Naxalites rely on violence primarily to let the state feel their presence and be aware of the causes for their existence. This makes the movement dangerous and perhaps is the major reason why the threat is so serious, with its intensity having grown over the years. Clearly, their presence in  rural areas has been hampering developmental efforts in those places. There have been frequent attacks by the Naxalites on economic targets like railways, mining companies such as the National Mineral Developmental Corporation (NMDC), and communication infrastructure. There were 109 attacks on economic targets in 2008 and the number of attacks on the targets in the preceding year was 80. The number of Naxalite-related incidents in 2008 was 1591, and ranks far higher than the number of violent incidents reported from Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

While there are several dimensions of the Naxalite threat; the objective of this essay is to discuss in particular the Naxalite strategy in urban areas. What are the implications of their urban penetration? What are likely to be the security implications of this new strategy of the Naxalites? More importantly,  will the Naxalites be successful in carrying out their will in urban areas? How can this new push be arrested?