



*CBRN South Asia* is an online monthly bulletin of the Nuclear Security Programme of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, providing a coverage of commentaries and news reports relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons material and substances in South Asia.

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## Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

November 2009, Vol. 2, No. 11

On 9 October 2009 the Nobel Peace Prize announcement that President Barack Obama would be awarded the esteemed prize drew gasps of surprise and cries of too much, too soon. Understandably the reaction to the decision around the world was swift, varied and mostly skeptical. The Norwegian Nobel Committee found President Barack Obama's extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy, co-operation between peoples and the deep changes in global mood that were taking place too good to ignore. Some of the reasons that were highlighted for awarding him the prize are his efforts to support international bodies and promote nuclear disarmament. It was a clear signal that they wanted to advocate and to build global support for the positive policies of his presidency, calls for peace and cooperation, pledges to reduce the world stockpile of nuclear arms, ease the United States' conflicts with Muslim nations and strengthen its role in combating climate change were some of those referred to.

Was it premature and too early? Does President Obama deserve to be in the company of such distinguished and transformative figures so early in his presidency? These were all questions that were probed by the world. If one looks at the past eight months of the Obama administration the award can certainly be seen as unexpected and as more of an encouragement for intentions than a reward for achievements. President Obama has a long road ahead as his ambitions for a world free of nuclear weapons is one that is easier to declare than to achieve. Despite the overwhelming mood it should be seen as a positive indication and should encourage President Obama to continue to create a new climate of international politics; one that promotes on engagement rather than isolation. One can only hope that the prestige associated with the prize will strengthen Obama's attempts at nuclear disarmament and help gather international momentum for the cause.

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President Obama sees it as vital for America to work with other nations, which is the key to ensure security and prosperity of the world at large. The most prominent instance to date of his policy of engagement is that of Iran's clandestine nuclear program. Iran's defiance has plagued the international community for decades but his efforts to "extend a hand" to Iran is a new beginning in relations. Progress is being made and cooperation on both sides is a step in the right direction. Whether this breakthrough can be sustained will only be answered if the Iranian leadership accepts the recent UN draft agreement on a framework for Iran to receive enriched uranium in compliance with UN regulations and after the IAEA inspectors complete their inspection of the recently discovered nuclear enrichment facility near the city of Qom. If President Obama succeeds in scenarios such as convincing Iran to dismantle its nuclear programme, only then will it substantiate awarding him the Peace Prize.

## Disarmament in South Asia

*Firdaus Ahmed, Freelancer*

President Obama chaired the UN Security Council meeting that resulted in Resolution 1887 calling on states to abide by obligations under NPT. This presumably includes those under Article VI regarding ‘negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,’ and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. This is in keeping with his agenda, outlined at Prague, of “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

In conveying India’s position on the Resolution its Permanent Representative endorsed Obama’s aspiration on ‘prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and providing for their complete elimination within a specified time-frame.’ However, that the onus was on the US was evident from the statement that said, “It is clear that the international community would look to the countries with substantial nuclear arsenals represented on the Council for meaningful steps towards nuclear disarmament.” India’s position is thus quite clear. India agrees with Obama’s most quoted sentiment from his Prague address that “This goal will not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my lifetime.”

The global disarmament initiative can be expected to progress with India’s tacit support at least till the Non-proliferation Review Conference in May 2010. Any prospects of progress on a regional level are linked with those on the global level due to presence of China as a player in southern Asia. Given that India seeks notional parity with China and China, in turn, would wait for movement on the US-Russia nuclear front, the regional nuclear situation cannot be expected to change. However, the worsening regional security environment, the possibility of India figuring in both conflict dyads – with Pakistan and with China, suggests a South Asian track towards disarmament needs to be progressed irrespective of the global agenda.

A consideration of the actors and stakes involved would indicate whether this can happen. Some scientists of the ‘strategic enclave’ have already staked out their position for more tests. The strategic community will be busy watching the global scene and writing ‘I told you so’ editorials. Maximalists can be expected to lead the drive for maximizing fissile material stocks before the window closes. Academics would add a chapter to the disarmament syllabus. The military is content with the ‘triad’ that has something for all three. The politician is not likely to go

out on a limb. The government is yet to recover from the limitations revealed at Sharm el-Sheikh. The NSA is reduced to cautioning the media against foreign policy determining levels of ‘hype’.

A disarmament agenda is not likely to come about on its own. Redirecting the energies of these actors and institutions will be required. Scientists will need to be held accountable for delivering in the power sector, now that the nuclear deal has opened up new vistas. The military would be happier with conventional armament made possible by a speedier acquisitions process. The strategic community should be challenged to design contours of a peace dividend that it had visualized in the run up to nuclearization. With these three sectors quiescent, the less pressure on the political class can permit a reaching out to neighbours. The government can then proceed more firmly. Media too could then find fresh wind in its sails. A self-reinforcing loop can then bring a regional disarmament track alive.

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Such an agenda can be set if nuclear dangers in South Asia are openly discussed. Presently, reliance on deterrence is such that military strikes are discussed as a response option to another 26/11. With no ongoing talks to act as a buffer, such a response may be inevitable. The expectation that Pakistan is a rational state, one which has repeatedly proven false, may not withstand the test of conflict. With respect to China, the mutual ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy is taken for granted. The chiefs of our armed forces have in the recent past hinted at the redefinition of China in Indian perceptions. China for its part, either to take pressure off Pakistan; in reaction or in cognizance of the subtext of the Indo-US strategic partnership, is making the moves that serve to justify Indian apprehensions. Given the importance of ‘face saving’ in any future conflict, rescinding of the NFU in a crunch situation by either side would be small price.

Proximity of nuclear dangers should be used to energize a peace and disarmament movement in South Asia. This can originate only in India. Pakistan, given the feisty media and middle class, is likely to catch on quickly. China would then have no recourse but revert to the bonhomie of ‘peace and tranquility.’ For this to happen, the peace discourse needs to become mainstream. Operating on the margins only facilitates its marginalization as ‘radical’ or ‘out of the box’. The key argument for a new peace discourse is that the break in the nuclear taboo in South Asia required for enabling disarmament, is now a distinct probability.

## GHQ Attack and Nuclear Security

*Jasbir Rakhra, Research Intern, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*

The General Headquarters (GHQ) siege has proved that Pakistan is badly bruised because of the pillage caused by the nexus between Taliban, al Qaeda and the ‘Punjabis’. The threat is from every direction and the question is – What after GHQ? An attack on the Majlis-e-Shoora or turning Minar-e-Pakistan into rubble? None of them stood as tall as GHQ, a symbol of glory and honour, pivotal in the national decision-making process. Next in the line of fire could well be Pakistan’s nuclear installations, seen as a symbol of Pakistan’s military might. What would extremists gain by attacking such installations? Can we consider these installations secure enough from any terrorist adventure? According to the latest Congressional report, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe and secure. The report says that Pakistan has taken a number of steps to win international confidence in its ability to secure its nuclear materials and installations. After 9 September 2001, Pakistan has initiated several positive changes in its nuclear command and control structure and taken a number of steps to implement various programmes towards increased nuclear security. Given that the dimensions of international terrorism have changed today and Pakistan itself is the new battleground, this report needs review.

