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#2395, 18 October 2007
 
Security Concerns in Siliguri
Souvik Chatterji
Freelancer
e-mail: souvik_chatterji2000@yahoo.co.in
 

Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir has effectively sidelined the systematic disruptive activities taking place in the Northeast India for the last several years. The Maoists have emerged as a destructive group whose activities have had a dangerous impact on the peace and solidarity of the Northeast. There is evidence of Maoists having developed links with the United Liberal Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamtapur Liberalisation Organisation (KLO), all of which operate in north Bengal and Assam. Sometime back, the Nepalese Maoist leader, Mohan Kiran Vaidya was arrested near Siliguri with documents revealing that the Maoists had spent approximately 10 million rupees buying explosives in Siliguri. Among the notable militant activities in the past, these organisations were involved in the New Jalpaiguri blasts, where a suitcase bomb with RDX explosives was set off with the help of an electronic timer.

The anti-establishment sentiment in the Northeast states such as Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and northern West Bengal, emerged out of a feeling of neglect from the Centre. Unemployment is the other issue which has helped the Maoists and other terrorist organisations in mobilising the non-working idle youth for their disruptive activities.

Siliguri is used as a pathway to Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal. The transit points include the Tenzing Norge Bus Terminus in Siliguri, the New Jalpaiguri Railway Station, and the Bagdogra Airport. As Siliguri is also a gateway for travellers or tourists, the visitors to Darjeeling, Kuseoung, Kalingpong, Mirik, Gangtok, Lava, Lolegaon, cannot be distinguished from the terrorists. Besides, there is also an unofficial deal between the tourist guest houses, hotels and officials of the local agencies to not publicise the disruptive activities in details. Tourists are the main source of revenue in this part of the world and if they are discouraged to visit these places through the exposure of activities of all these terrorist organisations through the media, the economy will suffer, like the way it did in Jammu and Kashmir over the last 20 years.

Several security measures have been introduced in recent times which include the high-tech gadgetry provided to the military, including the Battlefield Surveillance Radars (BFSRs), the Passive Night Vision Devises (PNVDs) and the Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), to check infiltration through the border areas. The 'one-border-one-force' policy enabled India to create a Secret Service Bureau (SSB) which is now committed to guard the border of Siliguri with Nepal. For example, places like Kakorbhita has to be guarded from entry of militants from Nepal as it is the location from where smuggled goods used to previously enter Siliguri and which were then sold in Siliguri's Hongkong Market. The SSB consists of 30,000 men who are permanently stationed three miles from the Nepal-India border with some military deployed in each post.

In addition, the Border Security Force (BSF) in Siliguri has systematically regulated the entry of export trucks into Siliguri. The tightening of entry routes in Siliguri, however, has generated grievances within a certain section of the government for its impact on bilateral trade.

In conclusion, it can be said that the biggest challenge facing Siliguri today is maintaining security at the transit points, which is more difficult at times than the border-checking points. Broad gauge, meter gauge and narrow gauge trains ply from Siliguri to Alipuduar and to the district of Coochbihar, with many travellers transiting through these stations per day. If there is double checking in all these points it can help reduce the chances of militant infiltration. At the same time, peace talks with the militant organisations by the government can also provide a solution, if they offer a lenient provision towards the militants who surrender themselves and help the government by providing relevant information, similar to the way the surrendered ULFA militants were provided lesser punishment. Lastly, increased publicity by the media about the events that occur in the Northeast is very important; unless the Indian government and the outside world are exposed to the problems, appropriate measures cannot be taken. Maintenance of peace and solidarity can further help enhance cross-border trade through Siliguri.

 
Article by same Author
Buddhadeb's Stand on the Maoists

State Government Rules Out Talks Against the Maoists: The Right Step?

Tackling Extremism in Purulia and Bankura

The Naxalite Movement in Andhra Pradesh

Dealing with Adivasi Resentment in Assam

Violent Bihar

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