated a new policy seeking industrial cooperation with the US and Europe and financial support for producing new nuclear technologies and also engaging developing countries which are introducing nuclear power in their markets.
Japan’s nuclear nonproliferation policy is based on three fundamental principles defined by former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967: not to posses, not to produce and not to permit the introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. Since then, the successive Japanese Prime Ministers have treated these principles as cornerstones for their nuclear nonproliferation policies. Even public opinion was very strong on nuclear weapons principles and endorsed the government’s viewpoint. In addition, the issue of arms trade also contradicted these principles which prevented Japan from adapting to the nuclear renaissance. The public and the government became allergic to nuclear issues. And for a long time, it was a taboo to discuss Japan going nuclear. Those who strictly adhered to the three principles are today called nuclear fundamentalists. However, clandestine research was carried out on whether or not Japan should seek nuclear weapons given the geopolitical developments and decline of US’ interest in the Asia-Pacific. A recent public opinion polls shows the emergence of a new trend that 50 per cent of the population think Japan should go nuclear. This shows that the public mood on nuclear policy is changing.
Japan’s nuclear options are conditioned by two factors: international and domestic. The international factors include China, North Korea and alliance with the US while the domestic factors relate to security concerns and public sentiments against Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Japan-India nuclear cooperation exhibits two factors: positive and negative. The positive factors of Japan-India nuclear cooperation are in recognition of the importance of India, global trends to support India’s nuclear posture, Japanese industrial interest, external (US) pressure and Japan’s security expectations of India. The negative factors hindering nuclear cooperation with India are: the fear of the NPT losing authority, the outcry from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, fallout of repercussions on North Korea and other countries, anxiety over India conducting another nuclear test and fears of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.
Japan’s decision-making process is changing vis-à-vis India mainly because of pressures from local industries and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) which sees enormous potential for cooperation in the nuclear field. The prospects for future cooperation between India and Japan in the nuclear field are by and large bright especially in industrial R&D cooperation, exchange of scientists and students, reprocessing of fuel and on Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) in which Indian technology is far advanced than that of Japan’s.
Discussant: Dr Jabin T Jacob, Senior Research Fellow, IPCS
The Japan factor is largely missing in any Indian nuclear discourse even though it is an important actor in the region. It is highly ironical that Japan constructed its first nuclear reactor meant for a foreign nation, for Pakistan. The fact that the number of nuclear scientists, engineers and students who engage in the nuclear subject are declining is quite interesting and suggests an area of complementarity for both India and Japan in terms of students exchange and technical cooperation. Also given the rate of economic growth in India, retiring Japanese engineers could possibly have second careers in India in the future.
The other interesting fact mentioned in the presentation is that 50 per cent of Japanese are now willing to discuss about the change of Japanese nuclear posture. This is a totally new development in the Japanese public attitude towards nuclear issues and shows how concerned the Japanese are about their neighbourhood.
As far as India-Japan relations are concerned, the foundation of their relationship is not based on shared values and interests such as democracy as is so often declared publicly. Rather it is largely shaped by the China factor and geopolitical imperatives. This cannot be the basis of a sustainable relationship and will lead to missed opportunities in other fields. Moreover, Japanese investment in India and the number of Indians working in Japan as well Japanese working in India are low as compared to South Korea, for example.
If India and Japan have to ramp up their nuclear cooperation, Japan needs to cross the hurdles created by public opinion and India is very curious to know what the Japanese government is doing on this front. Japan has to do something to mitigate the public anti-nuclear sentiment that could hinder the progress of the current nuclear cooperation. Otherwise, other countries will be able to overtake Japan in nuclear trade with India. For example, South Korea is more than willing to cooperate on nuclear technology and reactors and even China has declared its willingness for civilian nuclear cooperation with India. Japanese concerns over India conducting another nuclear test are overblown. India has much to lose in the process. Similarly, even if India continues to oppose the NPT as being discriminatory, it is only a matter of time before India goes along on the CTBT and FMCT.
DISCUSSION
The Indo-Japanese relationship has been purely driven by geopolitical factors especially since the 1971 Bangladesh war when India emerged as a significant geopolitical player. But where do they stand now on issues of global concerns is not clear, are they together or against each other? On the issue of nuclear brain drain, India is facing a similar situation like Japan where a large number of skilled nuclear technicians migrate to the Gulf countries in search of better fortunes. India also shares their view that nuclear knowledge cannot be taught in schools but rather learned through experience.
