Afghanistan - SEMINAR REPORT

Afghanistan - Recent Developments

Speaker:
Dr. William Maley
Director, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy

Opening Remarks: Amb Salman Haidar

A very warm welcome to Dr. Maley, who apart from his extensive knowledge on the topic of today's discussion is also very well versed with India-Australia relations. He travels often to Afghanistan and facilitates discussions that help in the formulation of policy.

Dr. William Maley

There has been a long engagement between India and Afghanistan. Recent developments in Afghanistan are indicative of problems that were easily discernable during the process of the Bonn Agreement itself. The challenges following the overthrow of the Taliban were not adequately addressed in the Bonn Agreement, although it was the best agreement obtainable at that point in time.

The wider context of Afghanistan's problem involves the disintegration of government and the collapse of the state. During the communist rule, denial of access to the countryside undercut the domestic funding of Afghanistan's economy, making it completely dependent on Soviet aid. The resistance forces that took over next inherited the symbols of the state, but not its substance. The battle for the capital city of Kabul stems from this attempt at de-legitimizing the new authority that has now taken over this symbol of power in Afghanistan.

There was also a fragmentation of the political elite. Ideological divergences led to major schisms between the radicals and those supportive of the return of the exiled king, Zahir Shah. Afghanistan also experienced massive social dislocation. Six million Afghans became refugees which is indicative of how very large numbers were extracted from their economic and social activities. This is what gave the Taliban a toehold; rather than being "village vandals", the Taliban were a pathogenic movement that led to a breakdown of Afghan society, which was potentially dangerous. There was also the destabilisation by neighbouring powers, most importantly Pakistan. In addition, the American toleration of the Pakistani policy of interference in Afghanistan had horrendous consequences in terms of its domestic ramifications for Pakistan.

Although some measures of the Bonn Agreement were met and the Loya Jirgas were held in 2002-2003, there were key limitations to the agreement. The first was the design of the political institutions, embedded in the constitutional process, which lay emphasis on the old structure of administration and brought back the problem of widespread nepotism. The second problem was that since the government was imprecisely defined and existed mostly only on paper, ferocious rivalries came about in the wake of foreign aid being injected into the Afghan economy. The third problem was that of the transition of justice. After decades of bloodshed, the norms of justice applied to Afghan didn't address the argument between the ethic of forgiveness and that of absolving criminals from the past. The fourth problem was that of security. There was no capacity to provide basic security for the ordinary people and there was no immediate solution to this problem, only the anticipation which in turn led to the demand for the deployment of the ISAF in the capital. This deployment was then blocked in provinces beyond Kabul due to the momentum of the transition process and other political factors.

President Karzai tried to identify potential spoilers to his authority and used the strategy of incorporation to discourage people from going the other way. This policy however had adverse long term consequences, for it damaged the state's reputation and squeezed out tribal leaderships. These leaderships had already been marginalized during the Taliban rule and this was multiplying under donor activities and the presence of international agencies. The under-resourcing of transition meant that the recipients of direct assistance ensured that reconstruction entailed far greater costs than what it would have been under the local Afghans. Showcase projects were completed rapidly, eventually leading to the demand that the government be responsible for the maintenance of rapidly depreciating assets.

Although President Karzai had a clear mandate in his election and some very notable skills, his political environment was one without a concept of a state, a system based on reliance-building, not state-building. The Bonn Agreement created a presidency too strong on paper and too exacting in the President being at the centre of a politics where he had to deal with political rivalries, apart from being overburdened. The clear electoral victory would have given him procedural legitimacy but only in a consolidated system of government, not in Afghanistan. The election process was heavily criticized for ethnically mobilising different blocs, leading to an erosion of legitimacy.

The campaign in Iraq also sucked out the resources out of the Afghanistan campaign. Afghanistan is not Iraq and needs better signaling as Afghan actors are more aware of what is going on. A political process, the complexities of which are not understood by the ordinary people, might dwindle in the future. There must be international pressure for a clean and competent administration. There is no substance in pressurising Pakistan intermittently. There is a fear in the US that pressurising the Musharraf regime will lead to its downfall and that it will be replaced by a fundamentalist government. There is no possibility to negotiate with the Taliban and no guarantee for deliverance on the ground. Instead, it is a mere spectacle that will affect the legitimacy of the present government and take away from the support to the coalition forces, in the perception that the Taliban might come back.