The epitome of Pakistan’s security – Pakistan’s Army GHQ, supposedly invincible from any terrorist attack, was targeted by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) outfit. The Pakistan Army Headquarters would not be less secure than any nuclear installation or weapons storage sites in Pakistan. A new debate has thus begun after terrorist attempts to penetrate the impregnable establishment, guarded by soldiers equivalent to the strength of an infantry battalion. The vulnerabilities in the security apparatus exposed by this attack have raised many questions on the fate of nuclear installations in Pakistan. Security experts are fearful of the implications. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are now less secure than they were a few years ago, especially before the Pakistan Army’s alliance with US forces in the region to fight against the Taliban. Pakistan has already experienced three attacks on nuclear related facilities at Sargodha, Kamra and Wah. Despite the initiatives taken by Islamabad, there is a constant danger of Pakistan’s fundamentalist extremist groups attacking such establishments. At present threat perceptions have been aggravated since the motives of insurgent elements seem to be different from those assumed earlier. In the near future, if any nuclear facility comes under a terrorist attack, it seems that the attack would not be launched to acquire a weapon but to achieve a symbolic victory by striking the nation’s pride leading to national destabilization. Can we consider Strategic Plans Division’s (SPD) nuclear

security policies valid in the present context? The emerging issue regarding nuclear security is not related to the levels of security arrangement but the personnel employed within that arrangement. The treachery of one with an extremist bent of mind could lead the country towards devastation; this fear gain credence given that serving or former members of the security establishment had been involved in major terrorist adventures. The Congressional report expressed satisfaction in terms of the selection procedure of the personnel for the security of the installations. Though SPD has implemented special provisions to screen its personnel; doubts over the credibility of the system persist. In the recent GHQ attack, the leader of the attackers, Aqeel alias Dr Usman is a former Army Medical Corps soldier and hails from ‘Kahuta’.

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There are qualms over the integrity of SPD. With respect to the reliability of the personnel, the maximum intake in the SPD’s security division is said to be from the Punjab province, considered to have fewer links with the extremists groups. Unfortunately, out of ten terrorist involved in GHQ attack, five belonged to the Punjab province including their leader Aqeel and rest were from South Waziristan – a Taliban stronghold. Would it then be appropriate to say that ‘Punjabis’ are not prone to extremist fundamentalism? Especially since the claims of attack are made by the Ahmad Farooqi group of TTP – a Punjabi dominated group. Further, security clearances and checks are performed on prospective employees by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and Military

Intelligence personnel. There is no reliable way to perform a security check on ISI personnel as they too may have strong affiliations with the Taliban, which is a distinct possibility given the history of ISI in the region.

Islamabad came up with a robust nuclear command and control structure but issues of reliability of personnel and coercive intrusions of extremists in the system requires serious thought and needs to be addressed through comprehensive measures. Pakistan may resort to a comprehensive security arrangement on technical issues with United States. But this is unlikely due to Pakistan’s stand on the global nuclear regime. Pakistan has only recently begun ‘Operation Raah-e-Nizaat’ against the Taliban in South Waziristan. Although the outcomes of this are yet to be seen, total elimination of extremists is not a realistic expectation. A massive retaliation by the extremists however, remains distinctly probable. Where and what form might this retaliation take? No one knows. The question remains the same – What after GHQ?

## India Investing in MIRV Technology

*Ajele Lele, Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*

What is a credible nuclear deterrence? This question is being debated in India for last couple of years without much of agreement amongst security experts. The debate normally focuses around issues such as what number of nuclear weapons should India possess? What should be the yield and type? Should the nature of nuclear threat envisaged from adversaries determine the number of weapons? Or should the type and number of targets which India proposes to engage to prove its second strike capability, decide the numbers we should possess?

All these discussions have one basic premise and that is: one missile would deliver one nuclear warhead. India's nuclear triad: a delivery system for nuclear missile from an aerial platform, ship/land based platform or a submarine also essentially caters for one nuclear warhead per one missile launch. However, all this could change and the debate on 'quantifying' nuclear deterrence would have to take an additional parameter into consideration in near future and that is India's MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) capabilities. India's Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) is proposing to develop a new strategic weapon technology called MIRV.

MIRV technology is not a new technology. Rather it is a technology of the 1960s and was first developed by the US, followed by USSR. MIRV is a set of nuclear weapons carried on a single missile (intercontinental or submarine launched ballistic missile). This technology allows striking several targets in a single launch. During the launch the main rocket of this system pushes the set of warheads up in the atmosphere. Each warhead strikes a target separately. The launch of such missile constitutes firing a missile having multiple stages. During its ballistic path every stage gets separated at a predetermined time after the launch. Along with every stage one or more warheads get fired. A four stage missile could fire eight to ten warheads on the targets. For a standard launch normally 60 seconds after the launch the first stage separates and other two or three stages separate roughly with an interval of 60 seconds each. The post boost vehicle which separates from the missile prepares for re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. During all these maneuvers, warheads get fired after a gap of few seconds at pre-identified targets. The exact technology of firing sequence and how it actually happens has, for obvious reasons, always been kept a secret by states possessing this technology.

the multiple satellite launches undertaken by few states with a single launch vehicle. There have been cases where around eight to ten satellites have been launched in one go. The major difference is that these satellites are positioned in different orbits in space while in case of MIRV the warheads re-enter the earth's atmosphere and fire on the target. The system is designed in such a fashion that the damage caused by several small warheads could be much more than that caused by a single warhead.

There are reports that now India's premier defence research organization DRDO is validating technologies towards testing MIRV. According to DRDO officials, the platform for re-entry vehicles would be dissimilar from their earlier successful designs used in Agni series of missiles. It appears that they are testing a more modern technology. Another challenge for the Indian scientists would be to design and develop a guiding system with a high degree of accuracy. Some are of the opinion that MIRV technology need not be viewed only with a nuclear backdrop and even conventional warheads could be placed onboard of such missile. It also needs to be noted that India is yet to prove its ICBM capabilities and is expected to test 5,000-km-range Agni-V missile shortly.

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MIRV testing has received a significant amount of criticism too. This technology is known for reducing the impact of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT). SALT talks about limiting the number of missiles but with MIRV the issue of number of missiles becomes irrelevant since a single missile can carry many warheads and cause significant destruction. Also, this technology reduces the importance of a missile defence shield. This is because such systems are capable of addressing only one missile threat at a time.

Possession of MIRV technology is expected to boost India's defence preparedness. DRDO's willingness to invest in this technology clearly indicates that India's missile programme has matured considerably. Coming years would see greater Indian investment in micro-electro mechanical systems (MEMS), nano-sensors, nano-materials and advanced information technology tools. Such investments would be essential for creating reliable and robust but highly accurate systems like MIRV. This technology would certainly boost India's nuclear deterrence capabilities. It also needs to be appreciated that the technologies developed for MIRV would find direct or indirect applicability in various other fields of defence too.

For better understanding, parallels could be drawn from

## The Illogic of 'Unacceptable Damage'

Ali Ahmed, Security Analyst, New Delhi

India's official nuclear doctrine of January 2003 has rightly been critiqued for including the term 'massive' in its formulation: 'Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.' Nuclear retaliation does not need to be 'massive' to ensure 'unacceptable damage.' On this score departure from the original formulation of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) Draft Nuclear Doctrine of August 1999 was not required since it was better phrased thus: 'any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.' This was in keeping with the 'fundamental purpose' the latter envisaged for Indian nuclear weapons, it being, 'to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces.' Here the idea of punitive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage is queried. It is argued that infliction of 'unacceptable damage' on an adversary would lay India open to like retaliation and on that account may not be sensible recourse on breakdown of deterrence.