However, many countries are shifting their energy reliance from nuclear to renewable sources such as solar and wind and nuclear power is declining worldwide with the number of reactors going down. So the more important question is what is the relevance of nuclear weapons and how far will Japan proceed with FBR constructions?Moreover, one should not be more optimistic about India-Japan nuclear cooperation given the reality that there is a strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan which poses a significant challenge in the future.
On the question of India conducting nuclear test in future, the option remains open for India since it has declared only a nuclear moratorium, which means just a temporary suspension of activity. This was also emphasized in the India-Japan joint statement. The potential area for cooperation between India and Japan would be developing renewable energy sources, clean coal technology and green energy sources.
Japanese general public perception about India has changed tremendously in the recent years. Japan looks at India as a big democracy, emerging economy and a stable country in South Asia. Also, the Japanese MOFA’s attitude towards India has also changed. India is a crucial partner for Japan because both can play a bigger role in the Asia-Pacific as and if the US influence in this region decreases.
Kazutoshi Tamari, Doctoral Candidate, Chuo University
Indo-US Nuclear Deal and its implications for Japan
It is significant to address the question of how domestic politics of states influence their respective nuclear policies. While the Indian public is more sensitive and attentive to the Indo-US nuclear relationship, the US public pays much less attention. According to Robert Kagan, domestic constraints guide the negotiations of a government in international politics. Looking from this hypothesis it is unclear how the US senate could approve the Indo-US nuclear deal when their public was least in favour of it. But it can explained from the fact that the non-proliferation lobbies in the US Senate lost control in the late 1980s because of growing demand for nuclear power from the developing countries and domestic corporate pressure to relax some provisions of the US state non-proliferation policies to facilitate nuclear trade. Similarly, in India the domestic or public opinion on nuclear weapons or policies has been shaped by the Chinese and Pakistani threats since 1962. This has led to India testing nuclear devices twice. Thus, the Indo-US nuclear deal can be viewed as a counter action against Chinese proliferation of nuclear technology to North Korea and Pakistan. In both the cases domestic pressure from various quarters had immensely influenced the nuclear policy of the government.
Nevertheless, the recent India-Japan nuclear cooperation was signed despite growing Japanese domestic anti-nuclear concern. This proves that domestic pressures matter little when the external pressure is intense. History shows that successive Japanese governments have succumbed to external pressures, mainly from the US. For instance, US pressure in the aftermath of Second World War forced Japan to open its markets. However, there are some domestic considerations such as the crumbling nuclear industry in Japan and lack of skilled staff in the nuclear arena, which may have played a significant role in bringing India and Japan together on nuclear cooperation.
Discussant: Prof P R Chari, Visiting Research Professor, IPCS
The Indo-US nuclear deal was a significant development in the nuclear regime. As far as Japan is concerned, it had opposed the deal when the matter was placed before the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). And Japan was not alone; Australia and other set of Scandinavian countries including China opposed the deal. But it was the US pressure, to put it bluntly, on these countries which made them change their minds and hold down to the Indo-US nuclear deal and let it pass in the NSG. This is very important because all decisions in the NSG are made through consensus. Even if any one of these countries had opposed it, the deal could not have materialized. Surprisingly that did not happen. Of course the role of China was very insidious because at first China opposed the deal and then informed India and the US that they would oppose the deal. It even tried to instigate the other dissidents to oppose the deal and in that it succeeded. China went on record to say that what had happened by making India an exception to the prohibitions of the NSG was not a good precedent. In a similar manner, Japan at the time had indeed opposed the deal but it was the US pressure that probably prompted Japan to endorse the deal.
Second, there was a sea change in the American attitude after the Clinton administration lost out and the Bush administration came in. This was extremely important because the Bush administration’s foreign policy at least in this regard was extremely different from the Clinton administration. And also it is worth mentioning that there are several reasons quite apart from Bush’s personal likes and dislikes which aided the burgeoning of Indo-US relations. First reason, the United States appreciated that India is a growing economic power and will be the second largest economy by 2020. Therefore, India will provide huge markets for American goods in the near future.
But now it seems that there is another reason that India is a source of capital for the struggling American economy and provides employments for the American workers. The second reason attached to the Indo-US nuclear deal is Bush administrations’ personal need to balance China in the security architecture of Asia. And the Americans do believe that the peaceful rise of China is only rhetoric and China is a hegemonic power seeking to reconstruct the middle kingdom. The US cannot confront China directly because of its trillion dollar trade balances with China but it can contain China through other powers by building alliances first with Japan and then India in a sense that the Japan, the US and India can balance China in Asia. Therefore, the US wants to establish a concert of democracies. These are the reasons or compulsions for US to enter into a nuclear deal with India.
