New Security Concept of China

An Analysis

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About "Inside China" Series

The China Research Program (CRP) within the Institute, as a part of its activities, undertake research and organise events under "Inside China," aimed at exploring issues and challenges in contemporary China covering economic aspects of China’s growth, political development and emerging social tensions and fault lines. This essay was a part of the first annual conference in 2011.
In the post-Cold War era, the defining feature of China’s international security discourse is ‘comprehensiveness’ (quan mian hua) and its strategic planners started talking of ‘comprehensive national strength’ in discussing the long-term security strategy (Hu 1995). In simple terms, security is no longer restricted to only military aspect but also encompassed non-military issues like economy, ideology, environment/society, and science & technology. The phrase that was used in their international relations discourse reflecting these various aspects of security was “New Security Concept” (xin anquan guandian) (NSC henceforth) first included in a major security agreement signed with Russia and other Central Asian states in 1997 (Finkelstein 2005).

The third generation of PRC leaders projected the concept as well-suited to what they claimed to be a new post-Cold War strategic environment characterized by peace and development in which threats are non-traditional involving environmental degradation, terrorism, drug trafficking, migration, energy security, and disease (like SARS, HIV/AIDS etc.). In this new era, they argued, security should be based on mutual trust and common interests. They saw the establishment of the NSC and a new just and fair international order as the only way to promote development of the disarmament process and provide the guarantee for international peace and security.

I

NEW SECURITY CONCEPT
A BACKGROUND

The end of the Cold War was interpreted by the Chinese strategist as the end of the Yalta system established by the victorious powers of the Second World War. To them, the world structure that was going to succeed the Yalta system would be multipolar dominated by the five “poles” namely, United States, China, Japan, EU, and Russia. Until the world becomes multipolar, there would be an intervening phase characterized by intense competition for the military prowess and Comprehensive National Power (CNP) (Pillsbury 2000: 23).

The Chinese security analysts attributed collapse of the USSR to its policy failure in the CNP competition where it focused on the military aspect at the cost of economic dimension (Pillsbury 2000: 23). Security, in the post-Cold War era, was no longer understood in terms military/state security by the Chinese leadership. Rather it took a holistic view; China’s perception of its post-Cold War security environment comprised six strands: No Major Power War; Globalization; US as a Partner and Competitor; Non-traditional Security Challenges; Energy Insecurity; and China’s Rise.


David M. Finkelstein, however, argues that the defence white paper merely capped off more
than a year and a half of clarion calls throughout the Asia-Pacific region by high level Chinese foreign policy and defence policy officials for such a new alternative concept (Finkelstein 2005 :3). For example, in their Joint Statement at the conclusion of their April 1997 summit, Presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin called for a “new and universally applicable security concept.” In December 1997, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen explained the “New Security Concept” during activities making the celebration of ASEAN’s 30th anniversary. In February 1998 Defence Minister Chi Haotian called for the establishment of a “New Security Concept” in a speech in Tokyo to the National Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies during his visit to Canberra, Australia. Avery Goldstein, described 1997 as the “year of transitions” during which the concept came into the limelight was described by (Goldstein 1997: 34).

In February 1997, Deng Xiaoping died. In July China regained the sovereignty over Hong Kong from the British. In September, the “third generation” of communist leaders, convened the 15th party congress in September. And in late October, President Jiang Zemin initiated a active phase in China’s international affairs, highlighted by his state visit to the United States. It was against this backdrop that China floated the idea of NSC. It also showed China’s growing self-confidence in successfully tiding over the crises of Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, the regime insecurity after collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in between 1989-1991. Besides, despite all the politically tumultuous times China, sustained its higher economic growth rate.

Apart from mutual/common security, another feature of the new Security Concept of China is - it broadened the concept of security in the light of combating non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, immigration, environmental degradation, drugs trafficking, diseases etc.

self-help security, the new generation of Chinese leaders interpreted as a zero-sum version of security that dominated the Cold War between the two superpowers where security of one superpower/block was regarded as the insecurity of the other. The new security/common security, they opined, included win-win diplomacy meaning maximization of security of one country did not lead to the minimization of another country’s security. It also talked of the idea of a multipolar world against the unipolar world led by the sole superpower, the US.

