Worldviews of India as a Global Power
Speakers:
Dr. Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, and Professorial Lecturer, George Washington University
Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor and Chair, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Dr. Nikola Mirilovic, Research Associate, Sigur Center for Asian Studies
Dr. Deepa Ollapally: New Discourse on India as an Economic Power
An understanding of the world’s rising powers inevitably demands a reading of the foreign policy debates within those countries. A study of India as a rising power in the world has two major aspects – the military policy and the economic instruments of India. It might not be unfair to term India as “an ambiguous rising power” due to less visibility in any identifiable consensus on India’s objectives, India’s preferred instruments of power projection (coercive, remunerative or soft power; or what has been called the 3 Ms: might, money and mind), and the tradeoffs India is willing to make between them.
There are four different strands of foreign policy thinking in India. In the traditionalist framework, India is perceived to be a great civilizational power holding a high moral ground. Within this structure, a policy of non-aggression and non-intervention is acknowledged. The nationalist school is dominated by “Nehruvian” approach that followed a foreign policy of avoiding international alliance entanglements. Implication of such a policy was low level of international economic integration and domestic sectoral advancement getting precedence over high growth rates. In the perspective of the regionalists, the predominant narrative is of India as a South Asian power with larger Asian vision. The US alliance structure in Asia-Pacific has forced India to look toward establishing broader Asian relationship while building bilateral relationships with neighbours. The new globalists’ strand of thinking that emerged post 1991 gives salience to economic and security concerns. Accordingly, India began to see the need to engage globally through economic, strategic and ideational instruments of foreign policy. The variants of new global thinking consist of money (remunerative and financial power), might (military and strategic power) and mind (ideational and soft power). A common assumption of the globalists is that India’s rise is benign and beneficial in contrast to China’s rise.
Presently, India’s economic success is regarded as the weapon to exercise global influence in the decision-making realm of the country. There is a drastic shift in the underlying objective of India from earlier preoccupation with sovereignty to being a conscious global player. Indian foreign-policy analysts use aid diplomacy to gain traction in different parts of the globe. In order to sustain the “Indian Brand” created by its economic success, the country has to cultivate primary relationship with the US without any prejudice toward other countries. The root of the thinking on India as a developing country lies in the nationalist discourse. The economic growth rate was compromised to protect domestic business sectors and for equity. Current UPA government is attempting to pursue both simultaneously: embracing globalization and protecting domestic popular interests. The government has managed to convince the population for greater liberalization in economy. Although there is a reliance on the ‘trickle down effect’, the government cannot ignore the part of population living in abject poverty.
It is difficult to define the roles and responsibilities of India, which is a rising global power even as it remains a developing country. Indubitably, India is not in a position to manage relations on unilateral or bilateral bases. Indian policy makers are deciding on how international institutions could be manipulated for its benefits. The balance of power between groups tied to the reality of India as a rising power and India as a developing country, is not easy to measure and remains to be seen.
Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan: Hard Power Perspectives in Indian Grand Strategy
The perspectives on hard power broadly include the view that India should emphasize more on military power and balance of power strategies.
It is important to understand which opinions matter in Indian strategic policy. There is skepticism over whether active strategic policy debates outside the periphery of the government influences its policy decisions. The non-governmental opinion seem to matter to the extent of acting as a constraint or a veto to the government’s policies rather than positively encouraging them through policy lobbying. The veto opinion was particularly noticed with respect to the debates on CTBT. Thus, in India, there is relatively weaker communication between the opinion makers outside the government and the decision makers inside it. Also, the opaqueness of Indian state is the key problem in delineating perspectives within government. Rarely are the differences within the government known to the outsiders, and those that are known are mostly related to differences of personality rather than a differing perspective about India’s role in the world.
Over the last two decades there has been a debate among the Indian foreign policy analysts on whether the country’s foreign policy is ‘Realist’ or ‘Idealist’. There are many who propose that India must adopt Realist power-oriented grand strategy as they feel that Indian foreign policy is suffused with unnecessary moralism. It is fair to say that Indian foreign policy makers had an understanding of power and demonstrated their ability to use balance of power, especially in balancing China after 1962. Even so, India’s diplomatic history records instances where the policy makers failed to understand the power imperatives.
A reinterpretation of the Nehruvian and traditional model of Indian foreign policy reveals the differences in the new revisionist literature on what should be the constituents of a ‘Realist’ foreign policy. These range from Hyper-Power Perspective (HPP) to the National Power Perspective (NPP) to the Liberal Power Perspective (LPP) on grand strategy. The Hyper-power perspective is a post-Cold War phenomenon associated mostly with the miniscule Indian right-wing opinion. Hyper-power proponents in India propose improving military capacity and are doubtful about the country’s international interactions. The National Power Perspective is considered as ‘establishment perspective plus’. This perspective is inconsistent, advocating both power imperatives and moral imperatives in policy. Although defence spending is encouraged under this perspective, the military capacity is not considered an end in itself. One of the key areas of disagreement between the NPP and HPP is in terms of nuclear policy. For NPP, nuclear weapons are political tools and they tend to be deterrence optimists as against HPP, which stoutly oppose any moderation in the nuclear policy. The LPP like the HPP represents a post-Cold War evolution. LPP gives least attention to military might as it sees diplomacy and trade having dominant roles in international politics.
India being a ‘soft state’ has minimalist perspective on the use of military power due to the fairly secure international strategic security conditions and thus, gains from hard power is not on cards for India. This structural condition limits the advocacy of hard-power perspectives. There is another side to this debate wherein some invoke Nehru’s strategy to emphasize on greater ethical content in India’s grand strategy. This view is critical of the changes in the post-Cold war Indian foreign policy.
