US & South Asia - Articles

Iraq: Bush versus Saddam

There was inevitability about this war. The assembled 300,000-strong force could not have come back home without testing their new weapons, tactics and operational philosophy. It was therefore necessary for the United States to cast the issues in simple, uncomplicated, black and white termsâ€â€�good versus evil, Bush against Saddam Hussein. Personification helps to focus popular attention on individuals rather than issues that can bemuse people. Hence the demand for regime change being added to the original U.S. requirement that Iraq ‘come clean’ on its alleged possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Earlier, the forces of evil had been identified with the elusive Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, the embodiment of evil at that time, encapsulating the threat to the world from international terrorism.

This time-tested ploy for eliciting public support has not worked for Bush, neither in Europe nor, for that matter, in the United States, if the mammoth rallies against the war are any indication of the popular mood. Governments and leaders supporting the war, prominently the U.K. and Tony Blair, are facing a revolt in their own ranks, apart from being condemned in these meetings; they convey a clear message to politicians about their fate in the next elections. This situation has not been helped by the Bush Administration’s assiduous and none-too-subtle efforts to intimidate governments into supporting its war against Saddam Hussein, with the heat being turned on the elected members of the Security Council and other influential countries in the United Nations.  

The repercussions of Bush’s war against Saddam Hussein can be summed up. On the credit side is the removal of an oppressive and unrepresentative regime whose crimes against humanity are legion, and which was trying by devious means to procure nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to further its adventuresome and notoriously feckless conduct. The contradictions here are also legion. What about North Korea? It has a repressive regime, has brazenly flaunted its clandestinely acquired nuclear and missile capabilities, and is willing to transfer its missiles to any buyer for purely monetary considerations. What about Iran? Evidence is mounting that it has established a uranium enrichment plant, which is being steadily upgraded; it will provide Iran with the fissile materials it needs to make nuclear weapons. What about Pakistan? It had transferred uranium enrichment technology to North Korea, which reciprocated by providing missile technology to Pakistan. Currently, Pakistan enjoys considerable American patronage to further its war against terrorism in Afghanistan. What about China? It has blatantly proliferated both nuclear and missile technology to several countries in the world. Saddam Hussein and Iraq remain, however, special entities in the Bush hate pantheon.

Several reasons underlie the Bush administration’s war against Iraq, apart from the ostensible one of achieving regime change and destroying its capability to make WMDs. They include finishing the unfinished tasks of the first Gulf War launched by Bush the Elder in 1991, ensuring the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1441 that requires Iraq to make a full and truthful declaration of its WMD capabilities, gaining control over Iraq’s oilfieldsâ€â€�second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of their proven reserves, and acquiring a stranglehold over the Gulf region to guide the evolution of its constituent nations into practicing democracies. Further, the United States had tried several means earlier to oust Saddam Husseinâ€â€�containment, limited military action, and covert operations. None had worked.

The premise that only a full-scale war will achieve Saddam Hussein’s ouster could, of course, prove very unwise. Firstly, Americans all over the world will be placed at risk from terrorist attacks mounted by al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist organizations; they would perceive the killing of Muslims in Iraq as good reason for them to kill innocent Americans across the world. Secondly, unilateral U.S. action against Iraq embodies an anomaly. How could the U.S. thereafter seek multilateral cooperation to continue its global war against terrorism? How could it, in good conscience, ask the international community to contribute for the economic reconstruction of post-war Iraq? Thirdly, scenarios can be sketched in which, post Iraq war, the Kurds and the Shias could claim separate states in North and South Iraq respectively. The unravelling of the Iraqi state could lead further to a similar vivisection of Saudi Arabia, leading to a balkanisation of the Gulf region. This may seem fanciful at the present juncture but, if this occurs, Iran would assuredly become the dominant power in the region, which could be an unintended consequence for the Bush Administration of the second Gulf war.

Perhaps, this is over-analysis. Bush was equally trapped, and saw no way out, except to move forward into this war. With a huge force assembled in the region, war was his only option, in a classical repetition of the Guns of August scenario.