It must first be visualised as to what may be the most likely manner of nuclear first use. The upper end of nuclear use involving counter-city targeting, disarming first strike and decapitation, as was the thinking in the Cold War era, can reasonably be discounted. This owes to counter-value targeting assuredly leading to a counter-value escalatory exchange. There being no guarantee that a disarming first strike would succeed retaliation by a nuclear opponent, whose capability has been whittled by the strike, would inevitably be on counter value targets. Decapitation is only possible in a 'bolt from the blue' attack with its attraction degraded by means as command posts, alternative command chain etc.

Lower end first use in terms of being less provocative for escalation and with a lower 'opprobrium quotient' makes better sense. This enables nuclear signalling, particularly that of resolve for escalation and a desire for negotiated conflict termination. It may also have operational level military utility in case of adverse equations of relative strength. In a favoured scenario in discussions, this involves nuclear targeting of a tactical target in a defensive mode on own territory against an aggressor with an intent of strategic communication of the intent to escalate in case the aggressor does not back off.

This is a possible scenario in any future Indo-Pak conflict in line with the 'option enhancing' strategy Pakistan may choose to follow that has the first strike option ranged on an ascending scale of opprobrium quotient. Such a lower order strike could take place in a Sino-Indian conflict too, since it is believed that China has a caveat to its NFU policy permissive

of nuclear first use on its own territory. Territory it claims, particularly Arunachal Pradesh, may be included as a theatre where India cannot ignore the Chinese first use.

It makes sense therefore to query if an escalatory retaliation by India of the order of inflicting 'unacceptable damage' is sensible to a lower order first use, which, as has been seen, is more likely. Clearly, the promise of an escalatory and seemingly disproportionate retaliation is to stay the enemy's resort to the nuclear option. This is par for the deterrence course. But should push come to shove, does it make sense as a nuclear employment doctrine as against a nuclear deterrent doctrine?

Violence associated with any nuclear strike is quite clearly of an 'unacceptable level.' Therefore, it is only

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factual to claim that nuclear retaliation would have 'unacceptable' consequences. But, 'unacceptable damage' also has the connotation of counter-value targeting. This could include population centres, infrastructure busting and more disturbingly, even targeting resulting in release of dangerous forces, such as dams, nuclear power stations etc. Self-evidently, an enemy on receiving such retaliation would strike back in like vein. Therefore, the satisfaction of inconveniencing an enemy cannot compensate for the damage received in return. Self-deterrence in such consideration makes sense.

A disarming strike would be required alongside infliction of 'unacceptable damage.' There is no guarantee of success. Reliance on the enemy being shocked into conceding is to invest too much into an expectation. In case 'unacceptable damage' is inflicted in response to what the enemy considers a lower order strike, then the seeming disproportion would impel counter strike. This begs the question: Why 'unacceptable damage'? That counter-value targeting may result in case of breach of nuclear taboo helps deterrence. This implies that a shift can be done in case of breakdown in deterrence. Second, it gives confidence to the military of national support. But even the military would not expect the nation to commit suicide. Constitutional and democratic India would not be able to sustain 'unacceptable damage,' even if Pakistan is 'finished' and China is set back likewise.

Deterrence needs reformulation. Nuclear weapons may not deter war or lower order use, but deter 'unacceptable damage.' Therefore, there is a need to keep the promise of 'unacceptable damage' off India's nuclear employment doctrine, even if it figures on the deterrent doctrine.

## Review of the Shanghai Meeting and the Future Agenda

*Report of the IPCS Panel Discussion held on 16 October 2009*

### Introduction: Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee

Many issues arose at the debriefing of the “India-China-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue: Towards a Stable Nuclear Order in Asia” held at India International Centre on 3 September 2009. The main purpose of today’s dialogue is to discuss those issues that were left out and to see how we can take this process forward in the future. What additional steps need to be implemented?

This meeting will be in the form of a discussion and the speakers will make an assessment of the dialogue and raise the principle issues that they were requested to speak on. Based on this, at the end of the presentations we will continue with a discussion which will identify the next steps that need to be taken for the upcoming third trilateral dialogue.

### Session I: Global Nuclear Strategic Trends

*Amb. Arundhati Ghose*

The issue of global nuclear strategic trends refers to cooperation among India, China and Pakistan at the multilateral level. They never really addressed the issues and each of them stated their positions. First, there needs to be some kind of bilateral trust as a basis for the trilateral dialogue, which has to be built between India and China, India and Pakistan; because between China and Pakistan there is perhaps a bit too much interaction. There needs to be some kind of a basis before one can consider cooperating, at a tactical level it may be possible but not on an overall strategic level. This one meeting was not sufficient because the assessments were very different.

Pakistan sees the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as an India and Pakistan issue. This is one of the explanations they gave for having altered the discussions on the FMCT on a procedural matter when India signed the nuclear deal with the United States. Pakistan was not ready to accept the FMCT, due to their perception that the US was giving India a better deal than Pakistan was getting.

The Pakistani side seemed to be confused about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but China was not. Contrarily China announced the use of a general plan which says: should the US ratify (the CTBT), it would be a consequential step for China to do so; the Chinese ratification would be a consequence of the US ratification. The continuing question is, where is India on the CTBT, should we or should we not go with it, or whether India will accept being the only country to hold up the entry into force?

On none of the major multilateral discussions was there a meeting ground and it was not tried to achieve one either. Although the three countries do cooperate in multilateral fora at a tactical level, the work is limited up to a point and when push comes to shove they move separately. It is not only on arms control, whether it is at the World Trade Organization (WTO) or any other thing, China, Pakistan and India usually

are in it together at a multilateral level. Thus it should not be very difficult to translate what is a local or tactical cooperation, into an understanding of each others’ positions. However, the question is whether they can go further than that. The assessment is that it is worth a try, but unless there is a greater understanding between India and China, India and Pakistan seriously on this issue, the rest of it is not likely to jell. Even if there is no official convergence between Pakistan and China, the coordination between the two already exists. When the discussion shifted to bilateral India and Pakistan issues, China kept quiet. However, on global issues, China took a strong non-proliferation stand on the NPT. In fact, China stated that it does not see India as a nuclear threat; rather it sees it as a proliferation problem. India raised issues on whether there is a qualification in the Chinese No First Use (NFU) policy. Pakistan says it does not accept the NFU and therefore it did not even attempt to discuss it. There is normally room for disagreement, but Pakistan was unwilling to even agree to disagree. China has recently, in 2007, come out with caveats on the NFU. Therefore, when this was raised, it did not respond. One of the four caveats is that the NFU will not stand if any territory claimed by China is attacked.

