US & South Asia - Articles

What exactly is the US up to regarding Taiwan? The contradictory signals emanating from Washington have all the hallmarks of a tussle at the highest levels of decision-making in the US.  The anger on the Chinese side over Taiwanese actions, especially the reaction of the PLA, will only consolidate the “I-told-you-soâ€Â� attitude of the hardliners in the US.

Despite the recent series of military interactions with the Chinese, including the exchange of naval visits, the hawks in the Pentagon are eager to ‘contain’ a ‘rising’ China. India, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia have been the beneficiaries of this position as the US has upgraded its military tie-ups or engaged in military exercises with these countries. Similar thinking has preceded the stationing of US missile defences in Australia. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, had a role in delaying the restoration of military ties with China damaged after the EP-3 incident, despite a general agreement that the US needed the Chinese on their side post-9/11.. The latter are looking for a working relationship with the US and must be upset at the general hostility of the Pentagon, and increasing American military ties with Taiwan. Little wonder then that the PLA has reacted as belligerently as it did over the Taiwanese referendum law.

US policies are intimately linked to Taiwan’s very existence. Every nuance in Washington’s China policy is closely watched by Taipei. Apart from next year’s presidential elections, there must have been something in the recent trend of American relations with the mainland that must have encouraged the separatists in the Taiwanese legislature to introduce the referendum bill.

Sino-US trade disputes have intensified in the recent past. The US has expressed concern over its growing trade imbalance with China but its solution – devaluation of the renminbi – was rejected by the Chinese. Meanwhile, US Commerce Secretary Donald Evans was quoted by the People's Daily on 5 November, saying of the US relationship with China, "I don't think we're enemies at all". However, towards the end of the month Evans was portrayed in an opinion piece of the same paper as threatening that the US was losing its patience with China on the issue of intellectual property rights.

Also, despite the 12 November statement by the American ambassador to Beijing that the US was committed to the “one China� policy, Rumsfeld’s absence at a Chinese embassy dinner for the visiting Chinese defence minister, Gen. Cao Gangchuan, was a sign of fissures within the US administration over its China policy.

Following a statement on 18 November made by the vice-minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, Wang Zaixi, threatening war, the US responded the next day saying "[t]he use of force to resolve cross-strait differences is unacceptable". The administration, in fact, sought to rub it in for the Chinese as a senior official declared that Beijing was clearly frustrated at its inability to influence the course of events. Besides, reminding the Chinese of the democratic credentials of Taiwan, the US also sought to remind them of 1996 and 2000, when military threats only resulted in the victories of presidential candidates opposed to Beijing.

Indeed, the US too, is constrained in the matter by the democracy that thrives in Taiwan.  The American unease over interfering directly in a democratic process in an allied country is clearly visible. Even with the best of intentions in the relationship with China, there really is no way that the US administration now or in the future can cut Taiwan off and let it be run over by what Americans consider a non-democratic regime. Nor can they allow cross-Straits ties to develop without attempting to influence them. This confusion is clearly visible to Taiwanese separatists who have an agenda at odds with the KMT.

Somewhere along the line, the US has failed to factor in a radicalization of Taiwanese politics. This has landed the US in a piquant situation. It was all very well to have supported dictators, including Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), in the past, but an altogether different matter to oppose a democratic process or its results, especially when the US is trying to foster democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Americans are also sending all the wrong signals to the Chinese. Cultivating a friendly constituency in China will be out of the question if the Americans cannot stop pulling in different directions on their China policy.