According to the Defence White 1998 paper, “Security cannot be guaranteed by an increase in arms, or by military alliances. Security should be based on mutual trust and common interests. We should promote trust through dialogue, seek security through cooperation, respect each other’s sovereignty, solve disputes through peaceful means and strive for common development.” Apart from mutual/common security, another feature of the NSC is— it broadened the concept of security in the light of combating non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, immigration, environmental degradation, drugs trafficking, diseases etc.

The NSC identified five types of security, namely, military, political/regime, economic, social/environmental, and scientific & technological security. This widened definition first appeared in the article in the PLA’s newspaper Jiefangjun

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The NSC was a Chinese initiative to shift from self-help security to what it termed mutual/common security (China Report 2002). China also asserted that it has moved beyond the long-held victim mentality, and as a more self-assured state and responsible global power, it is ready to play a leadership role. (Lampton 2008: 4)
Bao dated 24 Dec 1997 (Li and Wei 1997). However, military security remained the core component of NCS (Goldstein 1997). Defining military security, it said, “the military force shoulders the important mission of defending the state’s territorial sovereignty and integrity, resisting foreign aggression and safeguarding state unification. Therefore it is necessary to strengthen army building, develop armament and reform the military organization. The military forces of all countries should play a role in a broader scope such as cracking down on terrorism and drug trafficking, rescue work and humanitarian aid. “

This definition of military security is quite similar to the conventional definition of security, which deals with territoriality, reunification, use of coercive power of the state to realize political aims, military modernization, and threat perception from a hostile neighbour and so on. After the disintegration of the USSR, China no longer faced any direct military threat from the North. For the first time since the first Opium War (1839-1842), China enjoyed a security environment free from any military threat to its territorial integrity by a major power. However its territorial claims over islands in the East China sea (in Chinese Diaoyu and in Japanese Senkaku), South China seas (Spratly and Parcel islands), Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet in Chinese) and Taiwan poses serious military challenges to the PLA.

Out of all these territorial issues, Taiwan is the most serious military challenge. Taiwan’s de jure independence might pave the way for the secession of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. Strategically, China would lose control of its door to the western-pacific. Also, it is possible that to militarily balance its giant neighbour, Taiwan might forge alliance with the US and Japan and thereby seriously endangering China’s security environment. It is important to note - before unveiling the New Concept of Security in 1997, China indulged in missile diplomacy against Taiwan during 1995-96 to intimidate and thus prevent it from disobeying one-China policy. Finally, a vibrant democratic Taiwan is an existential threat to the communist China by its very existence.

Importantly, the Defence paper has also incorporated into military security non-traditional issues like terrorism, rescue work and humanitarian aid, and drug trafficking. Terrorism along with extremism and separatism (“the three evils”) is a major internal security challenge faced by China in its Xinjiang province. The impetus for secession emanates partly, from ethnic and cultural differences between the Han and the local peoples, and partly from the ethnic and religious ties between Uigurs and Uzbeks on both sides of the border (Wu 1998: 130).

The fact that China is a highly earthquake-prone country, post-quake emergency rescue operations have been included as part of military security. Also, drug trafficking along the “Golden Triangle” involving Chinese mainland, Hong Kong and Macao has become a major challenge for PLA after the integration of the Chinese economy into the world economy since the Policy of Reform and Open Up (gaige kaifang) by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.

Defining the political/regime security, the defence paper has stated, “the political body and system of the state cannot be changed by another country, encroachment of a country’s sovereignty and unification shall not be tolerated, and no country shall meddle in the internal affairs of another country. On the international stage, all countries, big or small, poor or rich, are all equal. The big and strong
should not be allowed to bully the small and weak. In international political affairs, the superpowers should not be allowed to order other countries about, pursue power politics and impose their values on others. These are the indispensable prerequisites for global and regional security.”

Clearly, there is an anxiety amongst the communist leadership in China over regime survival and maintaining social control. Political security became even more challenging for the Communist regime facing serious legitimacy crisis in China, after the collapse of the USSR and refutation of communism as a socio-economic ideology between late 1980s and early 1990s. Its economic interdependence over the US in the second wave of globalization posed a serious dilemma in terms of perpetuating the communist ideology and adopting a capitalist democracy. Wu Xinbo, an associate professor at the Centre for American Studies at the Fudan University, argue that China faced two sources of threat to its political security, namely, peaceful evolution and Bourgeois Liberalism (Wu 1998).

