Developing a More Propitious Framework for China-India Relations: Debriefing of an India-China Track II Dialogue held in Beijing on 27-28 March 2010
Report of the debriefing held at the India International Center on 16 April 2010
Chair
Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee, Director, IPCS
Panelists
Prof Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor, Chinese Studies, Center for East Asian Studies, JNU
Prof Swaran Singh, Professor, Diplomacy & Disarmament, CIPOD, JNU
Brig Arun Sahgal, Consultant, IPCS
Ms Suhasini Haider, Deputy Foreign Editor and Prime-Time anchor, CNN-IBN
Dr Sanjaya Baru, Editor, Business Standard
Prof Srikanth Kondapalli
The Chinese delegation was of the opinion that in the global realm, international alignments are changing and there has been a dramatic reorganization of the international order especially with the rise of India and China. As far as their responses to regional issues were concerned, they suggested for instance, a comprehensive settlement on Afghanistan through political and ethnic reconciliation.
On the question of the rise of India and China, the views were relatively subdued; a key argument being that India and China should avoid being overly confident in terms of investing in their defense budgets. The Chinese view India’s strategic leadership as rational, despite the problems at a tactical level, which have caused much mistrust between the two countries. A need was felt to give Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) a fresh thrust, since till date, CBMs have only prevented conflict and not resulted in the building of trust between the two countries.
The Chinese participants seemed agreeable to an idea that some method should be found by which India and Pakistan could be included in the nuclear club, without changing the core aspects of the non-proliferation regime. One of the arguments made by the Chinese was the view put forth by the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, that the provision of nuclear technology to Pakistan by the US was only a means to strategically balance that of India’s in the post-123 agreement phase.
Prof Swaran Singh
There are varied shades of opinion within China on issues of terrorism and counterterrorism, how much interest they have in allowing India to discuss counterterrorism issues across China, and to what extent they see India involved in these issues. There is a fundamental dichotomy between India and China in their respective understanding of issues such as terrorism and counterterrorism, among others. China has no compunction in acknowledging that it is a victim of terrorism and even goes to the extent of emphasizing the links that their terrorist organizations have with external forces. India and China are signatories to almost all the major international conventions dealing with terrorism, they underline that most counterterrorism operations should happen under the auspices of the United Nations and that China has supported counterterrorism measures within a regional setting. There is an overlap now where they are both observers in each other’s organizations providing visibility to each other’s opinion in these discussions. They are looking for an open space for cooperation specifically in joint training in areas of hostage taking and hijacking issues. |
Brig Arun Sahgal
On the question of boundary, China feels that a resolution will take time; it also links boundary issues with nationalistic sentiment. Any boundary settlement has to be just and fair and meet the aspirations of both, the Indians and Chinese. On the question of Taiwan and Arunachal Pradesh, China projects India as using these issues as leverage against the Chinese; they condemn the media hype and allege that the West is behind it.
There has been a trust deficit between the two countries because of intrusions, belligerent statements within the Chinese media, military modernization and developments in Tibet. The Indian delegation suggested using tactical measures, including water management and certain CBMs like pre-launch warning of missiles, non-deployment of tactical missiles, and bringing UAVs within the ambit of air intrusions.
The Chinese are amenable to joint cooperation on maritime issues. Basing should not just be for R&R (Rest and Refill), but also military facilities. On the issue of South China Sea, they contend that India’s Look East Policy has a force projection content which worries the Chinese.
Suhasini Haider
China and India’s cooperation at the Copenhagen Conference (also referred to as the Copenhagen dividend) was exemplary and played a critical role in improving the bilateral relationship. For the media, last year was a black year in Indo-China relations. The problem stems from the limited interaction between media establishments in both countries. Media-to-media relations and exchanges must be strengthened and they should be regarded as an integral part of the bilateral dialogue. In China, the Indian media’s position on issues is sometimes confused with the official Indian position. There should be greater coverage of China and issues concerning it in the Indian press. This year however, has been different, with a growing recognition within China that India and China need to rework their relationship.
Dr Sanjaya Baru
China had been taking its sustained rise for granted which was perhaps justified given its continuous growth in the last 30 years. The global economic crisis therefore, came as a rude shock to China. China and India remained relatively unaffected by the global economic recession, with which the latter was able to deal efficiently, a fact greatly appreciated within China.