Discussion

Comments

What were the reasons for not deploying beyond Kabul and what is the situation on the ground regarding counter-terrorism?

Instead of relentless pressure on Pakistan, in the face of an army weakened by the situation in Balochistan, is there a possibility for increased dialogue between the NATO and Pakistan?

What is India's role in Afghanistan vis-Ã -vis the Tripartite Commission? Can India make a contribution in terms of police training?

This year, there are indications of a record opium production in Afghanistan. How can this problem be countered?

How do you see the tension developing between political legitimacy, which is internally derived and performance-based legitimacy, which has an external basis?

What is the thinking of the Afghan Government on the Durand Line? What could have prompted President Karzai to reach out to the likes of Mullah Omar?

On the question of Pashtun reconciliation, in 2002, there was talk about the moderate Taliban and in 2004 President Karzai talked at length about 'national reconciliation". Why do you think that this is now a bigger problem than before?

The failure of the Bonn Agreement was caused by ethnic composition representation. The government has moved towards the consolidation of a system of government that the Afghans look at as a western-style democracy? How will that work?

What are the conditions that led to insurgency amongst the Pashtuns? What is the opinion of the government on the question of their integration with other Pashtuns across the border with Pakistan, where they are the majority of the population?

Responses

• In the north, the situation is quiet. In the east, it's increasingly troubled. Due to the weakness of the local militia structure, the south is under more serious stress. There is a particular problem in Helmand due to the cultivation of opium and poor governance. Kabul itself has had only three significant suicide bombings. Much of the fear has been projected by commercial security contractors. The reason for not deploying in Kabul has been the American decision to conserve resources for Iraq.
• The forum for dialogue is an integrated regional network like the SAARC, which will also play out the Indo-Pak relationship. Institutional mechanisms are needed for dialogue. There are problems for the Pakistani army for the tribal belt and dialogue won't help overcome that dynamic.
• Policing is in the realm of regulation. Effective policing matters, but there is no infrastructure for mentoring the police who only receive training. It is unrealistic to see this as a solution. The resources poured into the civilian police have to be balanced with the understanding that the constitution of police capability is a slow process.
• The market mechanisms of narcotics trade is changing from revenue-based to credit-based systems. The pattern of distribution is moving towards growing a crop for revenue and growing opium as collateral to get loans to grow the main crop. The problem of spoilage is also faced. A solution has been proposed in subsidising prices for non-opiate products to compensate for the absence of natural markets. The eradication of opium in Afghanistan would lead to the equivalent of a Great Depression there.
• The state is not in a position to meet either. Development in Afghanistan is not associated with the government but with the donor. For instance, the Afghan National Army's funding alone would take away all the projected internal revenue of the government. The key instrument that could derive legitimacy is structured in such a way that is unsustainable from domestic revenue.
• On the Durand Line, there is a very strong emotional sense to pursue the issue through a trilateral discussion involving the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are psychological barriers to accepting the line, especially with Pashtuns on either side of the border. President Karzai was pressurised by the General Assembly to go in for talks and this was backed by the US. There was also a personal horrification at what was going on in Afghanistan.
• The 'Strengthening of Peace' was meant for abandoning association with the Taliban. A lot of those people have now come across and those left are high level and dangerous. By reconciling some of the issues of ethnic solidarity, the objectives of these hardliners could be met. The Neo-Taliban is hardcore and closer to the Al Qaeda and not representative of the Pashtuns.
• I don't think that's true. I think we need greater resilience between political institutions and the political culture. There was a divergence between the argument for the central and the federal systems of state. At the local level, there needs to be a more devolved system. The Wolesi Jirga needs a more evolved parliamentary process.
• There is a need for disaggregation of the Pashtuns who are not a unified force. The factionalism within the Pashtuns is exploited by the Taliban. There are different actors on the ground and the specific circumstances present a more kaleidoscopic picture than a photographic one. For effective counter-insurgency, there has to be a clear diagnosis of the exact nature of the problem. A one-size-fits-all-solution will end up offending everyone. There is much less antagonism than expected towards the government, given that there is no choice for a free autonomous government in Afghanistan.