Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The compound crisis of 1990
Report of the discussion on the book authored by PR Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen Philip Cohen held on 22 August 2003
Jabin Jacob, Radhakrishnan and Mallika Joseph
ACM S K Mehra
Appreciated the book as being crisp and readable. ACM Mehra called it a welcome addition to the debate over what happened in 1990. While Yakub Khan may have threatened using nuclear weapons, the ACM believed that there was no serious tension between India and Pakistan. He disagreed with the contention in the book that the IAF had overreacted. It had clearly detected a change of Pakistan’s electronic order of warfare and hence a certain number of aircrafts had to be strike ready. The remark on page 73, that the army and navy were not consulted, too, is out of context. The PM had only asked about air defence. Emphasizing that the military scenario had changed drastically since 1965 and 1971, when the PAF had acted first, he stressed that the IAF should now go first in case hostilities began. Moreover, the CAS also stated that India required a nuclear deterrent.
Seymour Hersh’s assessment that the forces were ready and waiting for a nuclear exchange, is “ridiculous”, “humbug”, and “bunkum”. Both sides had no definite idea about each other’s nuclear capabilities. Pakistan’s F-16s were not hard wired for delivering nuclear weapons. Both US satellites and IAF recces had picked up the movements of convoys at Kahuta, but this was probably a dispersal of assets.
The Americans played an important part in clearing the air, “facilitation”. US preventive diplomacy worked as there were no military movements by Pakistan. The US was in addition the biggest gainer as it emerged as a prominent third actor in the Indo-Pak affairs.
S K Singh
Mr. Singh noted that he has been called a “hawkish chap” in the book, but believed that the whole issue in 1990 was exaggerated. The real crisis was in Kashmir and the Indian handling of the Kashmir problem. But on his trips to the American and Soviet capitals, he found that the respective intelligence services of the two nations were convinced about the Indo-Pak crisis breaking out into a war. While the USSR was forthcoming on Indian requests for weaponry, in the US, only Snowcroft and Haass remained skeptical about the two countries going to war.
Considered negotiating with the kidnappers of Rubaiya Sayeed a “folly” and that the V P Singh government had set a bad precedent. Mr. Singh also believed that one of the kidnappers was connected to Rubaiya’s husband. The US according to Mr. Singh deliberately tried to carve out a role for itself in the Kashmir crisis, as it was displeased with Shimla Agreement which laid stress on bilateralism.
Gen. V N Sharma
Gen Sharma believed the true facts did not necessarily come out in the book. A nuclear threat did not exist, as neither country had nuclear weapons. The Americans very deliberately sought to build up their role in South Asia and therefore, played up the threat. The guilty party in the Indo-Pak confrontation “the accusing finger must be pointed in only one direction” and that was Pakistan and its intelligence agencies in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999.
On the question of why India did not take proactive action, Gen Sharma stated that this was so because India did not want war; its troops had only just returned from Sri Lanka. The army was therefore, “unbalanced”, and not ready.
The kidnapping was not the trigger. Pakistan had decided to wrest Kashmir by means other than military 8 or 9 years ago.
Why did Kashmir revolt? Kashmiri youth were being trained by Pakistan and parents were afraid of their own children. “The balloon went up in 1989,” as intelligence officers were shot dead, and the police and state administration failed. The army when it was sent in did its job competently.
“We had to educate the (new V P Singh) administration that you cannot change tack so suddenly, in a country like ours.”
The foreign media too was “a weapon of war”, but “we controlled the media, so effectively that there was no news coming out except good news”
Gen Sharma said that “we did not move our strategic forces, because we did not want to precipitate things”. In addition, there was good inter-services cooperation.
The general felt that the US wanted to help Pakistan and even its nuclear and terrorism programmes so that it could be used to keep Russia off-balance by involvement in Afghanistan
Gen. Sharma disagreed with the contention that Siachen was started by India. Pakistan had started sending mountaineering expeditions into the area, forcing Lt. Gen Chibber, to send in troops even before the snows had melted to occupy the heights. The army-to-army meeting between India and Pakistan to sort out the issue in May 1989 had Karamat on the Pakistani delegation. However, the agreement worked out, was eventually rejected because Bhutto was unwilling to part with the Saltoro ridge.
Anand Verma
Believed that there was indeed a crisis, but no outside power was really interested in the subcontinent at that particular point of time. Moreover, both India and Pakistan had weak governments.
Three factors are brought out in the book: the Pakistani assessment that the situation in Kashmir had come to a head and it only needed a push to exacerbate matters; the progress in Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation programme; the presence of Pakistan troops in disguise just across the border.
Yakub Khan’s statement to Gujral: “Please do not interfere with Kashmir or lightening will fall on you from the sky,” was rhetoric and this was met with rhetoric. Forces were moved around but that was all. Things remained as “placid as ever.” Mr. Verma believed that American diplomats in Delhi also felt the same way.
A “phase of exceptional alertness” by US intelligence, resulted in the Pressler Amendment being used against Pakistan. “Pakistan was planning a nuclear weapon adventure.” Therefore, the Gates mission was to tell Pakistan to “lay-off”. Gates did not reveal Pakistan’s intentions to India, nor even in his book written later on; Seymour Hersh was the first to file the story.
“I personally believe there was a crisis, though we did not know about it.” The authors, Mr. Verma thought should have taken note of this.
Naresh Chandra
Amb Naresh Chandra commended the authors for their efforts in stringing together the set of events that constituted the little-known Crisis of Spring 1990. For want of time, his discourse was focused on the various issues that ought to have received more prominence or had been disregarded altogether in the book.