The communist regime in Beijing since the 1950s has believed that the capitalist world led by the EU and the US has been following a two pronged strategy to sabotage communist regimes in the rest of the world, namely, military containment and peaceful evolution. To them, the West successfully employed this strategy against the Soviet Union and now China is their prime target. Their interpretation of peaceful evolution included western economic aid and trade as the Trojan Horse in order to gain political influence, ideological and cultural intrusion through various channels, such as fanning the anti-government sentiment, supporting political dissidents and nurturing the western forces.

During 1989-1991. A segment of the Chinese society influenced by western values has started questioning the monopoly of CCP. They also became sceptical about its competence to manage China’ post-Open Door economy. The new entrepreneurial and middle class that emerged in China in the post-Mao era started to demand more political freedom and emerged as a serious challenge for the CCP survival. To the communist regime, the most fearsome scenario was the nexus between internal and external hostile forces. The Tiananmen Square incident has increased this fear. The regime saw the incident as the handiwork of the western anti-communist forces which incited the students to demand overthrow of the CCP and to dismantle the socialist order in China.

The NSC incorporated economic security as the most important dimension of the post-Cold War concept of security. Although the sound economy had been a top priority in the national agenda since Deng Xiaoping took the helm in late 1970s, its pivotal contribution to the national security was recognized only between late 1980s and early 1990s. The crumbling of communism in the Eastern Europe coupled with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 deepened the conviction of the PRC leaders that national security depends on a solid economic base and not on the military might. Consequently, the 14th Congress of the Communist Party in 1992 stated, “modern Chinese history and the realities of the present-day world show that so long as a country is economically backward, it will be in a passive position, subject to manipulation by others. Nowadays the competition among the various countries is, in essence, a competition of overall national strength based on economic, scientific and technological capabilities.”

III
Bourgeois Liberalism

The ideology based on Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thoughts started to lose its charm in China since the 1980s when communism as a socio-economic system started to crumble in the Eastern Europe and most importantly, in the Soviet Union, the cradle of communist ideology

President Jiang Zemin linked economic security to the regime survival when he stated, “If we fail to develop our economy rapidly, it will be very difficult for us to consolidate the Socialist system and maintain long-term social stability” (Beijing Review 1992: 19) Similarly, the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in his speech to the United Nations Assembly in 1994 said, “economic priority has become the international trend, as
all countries of the world universally attach importance to developing their economies and strengthening international economic cooperation. The Chinese government takes economic construction as the central task of the whole country and makes reform and opening up one as of its basic state policies.” (Ong 2002: 23).

Against the above backdrop, economic security was included as one of the five pillars of the NSC. Describing it, the defence paper said, “the economic interests of a country must not be encroached upon; state-to-state economic relations should be established on the basis of equality, co-operation and common development; no country should be allowed to apply economic sanctions to retaliate against the other, still less use economic sanctions to obtain political gains; trade, investment and other economic activities should be carried out in the light of the principle of mutual benefits, and the most favoured-nation trading status and entry to the World Trade Organization should not be used as ‘cards’ to exert pressure on another country and disrupt the country’s economic development; economic competition should proceed in accordance with international rules and regulations; economic problems, friction and differences are normal, and should be resolved through dialogue on equal footing, consultation and talks.”

Thus, the Chinese definition of economic security included steady economic growth based on free and fair access to overseas market and uninterrupted supply of natural resources like hydrocarbons and minerals as raw materials for the industry. Notably, China became a net importer of oil since 1993. The oil exploitation activities by countries such as Vietnam in some parts of the South China Sea where China claims sovereignty, it considered as a threat to its economic security. China opposed regional protectionism such as, the passage of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and the establishment of a unified European economic community as a threat to its economic security. It also involved discarding economic sanctions and de-politicization of economic issues. For example, as a result of the Tiananmen Square incident, both the EU and the US imposed sanctions on China. The US also linked the annual renewal of MFN (Most Favorite Nation) status for China to its concessions on human rights, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countries such as Pakistan and North Korea, and other issues. Likewise the US made fulfillment of these demands as a precondition to the Chinese entry into WTO (Alagappa 1998: 128).

For Beijing, economic security also meant resolution of economic issues through institutions rather than unilateralism. Interestingly, China’s NSC talked of Social security as well, which primarily consisted of keeping population under check and environment degradation. Defining it, the defence paper said: “Keeping population growth strictly under control so as to ease the consumption of common human property; making efforts to protect resources so as to extend the life limit of earth and mankind; and eliminating environmental pollution and allowing mankind to have a piece of pure and permanent land for their subsistence.”

