Post-Election Scenario in Myanmar
Report of Interactive Discussion held at IPCS on 3 December 2010
Chair: Maj Gen (Retd.) Dipankar Banerjee, Director, IPCS
Chief Speaker: Amb Bhaskar Mitra, former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar
Myanmar’s foreign relations are at a delicate juncture at present. Its first elections after two decades aimed at achieving international recognition for its surge towards democracy. With the expected victory of the military junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, that has not happened so far. Moreover, internal developments in Myanmar with regards to Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, its cascading effect and the issues of ethnic minorities are keeping the junta on its toes.
Internal Developments
There are three components of Myanmar’s political structure: the military, the ethnic groups in the border provinces and the pro-democracy groups.
The military in Myanmar remains extremely secretive. Since the military takeover two decades ago, there have been numerous speculations on the possibility of an internal coup, but nothing has happened. Evidence suggests that the Myanmarese army is a unified force and anything unusual is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. Unlike many other countries, the army is careful to not disturb the basic structure of society and thus, there is no open hatred for the army from any quarter, except the political.
As in the Indonesian experience, Myanmar’s integration with the region and the consequent economic development, will lead to a rise of the middle class, triggering eventual changes in Myanmar’s political structure.
An institutional civil bureaucracy is paramount for democracy in Myanmar. The elections are just the beginning of a transformation. Myanmar needs about 15-20 years and an internal process to restore a workable, stable and permanent solution to political problems. One cannot simply transplant political models in other countries.
Suu Kyi Factor
Political groupings have changed in 20 years ago. A faction of the NLD broke away in the run-up to the elections, weakening the party. Politically, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a leader without a party and thus, not as powerful as she once was. The new constitution debars her from contesting elections and so she can bring change only by persuasion and dialogue, not force. In the foreseeable future, Myanmar will be very stable, and Suu Kyi’s rise depends on the collapse of the entire governing machinery. This time the military took no chances and were better prepared for the elections, which they won.
Ethnic Divide
The ethnic situation in Myanmar is as bad as in the Indian Northeast, just more magnified. All border areas in Myanmar have ethnic minorities-related problems. If Myanmar’s ethnic groups can satisfy their political aspirations without destabilizing the country, they would enjoy support. To raise the conflict to the level of 1980s is highly unlikely. They are also tired now and want some normalcy.
Since 1990, the Myanmar junta has been very wise in fighting the ethnic insurgencies. It took severe military action against the ethnic insurgent groups and forced them to come to the table for talks; most of them signed ceasefire agreements with the regime. The most powerful ethnic armies have now been reduced to a fraction of what they used to be. Converting the ethnic ceasefire groups into Border Guard Forces which function under the junta was a strategic decision which seems to have worked. Myanmar has managed to wean ethnic groups from the height of power they possessed in 1999, and break the chain of violence by shifting the power to the regime. The question now is not how to bring down the regime, but how to realize the interests of ethnic minorities in such a scenario. It is safe to assume that prosperity would bring them all together.
With regards to the Wa army in Shan State, while it is larger and more powerful, its area of influence is limited and until it decides to contest elections and possibly win at the State level, its sphere of influence will remain limited.
There are reports that many of the ethnic groups used the ceasefire time to rearm and reintegrate their support base. In anticipation of such a situation spiraling out of control, the military has been beefing up its presence in border areas. All ethnic groups in Myanmar are now politically savvy and have seen the gains of political engagement and of the rise of trade and industry. One cannot expect these groups to take up jungle warfare like they did back in the 1980s and 1990s and face off against a much stronger Myanmarese army.
China and India
Every country pursues its national interest over everything else. In this context, for India, Myanmar’s internal stability is a larger concern than pushing for democracy.