### Session II: Towards Asian Nuclear Stability and Security

*Rear. Adm. Raja Menon*

Before discussing this topic, some issues have to be clear to everybody. Actually, it was assumed that a number of things were so glaringly obvious that it was neglected to even put them on the table. Namely four things: one is that there have been some very authoritative writings that have come up, saying, how limited the Chinese arsenal will eventually be. There have been speculations on where the Chinese arsenal would end, and it apparently will end well short of that. China has not reached there yet, which means that it is, like India, still building. Second was that there is a possible scenario where the CTBT and the FMCT could come in, in as little as three years. The third was that the Pakistani arsenal is going through a monumental revolution with increasing its plutonium stock. Pakistan is a uranium production weapon state, but it is completely revolutionizing its nuclear weapons and it has been given this dangerous cruise missile. The fourth is the US denial for a similar nuclear deal to Pakistan. These four developments are rubbing up against each other. This was the background in which we went to the Shanghai dialogue, but in Shanghai the agenda of each participant turned out to be completely different.

There were some people on the Pakistani side who took India on a bilateral leather hunt and there were some Chinese who took India on a bilateral leather hunt, as well. Pakistan brought in issues which are true, but completely irrelevant to this overall situation. One was the question of why India has a Cold Start doctrine. Pakistan certainly has a lot to worry about with Cold Start, but it had nothing to do with the conference. They were implying that India resorting

to Cold Start would push Pakistan towards a first use policy, basically undermining their deterrent. The other leather hunt was that India has a nuclear deal which was unfair to Pakistan. According to Pakistan, India broke all international, bilateral and nuclear rules. Therefore, the conference tended to become bilateral with Pakistan on these issues.

The Chinese took India on a leather hunt in a different direction. China stated that the world is being unfair to North Korea; in fact, one Chinese participant defended North Korea by listing ten specific reasons why North Korea was going nuclear. According to the Chinese, everybody is looking at the proliferation issue, but the real issue is to bring North Korea back into the NPT. The next leather hunt was that if North Korea comes into the NPT, it would be a very fine idea if India and Pakistan also come into the NPT. Furthermore, China brought up the fact that Russia has a huge number of weapons and that it is located at the Chinese border. China also claimed that the NPT has virtually been killed by the nuclear deal because of the US making a special exemption for India with the nuclear deal. It has virtually taken the NPT and turned it upside down. That is really something that needs to be looked at, and is the biggest issue. The heavy threat to international relations came up where the US is being unfair to China when all it is trying to do is to reunite its country with Taiwan.

As a result, what happened there was that the nuclear issues got almost replaced by international relations and this is the constant danger. While talking about nuclear issues anybody can hijack the discussion by saying man is evil, and therefore he possesses nuclear weapons. In the end, the agenda becomes completely useless. There is only one way and that is for maybe the chairman to take it along a set route with no digressions. For instance we accept that men are evil, and states will do mean things to each other and therefore they possess nuclear weapons. Let us just take it from there as a given fact and decide what should be done about nuclear weapons.

### **Session III: Asian Security in the Context of Global Trends: Cooperation or Conflict?** *Amb. KC Singh*

First, the impression one got overall is that the Chinese are comfortable where they are with the US and Russia having to take the mantle to deliver and of course, they have two of their allies, DPRK and Pakistan. The sense one got was that China wants to see where India is going at the moment. The universal consensus today is that the Chinese behaviour vis-à-vis India has shown some alteration since the Indo-US nuclear deal. There is some correlation between the Chinese behavior vis-à-vis India. The Track II dialogue, talking to India and the global trends in which they are participating in, shows that the Chinese have one leg at the high table in the United Nations Security Council, one in Asia and they are keeping their Asian assets in play. Therefore, they are

seen as the good guys who are working with the US at the six-party talks. They may nudge and push DPRK, but they will not strangle them and they have a good alliance with Pakistan.

China is trying as much to understand where India is going as to understand where the allies will go. Some of the formulations at the trilateral dialogue were very interesting. A solution China bounced off was suggesting a new NPT. The three nations have different degrees of relationship with the NPT (India is 50 per cent in, Pakistan is completely out and China is a P5). Furthermore, China had a very defensive assessment of DPRK, stating that DPRK will blackmail the former. China would like any evolving structure to keep its assets alive, and keep them structured in. The global approach comes in for China, with the NPT, the FMCT and the CTBT. The question remains if the approach of the United States alters from administration to administration, then how will all this play out? So in the next four to eight years this will all be tied down, or the status quo will remain. The Chinese are quietly sitting in the middle and observing, and in fact simultaneously adding to their arsenal.

For this reason this dialogue is quite important. However, nothing new will come from Pakistan in this. Pakistan is basically interested in utilizing nuclear assets to increase its leverage for either using terrorism against India, or in combination with the nuclear to get some sort of a favorable settlement on Kashmir. They seem to be losing control over the game and a fear is setting in Pakistan. The Kerry-Luger bill is making the Pakistan army very nervous, because for the first time the oversight of the aid is bringing in the entire plethora of terrorists assets in Pakistan. This time the determination that the US President has to make, includes access to AQ Khan, the terrorist network (including the LET and so on), and the promotions in the army. We, however, don't know how this will all take shape. At some point this will impinge on the nuclear capability of Pakistan. How exactly the US would encircle Pakistan and how it may apply pressure is not decided yet. Of course Pakistan would try to hold on to its capability.

If you discuss an Asian structure or security dialogue, the Chinese have minimum concerns vis-à-vis Russia. China has its global concerns and that is why it is looking at the reductions in US numbers. In terms of regional concerns, India is not really a factor. China will likely be a part of the international posse chasing India through the Security Council, with the Americans, the NSG and so on. China wants to sit down with India to understand where India is exactly going; it wants to pursue it through the regional assets. China seems to be working at different levels and in the meantime it will strengthen its assets and improve capabilities. With this in mind, what type of dialogue can emerge? China suggested the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but it hasn't been successful. Do we then do a plus three and enlarge the trilateral dialogue? One hint coming from China was to enlarge the trilateral dialogue. In essence it makes sense, because you cannot limit the dialogue as all these issues affect all nations in the region.

Do you then bring in the US? This is seen as being uneven where the US is overseeing what is happening. One could potentially bring in Russia. They are leaving the door open on the debate to possibly include more actors. Or one can go the other way and bring in DPRK and Iran; this would increase the leverage of India in having a voice. Would this be useful under an Asian dialogue? The idea should be to create an Asian structure, minimize international interference and expand the Asian dialogue from there.

#### **Session IV: Steps towards a Secure Global Nuclear Future** *Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee*

The primary aim is to look at the possibilities of this trilateral dialogue and where we can go from here. One of the first issues that came up was that nuclear security can not be delinked from conventional security. This is a reality that needs to be addressed and the linkage has been accepted internationally. The second is the need for an Asian Security Order. There is no forum or an Asian security architecture where issues such as this can be discussed. Third, is the question of which countries should be included in such a dialogue? Only Asian nuclear powers (including Iran and North Korea) or other international players such as the US? This is where the question of US nuclear presence in Asia remains relevant. The question of new outliers also comes up; Myanmar may be one of them. If you consider enlarging the forum, the issue that will arise is how can India, China and Pakistan contribute to the process and to the ultimate objective of global nuclear weapons elimination?

Two distinct approaches emerge on global nuclear weapons elimination. One is to address elimination within a fixed time frame. The other is the Base Camp approach, addressing issues as we go along without a clear end period in mind. One view is that unless we have a clear statement or a fixed time frame, then we are not seriously addressing the issue. Should we follow one of the approaches or do we follow both simultaneously? On the issue of what measures these three nations can address, in Track II or Track I dialogues- develop confidence building measures (CBMs), address nuclear risk reduction measures, and avoid wrong nuclear signaling by key actors? These are a few of several issues that may be considered.

