US & South Asia - Articles

(Article Review: Stephen Cohen, "The Jihadist threat to Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003, 26;3, pp.7-25.)

Elsewhere, Cohen emphasizes that "unless Pakistan is defeated in a war or undergoes an internal split of an unprecedented magnitude - and neither scenario is likely - the army will retain its professional and organizational integrity and will prevent any radical Islamic group's rise to power in its own right, although the army may continue to use them in its own interests."

True, the military may prevent the Islamic groups from acquiring power; but given the political vacuum in Pakistan, perpetuating Army rule would only increase the political power of these groups. This would have three long-term consequences. First, the democratic polity would find it difficult to marginalize these forces, once they are entrenched as a political force, say after five years. Second, it would increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the military. By capturing 11 percent of votes, the MMA has paralyzed the Parliament and become a headache for the military through its "No-LFO-No, Go-Musharraf-Go" slogans. Imagine what would be the power equations if the MMA acquired more political power by default? Third, but most important, the kind of changes the MMA led government will enforce during their rule would be extremely difficult for any future secular democratic government to alter. This would shift the entire political framework towards the right; at a later stage, even moderate parties would be forced to shift rightwards.

If this comes about then Cohen's assumption that "the only scenario involving the army that could bring radical Islamists to a position of influence would be the army leadership's decision to don the cloak of radical Islam, which would be unlikely in the near future because the current army leaders are openly critical of experiments in the realm" would be questionable. The army becomes less relevant if bogus elections and dubious democratic government coming to power with manipulated mandate increases the political power of the radical Islamists. The army may not be directly responsible for the political growth of the radicals, but indirectly, the latter would win by default, filling the political vacuum created by emasculating the PPP and PML-N. The US government believes the Army to be the defender of Pakistani society; hence, it would never pressurize the present military government to return democracy in Pakistan. This support for the military regime at the cost of the democratic forces would decide the future of Pakistan "within the next five years."

In fact, Cohen himself says elsewhere in the article that, "it has almost always been the state, especially the Pakistani army, that has allowed most radical Islamic groups to function on a wider stage - equipping and training them when necessary and providing overall political and strategic guidance for their activities. Arguably, therefore, in Pakistan, radical groups have been more of a tool of the state than a serious threat to it." (Emphasis added)

It would be useful to identify the forces controlling the state vis-a-vis those controlling the radical groups. The Pakistani state, unfortunately, even during the democratic interregnum during 1989-99, has either been controlled by its democratic institutions or been under the Army in collaboration with some democratic institutions, including the President. This has been the rule, except for a brief period in 1998-99, when Nawaz Sharif attempted to assert his control over all other institutions. The radical forces, on the other hand, were always under the control of the Army Even during brief democratic interludes when the state was under the control of democratic institutions, the Prime Minister had no influence over military-militant equations, whether in Afghanistan or in Kashmir. Benazir Bhutto paid the price in 1990 and Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

The real threat to Pakistan in future will be on who controls whom in the military-militant equation. No doubt, radical Islamists were used by the military as its tool to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The military funded them, trained them and provided political and personal protection. There has been a considerable change in these equations. The objectives of both are no longer the same. The military has a limited objective – Kashmir and Afghanistan – but the radicals have a different agenda altogether. For them, Kashmir and Afghanistan are first steps towards a larger goal. Financially they are independent and do not need the military to fund their activities. Worse, they have the arms to carry out their struggle. The military under Musharraf attempted to deweaponize Pakistani society, regulate the external funds flowing for jihad and streamline from outside and streamline the madrassa curriculum, but it has failed miserably on all three counts.