Since the early 1990s, India has been engaging with Myanmar more proactively and the Rs.5.5 billion Sittwe transit project on river Kaladan is an example. India already has a few sizeable investments in Myanmar, like a Japanese truck assembly factory which was taken over by Tata and a computer training centre in Yangon, run by the Pune-based Indian government-run CDAC. There are also small units in Mandalay for training in skills like carpentry and metal work. Also, while India has lost marketing rights of energy blocks to China, Myanmar did give India’s state-run ONGC Videsh Limited preference for three deep sea concessions in A1 and A3 blocks.
Meanwhile, the economic participation of China in Myanmar is to the tune of US$8 billion. The West’s sanctions have been largely counter-productive and that is why Myanmar needs China’s support. Western media has forced certain perceptions on people. The Americans are now starting some forward movement with respect to their policies in Myanmar in view of their failure to isolate the regime. Myanmar could, in fact, become a hot destination for international investments.
There is no competition between India and China over Myanmar. The Chinese economy is bigger than the Indian economy which explains why China invests more in Myanmar than India.
Similarly, the Indian and Chinese diasporas in Myanmar cannot be compared. The 1960’s anti-Chinese riots in Myanmar left a large number of the Chinese diaspora dead and caused many others to flee the country. By contrast, nationalization of land only left Indian landowners divested of their property, even if many also left the country to escape its repressive policies. Those who stayed back had nowhere to go. Thus, while the Chinese were forced to leave, the Indians left voluntarily.
Border Trade
Most of China’s trade with Myanmar happens at the border. For India, the statistics are grim. On Myanmar’s side of the border there does not seem to be a problem. The Indian side though is plagued by insurgency, poor border crossings, bad roads and infrastructure and so on. These problems need to be corrected before India can match up to the kind of border trade China has with Myanmar.
India’s border trade regime with Myanmar has only 16 items on the tradable list. India should look for normal trade with Myanmar with only a list of negative items. India’s trade is already over US$ 1.4 billion with Myanmar in pulses, timber, gems and jewels, among other things. India should also look towards Myanmar to import fish fisheries which form a thriving industry since too much is spent on transportation and cargo charges to get fish to the Northeast from Gujarat or Maharashtra. Timber can be another product in the trade between India and Myanmar.
In China’s case, economic activity along Yunnan-Myanmar border has stabilized the law and order situation also. Perhaps India can emulate this model for stability in its Northeast, such as developing transit points like Moreh-Tamu along the lines of the Myanmar-Ruili-Kunming road developed by the Chinese.
Myanmar and the Rest of the World
There is substantial investment by Southeast Asian countries like Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia in Myanmar. Private investors may not be comfortable investing in Myanmar due to the apparent lack of stability or security concerns in that country, but that is an eventuality that has to be faced.
Germany and Japan were the biggest investors in Myanmar till 1988. The US and UK also supported the erstwhile government politically. That regime, with its isolationist policies, impoverished and alienated Myanmar internationally the most. By contrast, the economic development of Myanmar under the present regime is astounding. It is inclusive and comprehensive; even the Indian diaspora which suffered large-scale repression economically and were stuck in a vicious circle of poverty have since moved forward and are doing well.
Myanmar’s Nuclear Programme
So far, there has not been any concrete evidence to suggest that Myanmar is nuclear-capable. Some Myanmarese scientists were trained in Russia with experimental nuclear reactors and Russia had agreed to sell them some reactors but, Myanmar does not have the funds to pay for these reactors and the issue has thus not moved any further. The IAEA report indicating the presence of nuclear capability in Myanmar should not be taken as the gospel truth because it had also prepared a report on Iraq’s nuclear capability which eventually turned out to be a false alarm.
Conclusion
In 1948, Myanmar had the best potential for development based on its high level of natural resources, human resources and access to education. Then it went into decades of downfall and impoverishment, and only for about the last 20 years has it begun trying to inch back to normalcy. To recover from all the years of economic plunder and international isolation, it will need greater support from the international community.
Report by Medha Chaturvedi, Research Officer, SEARP, IPCS