Dr. Nikola Mirilovic: Democracy and Great Power Politics: The Domestic Sources of US Foreign Policy towards China and India
The role of democracy in the international power politics is significant. The key domestic political mechanisms in the United States through which democracy affects international relations are through legislative caucuses, business associations, the activities of Diaspora groups, and through partisanship effects. In the present world, relations between the US, China, and India are among the closest approximations of the relations between great powers. The argument is that four key domestic political mechanisms operate to give India an advantage over China in terms of domestic determinants of US foreign policy choices. India-centered caucuses are much larger than the China-centered ones in both the House and the Senate. Democrats are overrepresented on the India caucuses, while Republicans are overrepresented on the China caucuses. If partisanship had no effect on caucus membership, the assumption would be that the share of Republicans or Democrats on the China and India caucuses would be roughly the same as their share in the House and the Senate as a whole. These two patterns are consistent with two key theoretical claims that the members of the legislature prefer to be associated with a caucus focused on a democracy than on a caucus focused on a dictatorship. Democrats, leftist or center-left party, are overrepresented on the caucuses focused on a democracy and underrepresented on the caucuses focused on an authoritarian state. In terms of economic relations, bilateral economic links between the US and China are much more extensive than the bilateral economic links between the US and India. The volume of trade between the US and China is about eight times larger than the corresponding volume of trade with India.
The parties and coalition members concerned with political rights are more likely to prioritize assisting fellow democracies, relative to other concerns, than parties and coalition members concerned with free markets. Based on demographic factors alone, we should expect that the likely influence of Chinese and Indian Americans on US domestic politics and foreign policymaking should be roughly equal. Both groups are highly accomplished in terms of education and income. Measuring the influence of interest groups, including ethnic-based ones, on policymaking is notoriously difficult. However, one means of doing so is by relying on expert rankings and opinions. In his overview of ethnic lobbies in America, James Lindsay (2002) argues that Indian Americans are the group most likely to emerge as “a political powerhouse.” By contrast, Chinese Americans have suffered from concerns about dual loyalties and involvement in espionage on behalf of China (Aoki and Nakanishi, 2001). This contrast is consistent with the claim that Diaspora groups whose home country is a democracy have more influence than the Diaspora groups whose home country is authoritarian.
Discussion
Comments
- It is problematic to place events in neat, tight boxes and label them since in reality and actual practice these categories often overlap. One therefore can be a traditionalist, regionalist, nationalist, or new globalist in varying degrees.
- India’s foreign policy has changed dramatically in the last ten years. There is a growing importance of factors like trade, technology, commerce, and investment in foreign policy; broader interpretation of security as one that encompasses wider national interests and not simply the security of the country’s borders; greater strategic partnerships with other countries; and clearer views on global issues.
- NAM was relevant during the Nehruvian period because it was coeval with the Cold War and post-colonial period in international relations; it had a rationale because at the time India was seeking to establish independence in its foreign policy behavior. Its rationale, however, disappeared around the time that the Cold War was dissipating.
- As far as the comprehensive power projection of India is concerned, India is not looking at South Asia alone, but at extending its influence right from the Gulf of Hermus to the South China Sea. The other security concern is India’s sensitivity to its primacy in the Indian Ocean.
- As far as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are concerned, until multilateralism becomes the norm, India will continue to go the bilateral FTA route and negotiate at length with other countries to ensure that its national interests are secured.
- Chambers such as the CII, FICCI, and ASSOCHAM do not directly influence the formulation of the government’s economic and foreign policy, but certainly give inputs to the government as far as economic foreign policy projections are concerned.
- It is not enough to simply say that Diasporas in countries which are authoritarian have problems of dual loyalties and that in democracies they flourish and are able to spread their values since the process is far more complex. With the exception of North America, UK and to a much lesser extent Australia, Diasporas simply do not have the elbow room to propel themselves forward politically.
- As far as the India-China bilateral economic relationship is concerned, if one were to look at the composition of the trade between them, one is unsure of how strong or sustainable this trade relationship is or how long it will survive. Further, it is important to analyze how the relationship between India and China will evolve in a regional context as also India’s relative position vis-à-vis China in the various regional summits.
- India is still in an evolving stage of its comprehensive national power which is nowhere close to playing any prospective role of a global power. India in fact, is even struggling to play the role of a strong regional player. At present, India is pursuing and is likely to continue to follow a two-pronged approach: one, a growth strategy and the other, an interest-based strategy. While the first is largely an internal strategy seeking to address the numerous domestic dichotomies that exist and build a strong internal power base by strengthening India’s infrastructure, socio-economic development, and political institutions; the other aims to enhance India’s growth and development potential whether in areas of energy or economic security.
- The exercise of power requires institutions; its exercise requires one to orchestrate the economic, strategic and external dimensions of policies. Unfortunately, in India, the institutions necessary are at a very nascent stage.
- When we debate issues such as the perceptions of India as a global power, why is it that critical voices such as those of post-colonialists, feminists, or Marxists get ignored or sidetracked? Why do their voices go unheard by the strategic enclave? Do they not matter or do they have no power of expression and therefore, are seen as irrelevant in the discourse?
- When you take democracy as a defining and independent variable, does it help our understanding more than the realist variables of ‘power’ and ‘national interest’?
- The Indian caucuses are well-represented among the democrats and seem to have a higher representation compared to the Chinese. While this may do a lot for the Indian Diaspora in American society, from a realist perspective, if the role of the Diaspora is part of the domestic framework, then can it play any significant role in improving India’s image internationally?
Sonali Huria and Annapoorna Karthika
Research Officers, IPCS
Email: sonali@ipcs.org; kart.anna@gmail.com