Rising population has been a primary social concern for the communist regime in China. In order to deal with this social menace, China introduced One-Child Policy in 1978 and initially applied it to first-born children in the year of 1979. The policy was touted by the Chinese government as an instrument to alleviate social, economic, and environmental problems in China.
What is exacerbating this problem of population control, is the huge waves of migrants from the poor regions such as rural areas and the interior, to the prosperous cities heavily concentrated along the eastern cost of China. This scale of migration, in turn, has given rise to serious economic disparity in China between the coastal areas and the interior, and between cities and the countryside apart from creating huge unemployment problem especially in the cities. These social challenges became a source of serious threat to social stability.

Social stability has become an obsession with the communist regime since 1980s. During the Maoist era communist ideology kept the society together. However, with the opening up of the Chinese economy, many social issues have manifested themselves in China. China lost social control especially in the countryside. The market reforms and the relaxation of the political control over the society went hand in hand. This change was evident in the rural areas in particular where the “people’s commune” was dissolved and the farms were decollectivized. This triggered loss of political control over vast rural areas resulting in law and order challenge and societal chaos (Alagappa 1998: 134).

Another dimension of China’s social security is environmental degradation. The primary cost China paid for its economic development was in the form of environmental pollution. China’s economic growth was industry-driven. It contributed more than 65 percent to China’s gross national product since it started in the early 1980s. However, it played primary role in degrading China’s natural environment by polluting China’s rivers, soil and air, apart from massive deforestation.

The menace of rampant corruption contributed to the environmental pollution in China along with industrialization. As Wu argued that China passing through a transitional period when communism lost its influence on people’s behaviour but the system of rule by law not yet well established, those who held power could easily become corrupt. Chasing the political gains of economic development such as promotions based on attraction of FDI, local officials in China often overlooked environmental laws, worker safety and public health problems. Collusion between the local officials and polluters became very common. The companies bribed the officials to turn a blind eye to the gross violations of environmental standards. This led to the pollution of air, water and soil up to dangerous levels (Alagappa 1998).

As a fifth dimension of NSC, the paper also addressed the scientific and technological security: Science and technology should benefit rather than ruin mankind. For this reason, it is necessary to bring science and technology into the track of peace and development.

Thus S&T security, according to the PRC leaders, would be ensured by diverting their applications from destruction such as war towards developmental activities like socio-economic development and nation-building. They saw S&T as a vital instrument in China’s speedy socio-economic development and national security. It is notable that S&T was one of the four components of Four Modernizations initiative originally unveiled by Zhou Enlai in 1963 and which got formal go-ahead in December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee by Deng Xiaoping. S&T was considered very important to survive in an age of economic competition which new generation of Chinese leadership saw as a dominant trend in post-Cold War era. The transformation of China’s socialist economy into market economy required a vast

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labour force of skilled workers which was not possible without S&T being part of the new security agenda by the PRC leaders. Moreover, it improved the international competitiveness of major Chinese industries.

**The Concept of New Security as a Policy Option:**
The NSC unveiled in 1997 soon became a policy option for Beijing. China as an active participant in regional economic cooperation of various kinds, began working closely with other countries in the region for a multi-channel, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted new economic cooperation in East Asia. ASEAN Plus Three (involving China, Japan and South Korea besides 10 ASEAN members), an institution that emerged out of Asian financial crisis of 1997, was established in 1997 and institutionalized in 1999. It spearheaded the development of the regional economic cooperation mechanisms. China proposed FTA with ASEAN in 2001 to be operational in 2010-12. Also, China joined WTO at its Doha Development Round in Nov 2001 as the 143rd member. In December 2005, China participated in the first East Asian Summit. In 2006, it became an observer to the SAARC. Like the 1997 financial crisis, China’s role in the financial crisis of 2008-09 has been reassuring to its neighbours.

In the security arena too, China started working for the establishment and development of a regional security dialogue and cooperation mechanism. China believed that the key guarantee for Asia-Pacific security came from a regional security framework featuring dialogue instead of confrontation. To this end, China placed great importance on and taken an active part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). To bring about transparency in its military posture it started publishing white papers on national defence bi-annually since 1998. Furthermore, in order to strengthen peace and mutual trust in the disputed South China Sea, it signed with ASEAN the declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in 2002. A trilateral agreement in March 2005 with Vietnam and Philippines was also signed on the issue related to South China Sea. China became one of six members in the Six Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear programme issue in 2003.