For India, there could be two reasons to enter the deal with the US. First, New Delhi is also cognizant of the fact that the US occupies immense global political, strategic, economic and technological power. Despite the financial crisis, the US remains the largest economy in the world and accounts for 30 per cent of world GDP. And the second reason was that the deal would allow India to access nuclear technology and to escape the sanctions imposed by the international nuclear regime. Lastly, although the Indo-US nuclear deal was finalized in the end of 2008, it is not yet operationalized. At the moment the Civilian Liability of nuclear dimension is in controversy. It fixes the liability for compensating victims of possible nuclear accident upon the operator. This only accounts the Government because in India government is the sole operator and the private sector has been excluded for strategic reasons. So, what are the implications of this civilian liability act? It appears that the Civilian Liability Act serves as deterrence to any suppliers such as Westing House and Hitachi and also deters countries like France including Russia. This will be an important issue in the India-Japan nuclear cooperation in future.
DISCUSSION
Japanese nuclear companies have strong technical cooperation with American companies as they design and manufacture crucial reactor components for them. This relationship can also potentially limit the Indo-US deal, if Japanese companies are restrained by their domestic laws.
India-Japan nuclear cooperation is an attempt to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation regime vis-à-vis rogue nuclear states in Asia. Japan will not support similar deal between China and Pakistan. The Indo-US deal will enhance Japan’s nuclear trade with India and also India will get access to global nuclear technology regime.
Session II
Chair: Prof P R Chari, Visiting Research Professor, IPCS
The direction of India’s foreign policy has changed substantially over the years and India has tried to build core relationships with several strategic powers in the world, especially the US. While India is dependent on the US for ancillary equipments and other spare parts, it has however not abandoned Russia and at least 70-80 per cent of Russia’s military equipments have their origins in India. Drivers for strategic relationships with other powers exist due to the need for expanding security and defence cooperation especially in maritime security; including counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
It is significant to note that future bilateral and multilateral exercises in maritime spheres would take place in the Pacific. In this sense, India and Japan share congruent structures which generate affinity between the two and make them natural allies. There are two principal areas where cooperation can be envisaged between India and Japan: first, in the field of military operations-training and second, economic collaborations. The Indo-Japanese relationship is yet to achieve its full political potential. Cooperation in Research and Development on their industrial substitutes is highly necessary. Moreover, people to people and academic exchanges need to be emphasized to improve goodwill amongst the two countries. The procedure for Japanese visa acquisition also needs to be simplified for facilitating human and trade movement.
Prof Takenori Horimoto, Shobi University
Japan-India Relationship in an Emerging Asian Perspective
India and Japan share several common strategic orientations and most Indian political leaders have endorsed Japan as a significant partner in global affairs. The two countries not only have to manage the dynamics of China-US relationship, which is marked by indispensability and convenience for both, but also relations with each of them individually. On the one hand, there has been a dilution of the strategic partnership between Japan and the US given the China tangent, whereas on the other hand Japan’s relations with India continue to linger in diffidence, as Japan expects a more assertive posturing by India in terms of choosing its allies.
The Sino-Indian relationship is defined by an expanding trade dimension while being hampered by political issues like Tibet, the boundary disputes and China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean at the same time. And though the Sino-Indian relations are marked by ambivalence, but they are a significant factor in the maturing of Indo-Japanese relationship. Hence, this relationship requires a deeper analysis by Japan in order to evolve its own strategy towards the two neighbouring states. Japan also needs to take into account India’s increasing capabilities as a naval power and its capability to project naval strength.
The main drivers for strengthening Indo-Japanese relationship for Japan come from the fact that China applies several pressure tactics on Japan thereby demonstrating Japan’s dependence on China which is detrimental to its overall foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, India would benefit enormously from the economic exchange between the two countries. Several previous events indicate the scope for engagement between the two countries. In 2005, the bilateral relations embarked on a strategic plain when the two respective Prime Ministers visited each other’s country and consequently several high level officials followed. In 2006, the Indo-Japanese relations were upgraded to ‘Strategic Partnership’; in 2008 the two leaderships announced a joint statement on security cooperation, while the Comprehensive Economic and Political Agreement (CEPA) in 2010 marked a major milestone in the growth of the Indo-Japanese relationship.
The complexity in the Indo-Japanese relationship derives from the fact that two overlapping strategic triangles exist in the Asian Region. One triangle encompasses the US, China and Japan while the second encompasses the US, China and India. For resolving this complexity Japan is willing to assist India in acquiring a greater role in the Asia-Pacific. This can be done not only through the East Asia Community (EAC) initiative but also by supporting India’s membership in the APEC and the TTP. Japan also believes that the Indian model of economic development under a democratic set up with an attitude of self-reliance would best suit the development needs of the East Asian Countries. Moreover, since the US is not very excited about promoting democracy, the ASEAN Countries and the Arab League find the Indian model an excellent prototype.