For China, while Xingjian is a prominent issue, Pakistan does not figure high on its list of concerns. The fundamental difference between the Tibetan Buddhists and the Xingjian Muslims is that the challenge posed by the former is still a local phenomenon, unlike the latter which has global ramifications and thus, concerns China more.
As far as economic cooperation is concerned, China does not view India as a competitor or challenge since it is far ahead of India in terms of its economic progress. Alternatively, China views India as a tremendous market for its goods with great economic opportunities.
Discussion
Naval Military Basing
• MOS (Defense) MM Pallam Raju’s statement on India securing the Indian Ocean for Chinese shipping came up during the discussions with Chinese think tanks. There is great sensitivity within China regarding maritime issues owing to the country’s history of opium wars and gunboat diplomacy. The need for Chinese involvement in maritime security is warranted because of its significant increase in trade worldwide and the fact that 80 per cent of China’s oil travels through the Malacca straits and is therefore, dependent on the Indian Ocean region.
• Chinese interests in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters has increased significantly which is why there is a need for increased patrolling by Chinese ships in the region. This patrolling is based on three principles – a) China’s needs, b) countries providing them with naval bases, and, c) not making it a security issue in the region.
• The Chinese have acknowledged a positive role that India can play in maritime cooperation, through the use of Indian aircraft carriers in humanitarian operations. However, while the Chinese are wary of cooperation with the Indians on their turf, they are willing to cooperate with the Indians on Indian turf. Therefore, the Chinese great power mentality dissuades them from cooperation with India in the East China Sea.
• Concerns exist regarding China’s naval profile, particularly since a base is seen as a foot in the door, having military connotations. As the closest naval power in the region, India’s role in cooperating with China is strongly emphasized. Challenges to China in the maritime domain would particularly accentuate the need to work with the Indian navy, especially in light of the recent situation regarding the hijacking of a Chinese bulk carrier off Somalia.
Role of the Media
• The role of the Indian media, despite inaccuracies in its reporting, has helped contribute to the opening up of the Chinese to Indian concerns and vice versa.
• The media’s role needs to be strengthened as a means of contributing to lessening tensions between the two countries. Therefore, media-to-media tie ups are strongly recommended. The view of Beijing from a China-based correspondent carries more weight than that of an Indian-based reporter. The increased coverage of either country in the press of each country needs to be encouraged as a means of breaking down barriers of communication.
China-Terrorism-Pakistan
• There was no discussion on the subject of terrorism, despite both countries facing a threat from the al Qaeda
• The role of Pakistan was brought up, and Indian requests for China to impress upon India’s positive contributions in Afghanistan were declined. China views Pakistan as a friend and will not antagonize it.
• However, the possibility of holding a tri-lateral dialogue between the three countries was raised.
• The Chinese are shy of mentioning the role of Islamic fundamentalism and wary of publicly discussing the role of Pakistan in the unrest in the Urumqi and Xingjian provinces.
• Members of the Chinese military who were a part of the delegation engage officially with Pakistan on counter-terrorism issues and are regularly briefed on the Jihadi groups operating in the region.
Bilateral Relationship
• There has been a significant increase in the number of Indians visiting China, including students, tradesman, businessmen etc, which bodes well for bilateral relations.
• The increase in the number of meetings – from bilateral to multilateral forums, is a positive development.
• There is a need to work towards relaxing visa norms for Chinese nationals. This can help promote people-to-people contact, thereby reducing negative opinions on either side.
• The question of the Dalai Lama and water issues were discussed at both the Singapore and Beijing dialogues. The Chinese continue to allege that the Tibetan government in exile is active. The delegation did not respond to questions on the issue of water.
• There was no mention of Chinese interest in joining SAARC.
• The present extremist Chinese position posits the eastern sector as an important component, thereby promoting the acquisition of Aksai Chin and parts of Arunachal Pradesh. Compared to a moderate position which seeks to go back to relations in November 1959.
• China does not view its nuclear paradigm as South Asia-focused, and will not use nuclear weapons against India.
• The success of the Chinese economy is to be emulated by India, and it should be noted that the success was not an easy road. India would need to be wary of an economic strategic hold by Chinese investment in the country.
Report by:
Pia Malhotra, Siddharth Ramana, and Tara Sarin
Research Officers, IPCS