The crisis began in 1987 with Farooq’s dismissal, according to Mr. Chandra. Pakistan used this action to its own advantage. Kashmiri leaders who relied on Indian democracy were treated most shabbily as candidates of the Muslim Front were bashed up in the police stations. He lamented that the book did not adequately deal with issues immediately preceding the crisis and went ahead with anecdotal references to events and meetings that served to thaw the relationship between the two countries.
Mr. Chandra believed the Bofors issue took up too much attention of parliament and not enough time was given to the problems in Kashmir. The fact that Pakistan also had a plan in the Valley did not come out in the book at all. Intercepts with the Indian government clearly indict Pakistan of its complicity on planning the entire operation. Also the book did not take into account the “horrible situation” that Jagmohan inherited. The contention that the first search and clean operation was conducted during his tenure is wrong. It was ordered by the previous government.
While Jagmohan was removed because he did not consult the Centre before dismissing the government, the book Mr. Chandra believed was a bit unkind to Jagmohan and other governors. Gary Saxena had experience of tackling law and order situations in communally sensitive areas and had helped reestablish civil administration in these areas.
Jagmohan had arrived when the intelligence apparatus in the state had been almost dismantled through targeted killings. Elimination of those involved in political reconstruction and reconciliation did set the clock back on efforts at peace building. So the role of the army and police in ensuring a high attrition rate among the militants needed to be appreciated and this had been ignored by the book
On the Rubaiya Sayeed incident, Amb Chandra focused on political mismanagement in negotiations that highlighted the entire episode. He noted that “the administration was emasculated” in the process and requested the authors to re-look at the chronology of events; according to him, the militants were released earlier and there was a gap of almost eight hours before Rubaiya was released. This faux pas on the part of the administration, though of minor detail, was of major significance and needed to have been highlighted in the book.
On the issue of the media, the BBC especially, was never very complimentary. The Indian press too was not cooperative at all.
The book according to Mr. Chandra was too judgmental regarding actions on the Indian side and easy on the other side especially the US. Too much importance had given to the roles of the US ambassadors. He was critical of the role US played, especially on the Siachen glacier issue. The Siachen issue got bogged down after talks in 1989, because there was no agreement on who would authenticate the maps. The statement in page 53, “Siachen glacier is now technically a part of J&K and it was a cause for concern as it implies that India has changed the situation
The conclusions, Amb Chandra felt, were indeterminate juxtaposed with ifs and buts. Whatever the rhetoric, the policy of the Indian government is one of containment, said Mr. Chandra though the use of force is not ruled out. Too much has been made of the necessity for dialogue. But Mr. Chandra failed to see what end dialogue would serve.
DISCUSSION
K Subramanyam
Mr. Subramanyam made several points with regard to the book and clarified some of the remarks made by the speakers. The DRDO tried to asses the Pakistani response and concluded that Pakistan was not likely to do anything risky. He recalled V P Singh saying that his hands were forced on the Jagmohan’s appointment because Mufti had announced it
On the nuclear issue, Mr. Subramanyam noted that Richard Barlow of the CIA had declared that Pakistan had gone nuclear in 1987. He also stated that at Yakub Khan’s meeting with Gujral, the former had read out the statement from it. Mr. Subramanyam also observed that book ignored the views of the DGMOs of both nations. The Indo-Pak standoff was not like the US-USSR one; even “a bullock cart” could be used to deliver a nuclear weapon in 1990. Pak and India according to him were nuclear-capable by that year.
Mr. Subramanyam also denied having told George Perkovich what has been stated in the book. He said too that the book had also misquoted Steve Cohen – Cohen had stated that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons to seize Kashmir, not in 1990, but in 1980 in an Asian Studies conference.
Rammohan Rao
Mr. Rao stated with respect to a particular allegation of rape against the army, that the– Press Council of India deputed George Varghese to investigate the incident and the army was cleared of the charges. He also noted how foreign correspondents cooked up reports.
Air Cmde Jasjit Singh
Quoted the Stimson Centre report as stating that there was no real crisis. According to Oakley, there was no question of war. Air Cmde Singh himself believed that there was a crisis, but neither side was prepared for war. Yakub he made it clear was forced to say what he did. Air Cmde Singh said that there was a need to look at the chronology of events and at the domestic politics of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif was threatening to send first 5,000, then 10,000 civilians across the line of control, forcing Bhutto to act. The tension, he believed had gone down drastically by April, why then did the Gates mission arrive only in May? Was Pakistan, he wondered, using the nuclear card?
Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta
The US had a game plan to link nuclear weapons with the Kashmir issue, which was part of its non-proliferation agenda. The crisis was created by the US in tandem with Pakistan
S K Singh
Mr. Singh agreed with Gen. Mehta and stated that “the nuclear business is not over”
Anand Verma
Mr. Verma noted that a delegation of the stature of the Gates mission was not sent by the US earlier, but only in 1990. The implication was clear – Pakistan must have had a nuclear option.
M K Rasgotra
He began by saying that nothing of any consequence ever got into the files or archives of the Government of India, almost all major decisions were conveyed orally. Perceptions, therefore, could be built up on intuition.
Noted that p. 53 quotes Noorani and Krepon on Siachen, but they were wrong. He stated that the Americans had deliberately put out maps with lines going northeast from NJ9842. For the Americans, the issue was that Tashkent and Shimla had put them out of the picture in South Asia and they wanted to get back in. Mr. Rasgotra noted that the government in Pakistan was not weak, and that Bhutto was not the government.
The book he felt made the mistake of assuming that India was a weak state; it was never so in a conflict with Pakistan. He agreed that the crisis ended much before Gates arrived. He also noted that Dennis Cux was not cited in this book at all. Mr. Rasgotra dismissed Hersh’s report, believing that he was used by the US State Department to float stories.