On the stability factor are any of these issues relevant, for example, statements and measures regarding freezing of current arsenals, the FMCT or CTBT dialogues as a preparatory measure, commitment on not strengthening missile defences, support the non-weaponization of outer space, and modify the NPT to include both India and Pakistan? Regarding future steps, is a stable nuclear order a possibility? How should we proceed? What issues may be addressed? How should this particular round of dialogues be structured? What possible outcomes should we look for?

## **Discussion**

### **Comments/Questions**

- This trilateral dialogue can only be successful if India, China and Pakistan start to trust each other. China starts with the premise that it has not assisted Pakistan at all in its nuclear business. But the fact is, everything that Pakistan has, the plutonium, the reactors and so on, have been provided by China. The problem is that there is an element of mistrust. Unless trust is achieved on a bilateral level, it is difficult to build a trilateral agenda.
- If there is such a large lack of understanding of positions – then all three have to come together. Different positions are understandable but it is important to discuss these. Even initiating such a process is an important step. As the process is just starting, no major expectations can be made; perhaps even a reiteration of positions is sufficient. The agenda has an extremely ambitious goal, which is too diverse and too detailed. For example, CBMs may be discussed in the next trilateral and hence it might be better to select only one issue to move ahead. With a limited agenda the advantage would be that every participant of the dialogue would have to prepare a clear idea or opinion on the set agenda. This would lead to more constructive discussions on the issues and hopefully to additional trilateral talks.
- Responsible members of the media should also be included into this dialogue, instead of keeping it as a closed door meeting with analysts, former bureaucrats, and military personnel. The discussions can be enlarged to create a broader understanding of the issues at hand. It would also provide a kind of check to prevent any derailing of the agenda.
- Is it possible to negotiate with China on a bilateral level in this trilateral dialogue?
- This is obviously a very difficult exercise, because this trilateral can turn into several bilateral ones. The Chinese are backing the Pakistanis and the Pakistanis are backing the Chinese, thereby isolating India. If it turns into an India and China talk, it may be good from an Indian point of view, but neither from the Chinese, nor from the Pakistani point of view. That would threaten Pakistan's special relationship with China.
- There are some fundamental questions that should be answered: Is disarmament a good or bad thing? Is it feasible, is it desirable? All these questions are basic and they should get answered before proceeding with the next trilateral. Is there a possibility that there will be a nuclear threat by China against India, India against Pakistan, Pakistan against China or India? What kind of a nuclear threat? What kind of nuclear crisis is likely to arise between these three countries?
- The fundamental point is the need to develop trust. This trilateral dialogue should essentially establish trust. Maybe there could be three sessions: first, hegemony or threat perceptions by India, Pakistan and China. Second,

CBMs and third, the respective positions and interests towards non-proliferation and disarmament.

### Responses

- The Chinese defence is that after having signed the NPT in 1992, they have strengthened their export control regimes and, since then they have not assisted Pakistan's nuclear programme. Looking for nuclear stability is one objective, and it does not necessarily mean getting rid of nuclear weapons; there is no instability caused by nuclear weapons. Is instability due to nuclear weapons or due to proliferation of nuclear weapons? What comes up as a priority is the need to control proliferation in the region. Building up trust requires new CBMs. Pakistan's instability was caused by their fear that India might attack them and by India's conventional arms superiority. China says that it was contributing to stability by fulfilling the fear deficit of Pakistan, but Pakistan in fact used it as an umbrella for a clandestine terrorism network.
- The media is an important element in the dialogue. The first problem is that discussions of this sort are difficult to convey to the masses. The idea is to build stable nuclear relations among the three countries and for that, there is no need to actually display it to the world. It is important that these discussions get the attention of the governments concerned. It would be problematic if it is revealed to the public, particularly in a country like India, where there are such enormous diversity of views. It will not get anywhere and the objective of establishing a stable nuclear order among the three countries will become an exercise in futility.
- The media is no expert on nuclear issues; the media is an expert on communication, reporting on what is happening in the outside world. Is it really eligible to take the trilateral meeting to the outside world if the dialogue is only in its infancy? The media must be very clear as to what agenda it is working for. If it is working for stable understanding of nuclear issues between the three countries, then there is not necessary to include the media directly in such a meeting.
- No, it is not possible to have a bilateral goal in a trilateral dialogue.
- Why not consider splitting the agenda into four sessions? Is it possible to think in terms of narrowing down the issues but at the same time retain continuity of the original structures? In the global nuclear strategic trends, which are multilateral, the focus could lie on discussing CBMs in terms of multilateral treaties. Because the meeting is scheduled to occur before the NPT conference, there has to be a discussion about non-proliferation and disarmament to develop a common position. What are the NPT approaches and the non-NPT approaches? How to deal with the problem of proliferation?
- Some basic suggestions included, holding the next

meeting within the next three to four months and potentially in New Delhi, or another location within India, and including some responsible members of the media in the dialogue and lastly narrowing the agenda to focus on some key topics. The essential string that ties this discussion together is the concept of the trust deficit and somehow bridging it, perhaps by selecting some specific CBMs to work on.

# Major Events in South Asia—October 2009

## Nuclear Disarmament/Proliferation/Security

### PAKISTAN

**12 October 2009**

#### **Security of Pakistan nuclear weapons questioned**

An audacious weekend assault by Islamic militants on Pakistan's army headquarters is again raising fears of an insurgent attack on the country's nuclear weapons installation. Pakistan has sought to protect its nuclear weapons from attack by the Taliban or other militants by storing the warheads, detonators and missiles separately in facilities patrolled by elite troops. Analysts are divided on how secure these weapons are. Some say the weapons are less secure than they were five years ago, and Saturday's attack would show a "worrisome" overconfidence by the Pakistanis. While complex security is in place, much depends on the Pakistani army and how vulnerable it is to infiltration by extremists, said a Western government official with access to intelligence on Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. (*The Associated Press, 12 October 2009*)

#### **Clinton downplays threat to Pakistan nuke arsenal**

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Sunday the Taliban siege of Pakistan's army headquarters showed extremists are a growing threat in the nuclear-armed American ally, but she contended they don't pose a risk to the country's atomic arsenal. Clinton, in London on the second leg of a five-day tour of Europe and Russia, also joined British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in warning Iran that they would not wait long for the Islamic republic to convince the world that its nuclear intentions are peaceful. Before stops in Ireland and Northern Ireland, Clinton pledged continued U.S. support for the Northern Irish peace process and said those who continued to exacerbate tension and violence "are out of step and out of time." (*The Associated Press, 12 October 2009*)

**14 October 2009**

#### **GHQ attack returns focus on nuclear arms safety**

The assault on the General Headquarters over the weekend has renewed fears of an insurgent attack on the country's nuclear weapons installation. Analysts are divided on how secure these weapons are. Some say the weapons are less secure than they were five years ago, and Saturday's attack would show a "worrisome" overconfidence by the Pakistanis. While complex security is in place, much depends on the Pakistan Army and how vulnerable it is to infiltration by extremists, said a Western government official with access to intelligence on Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal. A US counter-proliferation official, meanwhile, said strong safeguards were in place and there is no reason to believe the nuclear arsenal is in imminent jeopardy of seizure by militants. (*Daily Times, 14 October 2009*)