Inside China, to bolster its socio-economic security, Chinese leadership has become more attentive to the grievances of the Chinese people emanating from rising unemployment, growing income inequalities between rural and urban households, illegal fees and taxes, corruption and environmental problems. Therefore, the Chinese government pressured local officials, who were traditionally rather autonomous, to address to the grievances of local populations and made the performance of local party officials “an increasingly important criterion in the evaluation, compensation, [promotion or demotion of local party officials]”(Tanner 2006).

Second, specifically against the rising unemployment, population growth and ageing of the Chinese population, China established a comprehensive social security system, which “is a logical requirement for coordinated economic and social development...and is also an important guarantee for the social stability and the long-term political stability of a country”, according to the Government white paper (White Paper 2004).

**IV NEW CONCEPT OF SECURITY: A CHINESE MANEUVER TO COUNTER CHINA THREAT THEORY?**

What has bee discussed so far is only the Chinese perspective on NSC. However, there is an alternative interpretation of this new concept which should also be looked into in order to analyse it in an objective and comprehensive sense.

Finkelstein, for example, has linked China’s initiative to produce the NSC to its security concerns cropping up in the aftermath of the Cold War during mid to late 1990s. He has identified three triggers behind this initiative: First, the NSC was the manifestation of the Chinese growing dissatisfaction with the emerging international order. The Chinese international theorists anticipated a multipolar world to succeed the Cold War. However, what really unfolded was an increasingly globalized
world with the United States emerging the sole super power. So the Chinese idealational discourse of “New Concept of Security” provided a framework for political, economic and security relations in the future multipolar world (Finkelstein 2005: 4). Second, China felt that its security interests are being undermined by the US policies and actions especially the strengthening of its military alliances e.g. NATO expansion into the Eastern Europe starting in 1995, NATO’s intervention in the Balkans, Partnership for Peace initiative to make inroads into Central Asia and the US Atlantic Command’s combined military exercise with Kazakhstan and Russia—CENTRAZBAT’97, the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Statement 1996 and the US-Japan Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. Besides the NSC was also a Chinese reaction to what it contemplated as the Washington’s attempt to establish its long term military primacy by developing and fielding advanced defense technologies. Hence, many Beijing’s verbal attacks on the US TBMD (Theater Ballistic Missile Defence) and NMD (National Missile Defence) initiatives were often couched in terms that argued that developing these systems “run counter” to the aspirations of many countries that want to see an end to the “cold war mentality.” Finally, the NSC initiative was an attempt to address the security concerns of the region especially the South East Asia in the wake of China aggressive posture against Taiwan in 1995, by presenting a benign and gentle posture. It was no coincidence that the concept was first formally enunciated at the 1997 ASEAN meeting. Over the 1990s, ASEAN states began to view China as the number one security concern. Indeed, the disappearance of the Soviet Union had created a major power vacuum in Southeast Asia and the ASEAN members feared that the United States might be tempted to withdraw its presence in the region; giving free rein to a militarily assertive China (Rehman 2009). In this strategically fluid environment Beijing’s action in the Spratly Islands, its claims in the South China Sea, and China’s apparent willingness to threaten military force as it did in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96 had alarmed the ASEAN states. All this was further worsened in some regional quarters by Beijing minimal defence transparency.

Chinese officials were especially concerned by the ASEAN states jointly protesting China’s actions at Mischief Reef, aPhilippine territory, in the Spratly Islands at the Hangzhou territory in 1995. As a result the “New Concept of Security” was offered to the region as a part of larger diplomatic effort to counter the so-called “China threat theory “enunciated and promoted by the US.

V

NEW SECURITY CONCEPT: AN ASSESSMENT

A retrospective look at the NSC as a policy instrument by Beijing shows that NSC has been only a partial success since its commencement in 1997. A region where it has derived success is Central Asia under the auspices of SCO. SCO’s military initiative against terror and extremism provided legitimacy to Beijing resorting to military force against Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. It also helped to safeguard border security and to reduce drug trafficking, which is one major contributor to the rapid spread of HIV in western China. The SCO also acts as bulwark against the growing US military presence in Central Asia especially since 9/11. SCO has offered China a framework within which it could pursue its energy security goals. At the Bishkek Summit in August 2007 the SCO member states concluded the Treaty on Long Term Good Neighborly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation, laying a solid political and legal foundation for security cooperation.