However, despite consecutive attempts to bring India into the East Asian Region for countering China’s heavy influence, it is undeniable that the Chinese influence is not likely to wane away any day soon. For this reason, any regional mechanism needs to be formulated keeping not only India but also China in mind. If China is excluded the sustainability of such a regional mechanism would be highly doubtful. India’s expression of ‘inclusive development’ summarizes the East Asian situation quite appropriately. The two countries are currently aiming to achieve a status quo. Though it is possible that India might not need Japan’s assistance in course of the next ten years, but without a regional mechanism it will be highly difficult for the regional powers to accommodate each other’s interests and cooperate on issues of common concern.
Discussant: Maj Gen (Retd) Dipankar Banerjee, Mentor, IPCS
Despite deep historical linkages, Indo-Japanese relations have not matured to their real potential. Though India has a well-crafted Look East Policy, it is psychologically limited to Southeast Asia. Given the geopolitical reality of the current times, nothing much is likely to happen in the Western part of the globe. Despite Japan’s negative image given its atrocities during the Second World War, the people of India and Japan have never harboured any enmity towards each other. Though China has overtaken Japan in terms of Gross GDP figures, Japan still holds a better record in terms of Per Capita Income. Japan continues to lead the world in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and India has benefitted most from it, a case in point being Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor which will have a transformational effect on Indian infrastructure.
India is currently constrained by a Chinese presence in its neighbourhood. However, this can be countered and challenged by building roads, railways and increasing connectivity amongst the people across the region. This also calls for consolidating relations with other powers across the globe like the US, Russia and the EU. India-Japan relations have seen an upward swing from 2006 based on the five pillars of engagement agreed between the two countries. A roadmap for New Strategic Partnership has been developed by the two countries in the Joint Declaration made in 2010.
It would be highly beneficial for the two countries to strengthen people-to-people contact particularly student exchanges. Indian students going abroad contribute most to the local economies; this phenomenon could be replicated in case of Japan as well. The Indian diaspora has always been an asset to their host communities which enables cultural relations to grow without any hindrances.
The current Asian security architecture has been set up over the past few decades and unfortunately it will be very difficult to alter it according to preferences of the emerging powers. Though several initiatives have been made through tentative recommendations in the form of ASEAN and other organizations, powerful countries like China are able to manoeuvre their existence for their own purposes. India and Japan should be able to devise strategies to function within the ambit of the existing security architectures.
DISCUSSION
There are not only two but three overlapping triangles in the East Asian Region, the third encompassing the US, India and Japan. Though the international community is worried about China despite its emphasis on ‘peaceful rise’, China’s role in bringing together these triangles cannot be underestimated. However, in India’s case, though the neighbouring countries while uneasy are not threatened by India’s rise, which allows it to build cooperative relationships with such countries.
One has to look beyond the jargons of economics and globalisation to understand the dynamics of the Indo-Japanese relationship. There is an enormous deficit in terms of India’s attitude with Japan in terms of connectivity. Much needed efforts and resources in this regard, are not properly invested. Mental infrastructure between the two countries is the need of the hour.
India and Japan are at present second-rung powers and thus face immense challenges in managing their relations with the dominant powers, however, it is in this regard that both these countries should try and involve their smaller neighbours like Vietnam and Indonesia for creating a multipolar structure in Asia. Taking an initiative in the realm of partnerships with the smaller countries will provide India and Japan with a substantial leverage and support also at the global level.
As far as political systems are concerned, democracy has held much prowess in the East Asian region. However, there is no comparison between the ‘harmonious development’ of the Chinese and the ‘inclusive growth’ of the Indians. The former concept implies a hierarchy led by China which is required to establish and preserve harmony. Meanwhile, the approach of inclusive growth as comprehended in the Indian model is unlikely to work since Japan itself is closed to external influence with limitations on immigration, for example. Moreover, cooperation between the two countries becomes difficult as it is not clear what positions they will take on other countries.
Security models are going to remain fluid for some time to come given the changing equations amongst the emerging powers. While alliance with the US may become less significant for Japan in the future, its relationship with India will be shaped by efforts to move beyond the economic realm alone. The significance of rhetoric is best explained by the need to keep the momentum up. Governance and infrastructure will become the two key parameters for as Indo-Japanese relations move forward.
Report by J Jeganaathan and Bhavna Singh, Research Officers, IPCS