**23 October 2009**

#### **US closely monitoring safety of Pak nukes**

The US has once again expressed its concern about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and the possibility that it could fall into the hands of Islamists. "We have been reassured about the security of the nuclear-weapons stockpiles and facilities. We have certainly made our views known and asked a lot of questions and are supporting the Pakistani government in their courageous efforts against these extremists," said US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Reiterating strong US concerns on the threats of proliferation of Pakistani nuclear weapons, especially through the A Q Khan network, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the US was watching the matter very closely. (*Times Now, 23 October 2009*)

#### **Suicide attack near nuke-linked complex in Pakistan, 7 killed**

A suicide bomber struck a checkpoint near a military complex reportedly linked to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme on Friday, killing seven people as the army pressed ahead with a major anti-Taliban offensive in the northwest. The attack took place near the sprawling aeronautical complex in Kamra, around 30 miles (50 km) from the capital, Islamabad, and is sure to raise renewed concerns about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear programme. The Kamra site is often mentioned by foreign military experts and researchers as a likely place to keep planes that can carry nuclear warheads. The army, which does not reveal where its nuclear weapons are stored, has denied that the facility is tied to the programme. (*The Times of India, 23 October 2009*)

**25 October 2009**

#### **Pakistan tells India: stop propaganda**

Pakistan on Saturday hit out at India for expressing what it called "self-serving" concern about the safety of its nuclear weapons. Responding to comments made by Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons after a suicide attack at the Kamra aeronautical complex on Friday, the Foreign Ministry here asked New Delhi to "stop its opportunistic propaganda against Pakistan." "Such remarks are evidently self-serving and integral to India's efforts to seek unilateral advantage at the cost of regional strategic stability by its feverish militarisation and working on dangerous military doctrines," it said in a statement. (*The Hindu, 25 October 2009*)

### INDIA

**1 October 2009**

#### **India's N-submarine undermines strategic stability: Pakistan**

Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi on Thursday said that the recent launch of a nuclear-powered submarine by India has undermined strategic stability in the region. "We are opposed to nuclear proliferation as well as an arms

race in the region," he said, adding that Pakistan believes the launch of the Indian nuclear-powered submarine will affect strategic stability. Pakistan has proposed a "strategic restraint regime" to India with the three inter-locking principles of dispute settlement, conventional balance and nuclear and missile restraint, Qureshi said in his address at the Los Angeles World Affairs Congress. "Our friends should encourage India to sign on to the proposed strategic restraint regime to guarantee strategic stability in our region," he said. (*The Times of India*, 1 October 2009)

### 3 October 2009

#### **The real Pokhran story (V Sudarshan)**

The father of the dud thermonuclear bomb Dr R Chidambaram is on record describing how a real atomic explosion works. This description is recounted in Raj Chengappa's engrossing book *Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power* (Harper Collins, 2000) which provides a broad-brush overview of the development of both India's nuclear and missile programmes. The author obviously had access to all the main players, the laboratories, which kind of makes it an almost official narrative. Chengappa who interviewed Chidambaram on June 10, 1998, writes (page 187): "Chidambaram's eyes always light up when he describes what happens when an atom bomb is exploded deep underground..." (*The New Indian Express*, 3 October 2009)

### 4 October 2009

#### **Kalam's dual standards (V Sudarshan)**

When the teams from BARC and DRDO replayed the tapes of the thermonuclear blast at Pokhran after they got back from Ground Zero, there was a further puzzled silence from Chidambaram and his team. The video showed the shaft intact. All that had happened was that the concrete casing that had been used to seal the shaft after it had been filled with sand had blown off. The video showed sand and mud being kicked feebly into the air. The mystery was all the more deep as that shaft had been configured for a fission blast and was not made any deeper. It is all the more strange considering that Raj Chengappa, who was given access to the dramatis personae and whose account (*Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power*, HarperCollins, 2000) is thus far undisputed by the Establishment... (*The New Indian Express*, 4 October 2009)

### 7 October 2009

#### **A self-defeating controversy surrounds Pokhran-II (Kanwal Sibal)**

It is not easily comprehensible why those who have held positions of responsibility and trust in our atomic energy and defence establishments should have been so unmindful of the national security repercussions of the public controversy they have stirred up over the status of our 1998 thermonuclear test. This is not an academic debate, a professional wrangle between scientists about the correct interpretation of complex technical data from some experiment with only in-house implications — however the conflicting argu-

ments are settled. The issue raised touches the core of India's national security. (*The Telegraph*, 7 October 2009)

### 10 October 2009

#### **Anti-nuke Obama won't allow India to expand weapons programme**

Just hours before the Nobel Committee announced the Peace award for Barack Obama citing his work in nuclear weapons elimination, the American President transmitted to the US Congress a letter which in effect promised that his administration was working with other countries not to support enhancement of India's nuclear weapons programme. Such a Presidential letter, or "certification" is required every six months under section 204 of the US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Act, but Obama's punctilious reporting to the Congress of the US meeting its obligation is among the factors that mark him out to be a staunch anti-nuclear weapons advocate. (*The Times of India*, 10 October 2009)

### 12 October 2009

#### **Indo-US relations will suffer if India tests nuke weapon: NYT**

India should not give into the pressure from some of its nuclear scientists to carry out an atomic test and if it does it would be a huge setback to its relations with the US and for the battle against terrorists, the New York Times said today. In an editorial 'Just say No', the influential US paper said Indian nuclear scientists are trying to bully their government into testing a nuclear weapon. "That would be a huge setback for India's relations with Washington, for the battle against terrorists, and for global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons... Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is resisting. He must continue to resist," the newspaper said. (*Press Trust of India*, 12 October 2009)

### 13 October 2009

#### **Two Prithvi missiles tested back-to-back**

In quick succession, India tested two advanced versions of the nuclear-capable Prithvi-II ballistic missile, with a strike range of 350-km, from the Chandipur interim test range off the Orissa coast on Monday. "The two P-II missiles, which can carry 500-kg warheads, were successfully launched within minutes of each other by the armed forces as part of operational exercises... Aimed at two different targets 350 km away from the launch point, the missiles met all mission objectives," said a defence ministry official. "The missiles were test-fired from mobile launchers around 10.30 am. Two naval ships tracked and monitored both the missiles hitting the targets very accurately," he added. (*The Times of India*, 13 October 2009)

#### **PM-Obama meet in mind, India and US move on n-fuel talks**

India has shared with the US the broad contours of setting up a dedicated national reprocessing facility to handle US-origin nuclear fuel. This is a key step forward towards concluding discussions on reprocessing before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits Washington in November. It's learnt that both

sides made considerable progress in the second round of talks held in Vienna last week and agreed to meet again next month so that negotiations are wrapped up before Singh travels to the US on November 24 as US President Barack Obama's first state guest. Under Article 6 of the 123 agreement, US recognised India's right to reprocess imported fuel. It was agreed that arrangements and procedures would be settled through negotiations. (*The Indian Express*, 13 October 2009)