However, NSC initiative has left much to be desired elsewhere both inside China and in Asia-Pacific especially in South China Sea. The NSC has failed to generate mutual trust, one of the basic tenets of new security between China and its smaller neighbours in the South China Sea. If fact, it has fallen flat in the wake of belligerent posture adopted by China in the region recently. It has declared South China Sea as “core interest” last year meaning China would resort to military force defend its interests in the sea. However, Beijing actions have only reinforced China Threat theory in the minds of its small neighbours forcing them strengthen their strategic ties with the US in the region. What is more troublesome for China is that India, which China regarded as
South Asian power has made dramatic inroads east of Malacca and complicated China strategic calculus. Its relations with Vietnam, Japan, Australia, South Korea and the US are creating a security nightmare for Beijing.

Internally, China’s social security by its own definition is seriously endangered. The level of social tension and number of protests against the government is rising. In 2010, China was rocked by 180,000 protests, riots and other mass incidents mainly on land acquisitions —more than four times the tally from a decade earlier (Orlik 2011). On demographics, China is destined to become the first country to get old before it becomes rich (Goldman Sachs 2007). The Goldman Sachs report has predicted that China would be an ‘aged society’ in 2027. By 2010 the average age in China would be 37 compared to 29 in a peer like India. Also the economic disparity between coastal areas and the hinterland in China has widened hugely over the last decade given the peculiar geography of China in terms of having just one coastline on its eastern borders. Similarly, despite all the awareness of environment degradation due to rapid industrialization, China continues to grapple with alarming or even in some cases dangerous levels of environment pollution. Public health in China is reeling. Pollution has made cancer China’s leading cause of death. Ambient air pollution alone is blamed for hundreds of thousands of deaths each year. Nearly 500 million people lack access to safe drinking water. Only 1 percent of the country’s 560 million city dwellers breathe air considered safe by the European Union ((Kahan and Jim Yardley 2007).

VI
CONCLUSION

In the post-Cold War international order, China’s security planners taking a vital lesson from the Soviet fiasco started a new security discourse centred on a comprehensive security. The traditional security during the Cold War was considered to be zero-sum security where security of one nation was perceived to be endangering the security of another nation. What the PRC leaders came out as alternative to the traditional security was New Concept of Security which was fundamentally separate from the Cold War security in the sense that it was based on mutual trust and common interests. In this security framework, maximization of security by one nation did not lead to minimization of another nation’s security hence in this respect it was projected as win-win diplomacy. The first formal declaration of ‘New Concept of Security’ appeared in the PLA’s newspaper Jiefangjun Bao dated 24 Dec 1997. One important feature of new security was that it widened the term security to also encompass military, political, economic, social/environmental, and scientific & technological.

The Chinese leaders soon adopted the NSC as a policy option when China joined established various multilateral security and economic institutions such as APT, ARF, SCO, WTO and so on. Inside China measures were taken to address social security by ensuring accountability of local party leaders, checking corruption, taking measures against environment degradation and so on.

However, a close look at the NSC shows that it has enjoyed only a partial success since it was floated in late 1997. Its main success is in Central Asia where under SCO China has accomplished most of the objectives laid down in the NSC. However, China has failed to realize the most of the goals of new security elsewhere. For example, within China, socio-economic security is seriously challenged due to a many internal factors and they have been accentuated due to external ones also such as financial crisis of 2008-09. Needless to say that in China economic security is directly linked to political/regime security.

On foreign policy count, two of the basic values of NSC, namely, mutual trust and common security have been seriously jeopardized in China’s relations with its neighbours. In the Western-Pacific and in South Asia due to China’s own high-handed acts, such as declaring the South China Sea as “core interest”, its assertiveness in East China Sea, Indian Ocean and soon have unravelled the hollowness of its new security. Although it has been denigrating the traditional concept security, however, the
actions it has taken over the last decade only shows that China herself is a big practitioner of zero-sum security. A classic case being its nuclear nexus with Pakistan which has further deepened since Indo-US civilian nuclear deal of 2006.

These acts only proves the thesis propounded by Finkelstein and others that NSC was just an eyewash in order to divert the anti-China feelings in the Asia-Pacific in the aftermath of China’s belligerent posture in the South China sea in the mid 1990s against its much smaller neighbours giving further credence to China Threat theory.

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