2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Security Summit
Chair: Professor PR Chari, Research Professor, IPCS
Panelists:
Professor R Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Amb Arundhati Ghose, Former Permanent Representative of India to the UN Conference on Disarmament
Mr K Subrahmanyam, Strategic Affairs Analyst
Introductory Remarks: Prof PR Chari
In the past fifteen days, events have accelerated in the non-proliferation and disarmament domain. The successful conclusion of the Nuclear Security Summit, signing of the arms control treaty between Russia and the US and release of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) are three such important events. The panel should focus on the technological aspects that will have to be faced to achieve non-proliferation and disarmament, like breeder reactors, the possibility of developing new proliferation-resistant reactor technologies, and the implications of small modular nuclear reactors being established to generate power. The panel could also speculate on the likely outcome of the upcoming NPT Review Conference and the role that India can play to achieve the non-proliferation and disarmament goal.
Professor R Rajaraman
The focus of the Nuclear Security Summit was to secure nuclear materials around the world. Nuclear materials [plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] are artificial materials that provide the explosive energy for nuclear weapons. They are produced by costly and complicated enrichment and reprocessing techniques that require the construction of large facilities that even nation states find difficult to conceal. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda may find these facilities virtually impossible to construct. Also, stealing an assembled nuclear weapon is difficult, even in unstable states like Pakistan, where nuclear weapon facilities are well guarded. The other option for terrorists is to make their own weapons using fissile materials pilfered from a nation state’s nuclear stockpile. It takes only 5kg of plutonium or 25-40kg of HEU to make a Hiroshima type bomb. There are large stockpiles (500 tons of plutonium and 1600 tons of HEU) of these fissile materials spread across 40 countries in the world and a significant amount of such materials (300 tons of HEU) is currently unaccounted for. Even the non-nuclear states possess about 10 tons of HEU (sufficient for 400 nuclear warheads). Hence, the goal of securing fissile materials cannot be limited only to the P5. The Nuclear Security Summit achieved some concrete commitments. Ukraine committed to getting rid of all its HEU from dismantled Soviet-era nuclear weapons. However, there were no declarations with binding commitments on all countries. The summit was cleverly designed to discuss only those aspects of non-proliferation (safety and security) on which everybody was bound to agree. The invitation to the Indian leadership to participate alongside the P5 is a sign of India’s growing acceptability at the nuclear high table. Prime Minister Singh’s decision to set up a Global Center for Nuclear Security in India with four schools to conduct research on proliferation resistant nuclear technologies is a positive measure.
Under the new START Treaty, the US and Russia will reduce their arsenals to 1550 deployed warheads, which is 30 per cent lower than what is provided in the Moscow Treaty. The new START treaty will have a duration of 10 years with an option to extend it by 5 years. The main advantage of this initiative is that both parties have established various technical procedures and verification mechanisms that will enable deeper reductions in the future. On the downside, the nuclear triads of both the US and Russia will continue to be maintained.
It seems that the US will decrease the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear states and is prepared to strengthen its longstanding negative security assurances by declaring it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
Amb Arundhati Ghose
The US has some concrete evidence about nuclear weapons or fissile materials falling into the hands of terrorists, and that is why it organized the Nuclear Security Summit at the level of heads of states. The US has brought in the issue of nuclear safety and security as the fourth pillar of the non-proliferation regime. At its core, the summit was a norm setting exercise and 47 countries committed politically to secure their fissile materials. The PM’s statement that India was a potential victim of nuclear terrorism was the first explicit articulation of the country’s security interests in a multilateral forum. India has repositioned itself thereby in the international nuclear debate.
The Nuclear Posture Review suggests a new approach, though the language used in it is very ambivalent. It seems to be a compromise text that addresses a multiplicity of audiences, but also attempts to bridge disagreements within the Obama administration itself. The US has made an effort to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its National Security Strategy.
K Subrahmanyam
President Obama declared that it is a cruel irony that the risks of nuclear confrontation have gone down while the risks of nuclear attack have increased. The US now accepts that the risks of a nuclear war among nations have come down significantly. The NPR is derived from this conclusion. The risks of nuclear attacks have two components, one is the availability of fissile materials, and second is that there are people who will launch this attack, the non-state actors or terrorist groups. The responsibility of states to eliminate them was not discussed at the Nuclear Security Summit. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh referred to them when he said that it was the responsibility of the state concerned to deal with these elements.
The NPR starts with the assumption that the risk of nuclear war has come down and nuclear weapons would only be used under extreme circumstances, stopping short of a No First Use (NFU) policy. One criticism of the NPR in the US was that there was no mention of nuclear weapons being used for the defence of the US.
The only country from which the US faces a threat to its homeland is from Pakistan. One nuclear threat which has not been discussed in the NPR is the threat of nuclear blackmail. In spite of everything Pakistan has done against the US, it has not been able to do anything to Pakistan because they are a nuclear weapon power. Pakistan feels that a certain amount of terrorist threat is necessary in the US to ensure that this will allow the US to continuously provide aid to Pakistan. The NPR is deficient; while it talks about a nuclear attack and stopping proliferation of nuclear terrorism, it does not talk about nuclear blackmail. The US must be having a strategy of their own, but they are not discussing this in public. It may be to get close to Pakistan, and ensure that their dependence is so high that they will be able to lay down its own terms.
Discussion
Nuclear Posture Review
• The NPR declares that the US will not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, even if they attack the US, its allies or partners with chemical or biological weapons, but will instead face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response. Who are these partners? Can India be considered one?
• The US already has a conventional lead that is far beyond that of any other country to an extent that would satisfy the domestic opposition against nuclear weapons reduction. The policy direction is to move from nuclear to conventional defence.
Nuclear Security Summit
• President Obama is a pragmatist, and is trying to see how he can increase the space for maneuver by addressing the US obligations under Article VI before the NPT Review Conference. The reason why the Nuclear Security Summit has been held and the delay in the announcement and formulation of the NPR indicates that a certain level of deterrence will continue to be required. Therefore the only pragmatic approach that can be adopted is to deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Indian context
• India needs to take a practical approach in taking various decisions. If the conclusion is that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treat (CTBT) would not affect India’s basic deterrent capability, then it would be worthwhile for India to keep opposing the CTBT even if the US signs on and others follow suit. India should take a firm stand on the CTBT rather than depending on what others will do. Similarly, for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), India must be having adequate fissile materials for purposes of deterrence. This is something in which India can partner with the United States. . The threat that India faces is with regard to nuclear terrorism from Pakistan, perhaps from non-state actors. But it is not clear whether India has the wherewithal to deal with this threat effectively, and perhaps here there is a need for collaboration with the US. This is an opportunity for India to abandon its traditional obstructionist approach, and play a constructive role in the overall global dialogue.
• It has been over ten years since India’s nuclear doctrine was formulated, and it is time to review the objectionable parts. The word “massive” to qualify retaliation with nuclear weapons for biological and chemical attacks should be removed. If a war game simulation is carried out between India and Pakistan or India and China leading to nuclear escalation, we will realize that this probability is extremely low, although it is important to ensure that there is no risk of an accidental nuclear exchange. Hence, the need for additional confidence building measures.
Report By:
Tara Sarin, Research Officer, IPCS
Chaitanya Ravi, Research Intern, IPCS