### 17 October 2009

#### **Climate, WTO, Nukes: The heat's on India**

This is largely unfamiliar territory for India. For much of its 62-year independent existence, it has prided itself on being on the morally correct side of international debates and battles. Rarely has India been branded a 'bad boy' in the comity of nations. The Pokhran N-test dealt Gandhi's India a knock, but apart from that, the world's largest democracy has had a generally shining record of good behaviour. Today, India finds itself in danger of being cast as a bit of a villain on the international stage. On three separate fronts - climate change talks, world trade negotiations, and the campaign to ban nuclear tests - India is seen to be standing stubbornly in the way of treaties that are considered by their proponents to be not just desirable, but also morally just. (*The Times of India*, 17 October 2009)

### 20 October 2009

#### **Manmohan favours global nuclear disarmament**

Favouring non-discriminatory universal nuclear disarmament, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today said India is ready to negotiate the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which is multilateral, non-discriminatory and verifiable. Addressing a conference of top commanders of the three defence services here, he said it needs to be ensured that discriminatory standards and approaches in global disarmament are not perpetuated. "There is a revival of interest on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. We welcome this because India was a pioneer in the campaign for a nuclear weapons free world," Mr Singh said. He was apparently referring to the push being given by the US under the Obama Administration to non-proliferation initiatives like Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and FMCT. (*The Hindu*, 20 October 2009)

### 28 October 2009

#### **Foreclosing testing options a great folly (A N Prasad)**

It is really unfortunate that the issue of nuclear tests, considered of great strategic importance, is mired in controversy, particularly the performance of the thermonuclear (TN) device. The focus of debate seems to have shifted to the question of credibility of scientists, bureaucrats and politicians rather than credibility of deterrence. The sequence of events leading up to our government declaring a credible nuclear deterrence started with the tests of 1998. The scientists at the helm declared the tests a total success. The government of the day, and the one that followed, were satisfied. The public accepted the account and for the last

11 years the country has basked in the security of a credible minimum deterrent. (*The New Indian Express*, 28 October 2009)

## Nuclear Energy/Environment

### 3 October 2009

#### **Ship near Kudankulam N-plant triggers security concerns**

In an incident that triggered security concerns, a Jeddah-bound ship from Singapore, with 10 Indonesians on board, entered Indian territorial waters about 10 nautical miles from the upcoming 2000MW nuclear power plant in Kudankulam in Tirunelveli district in south Tamil Nadu on Thursday evening. The vessel's presence in the vicinity of the high-security nuclear plant created a quite a stir, though it was later found that the ship had strayed into the country's territorial waters due to bad weather. However, authorities are not taking any chances and the ship is being towed by the Coast Guard to the nearby Tuticorin port for further investigation. (*The Times of India*, 3 October 2009)

### 14 October 2009

#### **Land acquisition for nuclear power plant to begin today**

The process for acquiring 938 hectares of land for setting up Jaitapur nuclear power plant in Konkan will start on Thursday. The project, to be implemented with the help of France, will equip India with six European pressurised water reactors (EPRs). The EPRs are a third generation design, with each plant having a capacity of up to 1,600 MW. The project is estimated to be over in 10-12 years, following which 10,000 MW of electricity would be generated, said S K Jain, chairman and managing director of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) on Wednesday. According to Jain, the technical specifications for the first two EPRs would be decided within a month and techno-commercial negotiations would be over by this year end. (*The Times of India*, 14 October 2009)

### 16 October

#### **New Delhi notifies separation plan to nuclear watchdog**

India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA has become operational, with New Delhi notifying its separation plan to the international nuclear watchdog. With the notification that separates the country's nuclear civilian and strategic establishments, 14 reactors will be put under the India Specific Safeguards Agreement (ISSA) by 2014. The separation plan was officially announced in March 2006 during former US President George Bush's visit to India. IAEA would begin to implement the new safeguards agreement this year by inspecting the imported Uranium fuel fabrication at the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad and its transfer and loading on the newly constructed RAPS 5 and 6. IAEA inspectors have already fixed cameras at the plant site of RAPS 5 and 6, which are expected to be commissioned by December, after a delay of almost one year. (*The Economic Times*, 16 October 2009)

## Nuclear Cooperation/Treaties/ Agreements

**1 October 2009**

### **India can't be expected to sign NPT in present form: IAEA chief**

In a clear authentication of India's stand, IAEA chief Mohamed El-Baradei on Wednesday said that India cannot be expected to sign NPT in its present form and that CTBT instead could be more acceptable to New Delhi. El-Baradei was speaking after being conferred the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development for his "impassioned opposition to use of nuclear energy for military purposes". El-Baradei's statement came a day after PM Manmohan Singh said that any global non-proliferation attempt must be linked to complete nuclear disarmament and that NPT in its present form was discriminatory. (*The Times of India*, 1 October 2009)

**4 October 2009**

### **India, US hope to clinch agreement on reprocessing n-fuel**

India and the US may clinch the much-awaited "arrangements and procedures" agreement on reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel of American origin when they meet in Vienna soon. The talks between officials of the nuclear establishments of the two countries are expected to take place within the next fortnight and will be observed very closely by US companies which are keen to set up nuclear power plants in India. The first round of talks in July in Vienna were "very surprising for both the sides", sources close to the negotiators said. Department of Atomic Energy officials also said the two sides had made "good progress" in the first round of discussions and were optimistic that agreement could be clinched "in a couple of months". (*Press Trust of India*, 4 October 2009)

**5 October 2009**

### **Commission calls for bringing CTBT into force**

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, promoted by Australia and Japan, has called for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and singled out India, Israel and Pakistan as the three countries which must contribute to make the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty universal. India views the NPT as a discriminatory vehicle to promote disarmament and feels all countries must give up all their nuclear weapons to usher in an atomic weapons-free world. Co-chaired by the former Foreign Ministers of Japan and Australia, the participants at a meeting of the panel here were optimistic that the renewed focus of major powers on disarmament, led by the U.S. and Russia, offered an opportunity for progress and noted that the NPT had "near-universal acceptance." (*The Hindu*, 5 October 2009)

### **'For India, no entry into NPT as nuclear power'**

India, Pakistan and Israel will not be allowed to join the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nuclear-weapon states, Gareth Evans, Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, has said. In an exclusive interview to the BBC's Hindi service, Evans, whose commission was set up by the Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan last year, said on Sunday that the group would be presenting a major report ahead of the May 2010 NPT review conference. "I think nobody is going to allow India, Pakistan and Israel to join (the NPT) as nuclear-weapon states and these three countries are certainly not going to join as non-weapon states. So we have a real stalemate," Evans stated. (*The New Indian Express*, 5 October 2009)

### **US-India second round nuke fuel talks in Vienna**

The US and India will hold the second round of talks on reprocessing spent nuclear fuel in Vienna this week, with officials hoping to complete the negotiations much before the one year time limit under the historic Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. The first round of talks were held in Vienna in July this year during which, informed sources told PTI, both India and the US "surprised" each other by coming out with draft proposals which could advance the completion of negotiations by several months. Officials hope to complete the negotiations much before the one year time limit under the 123 Agreement that was signed on October 8 last year. (*Press Trust of India*, 5 October 2009)

**8 October 2009**

### **Completing nuke deal with India "very important": US**

Wrapping up the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, which has strengthened trust between the two countries, in the near future is an important priority for US, new Ambassador to India Timothy J Roemer today said. "...we have 3 or 4 issues to complete, to wrap the nuke deal that will bring jobs in the US and India and completing that hopefully in months ahead is a very very important priority of the United States..." the Ambassador said here at a CII function. Roemer said President Barack Obama has put his priority on relationship with India, as for America there is "strategic interest to cooperate more and more and engage in trade". (*Press Trust of India*, 8 October 2009)

### **Treaty will lead to more investment in India: US envoy**

The completion of the bilateral investment treaty by India and the US will lead to increased investment by American companies in infrastructure sectors, US Ambassador Timothy J Roemer said in New Delhi on Thursday. "We are negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. Once in place, this will encourage the entry of billions of dollars in foreign direct investment (FDI) in infrastructure," Roemer said during his interaction with Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). This was his first meeting with Indian business leaders under the aegis of CII. Instead of speaking from the dais, Roemer stepped down to the audience and walked across the room as he spoke about India-US relations in the economic sphere. (*Hindustan Times*, 8 October 2009)

**14 October 2009**

### **Australia firm on uranium exports to India: FM**

Australia has asked India to take part in joint military exercises but is standing firm against exporting uranium for the Asian country's nuclear energy programme, Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said. Speaking in New Delhi on Tuesday, Smith said Australia wanted to strengthen security cooperation with India and was ready to place it in the "front rank of our bilateral relationships". But he repeated his government's position that it would not sell uranium to the Asian giant, which is energy-starved but nuclear-armed, unless it signs a key non-proliferation pact. Smith said he and Indian counterpart SM Krishna had talked about uranium but that Australia had no plans to revive a landmark deal negotiated by the former government to sell the ore to India. (*Hindustan Times*, 14 October 2009)

### **India's nuclear treaties dilemma (Rahul K. Bhonsle)**

The United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1887, which resolves to "create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)", heralds the beginning of a difficult period for Indian diplomacy facing varied dilemmas on the country's nuclear identity. The ministry of external affairs pre-empted the UN resolution by a letter to the US, which was then president of the Security Council, stating India's well-established position on NPT, testing and universal disarmament. However, nuclear winds may possibly edge the country into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and eventually NPT despite apprehensions about the yield of the thermonuclear test in May 1998. (*Livemint*, 14 October 2009)

### **15 October 2009**

#### **India, Argentina sign civil nuclear pact**

India and Argentina signed a civil nuclear pact and nine other agreements on Wednesday. The Argentine President, Ms Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, on a state visit to India, signed the agreements after extensive discussions with the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh. A joint statement issued after talks between the two nations stated that India and Argentina will use the synergies between the and the vast experience of their nuclear scientists and technologists. "Taking into account their respective capabilities and experience in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, both India and Argentina have agreed to encourage and support scientific technical and commercial co-operation for mutual benefit in this field," said the joint statement. (*The Hindu Business Line*, 15 October 2009)

### **19 October 2009**

#### **U.S. welcomes site allocation for nuclear plants**

The U.S. has welcomed India's allocation of sites for the construction of nuclear plants by U.S.-led companies. The grant of the sites to the U.S.-led consortia at Chhayamithi Virdi in Gujarat and Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh followed an agreement between the U.S. and India for expanded co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The prom-

ise of providing business to the U.S.-led companies for production of nuclear power worth 10,000 MWe was held out by India in the run-up to ending the country's isolation from the global civil nuclear commerce as it is not a signatory to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "This important announcement [of allocation of sites] comes in welcome recognition of the trust and confidence as well as the growing partnership between our two countries. (*The Hindu*, 19 October 2009)

### **21 October 2009**

#### **Indo-US nuke deal unique, part of broader strategic ties: Hillary**

Affirming that the Obama administration fully backs the US-India nuclear deal, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Wednesday said that it was part of broader American strategic approach towards New Delhi and could not be used as a precise template or precedent for other countries. "The nuclear accord that I supported as a Senator, and the Obama administration supports it as a government, is embedded in a broader strategic dialogue with Indians. We view the relationship as comprehensive and very deep in terms of the issues we wish to explore with our Indian counterparts," Clinton said in an address on non-proliferation issues at the US Institute of Peace. (*The Times of India*, 21 October 2009)

### **23 October 2009**

#### **US for India's help on NPT**

The Obama administration wants to work with India to try and come up with "the 21st century version" of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, according to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Clinton, speaking at the US Institute of Peace in Washington on Wednesday, said the Obama administration wanted India to be part of its non-proliferation efforts. "And we want them to really be a major player at the table in trying to figure out how, starting from where we are right now, we go forward in an effective, verifiable manner to reinstate a non-proliferation regime that can prevent further countries acquiring nuclear weapons, or even peaceful nuclear capacity without the safeguards that we envision," she said. (*The Tribune*, 23 October 2009)

### **25 October 2009**

#### **Areva in JV talks with Bharat Forge for nuclear reactors**

France's Areva SA, the world's largest supplier of nuclear reactors, is in joint venture talks with Bharat Forge Ltd, the largest global maker of automotive forgings, to manufacture pressurized heavy water reactors as the European company seeks to gain a share of India's potential atomic energy market. Bharat Forge already has a joint venture with Areva for nuclear forgings, for which it has shortlisted two locations at Dahej and Mundra in Gujarat. The reactor venture, which will involve an investment of around Rs1,000 crore, is expected to be housed in the same complex that will house the forgings company. "The talks are on with Areva. It is yet to be finalized," said a person aware of the development but who did not want to be identified. (*Livemint*, 25 October 2009)

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**26 October 2009**

**EAS calls upon India to sign CTBT**

In a clear attempt to mount pressure on India, the East Asia Summit (EAS) today called upon its member states to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). “We encouraged those EAS participating countries that have not acceded to the CTBT to do so as it would serve as an impetus for having a successful NPT Review Conference,” said the Chairman’s statement adopted at the end of the day-long summit. It noted the intention of the Philippines in its capacity as President of the May 2010 NPT Review Conference to undertake wide and transparent consultations with parties to achieve a successful outcome of the conference. India is among the countries which have refused to sign both the CTBT and the NPT, contending that the treaties were discriminatory in nature. (*The Tribune, 26 October 2009*)

**27 October 2009**

**India’s nuclear drive sparks safety fears**

In hopes that nuclear power will meet its rising energy needs, India has embarked on a spending spree since a civilian nuclear deal with the United States last October removed sanctions that had long denied it access to the international atomic energy market. India has signed agreements with an array of nations to share and access nuclear fuel and technologies since the deal was completed. The most significant have been with Russia, the US and France. The government last week allocated sites for Russian, French and American firms to build five new light-water reactors. French firm Areva is earmarked to build a reactor in Jaitapur in Maharashtra state; Russian firms will build two plants, in Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu, and in Haripur, West Bengal; and US firms are set to build a plant in Kovvada, Andhra Pradesh, and in Chayamithi Viridi, Gujarat. (*Asia Times, 27 October 2009*)

## **Nuclear Commerce**

**6 October 2009**

**India-Canada set to boost trade ties, nuclear commerce**

India and Canada are set to boost their economic ties, with the two nation in the final stages of finalising a series of trade-related pacts, including nuclear commerce and moving towards a free-trade agreement. Prime Minister Stephen Harper will visit Mumbai and Delhi between November 15 and 18 and meet with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, sources said, adding that it is intended to be a turning point in the trade relationship between the two nations. Last week, India’s Commerce Secretary Rahul Kullar met in Ottawa with Trade Minister Stockwell Day and other top officials and signalled that after years of little progress, India was seeking real advances in trade. (*Press Trust of India, 6 October 2009*)

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