Terrorism - Articles

The much talked about Kabul Conference got over on 20 July 2010; three issues emerge clear. First, Karzai wants to take over the complete security of Afghanistan as early as possible, perhaps sooner than the international forces want to leave; second, he wants ‘Afghan’ ownership (read ‘his’) of the administration and distribution of aid; and third, the international community has decided to leave Afghanistan (perhaps abandon?) as early as possible. All these are invitations to disaster; perhaps the countdown has already started. Consider the following questions.

Will the ANA be ready by 2014?
Is the Afghan National Army (ANA) in any position to take over the security situation by 2014? Ever since the international community started its programme on building an Afghan Army and started investing in the necessary infrastructure and training, until today, there has not been a single military operation that has been fully undertaken by the ANA, and which could be considered a success.

Though the preparedness of the ANA needs a separate analysis, it is sufficient to state here that the ANA is far from ready to take over the security of Afghanistan in 2014. Why would Karzai ask for the same? Does he not understand the limitations of the ANA and its preparedness? Perhaps, Karzai is sure about his proposed dialogue with the Taliban and he believes that by 2014, there will be an understanding with the Taliban, or sections of it led by the Haqqani network.

It is difficult to foresee a situation in which Karzai and Taliban (or sections of it) are working together, thereby not really challenging the ANA. But even if this scenario is accepted, what will happen to the Taliban and its fighters? Will the Taliban want to reintegrate its fighters into ANA, as the Maoists in Nepal have demanded? Or will the ANA disintegrate and merge with the Taliban? The ANA is ethnically diverse; from a historical perspective, the soldiers always fought along ethnic lines and were more loyal to their clan leaders. This will be a crucial factor in deciding the outcome of any security situation that will arise after 2014.

The above scenario does not include a section of the Taliban waging a ferocious insurgency, or other groups, for example, led by former Mujahideen leaders like Hekmetyar. This also does not include the situation in which the Afghan government becomes unstable, with ethnic minorities walking out, along with their respective brethren in the ANA.

Will there be an effective and inclusive administration by 2014?
Karzai is anxious to take over as early as possible and be in charge of the complete administration. As of now, less than one-fifth of the aid is distributed through the Afghan government. Thanks to the prevailing level of corruption and the ineffectiveness of local administration, the donor agencies prefer distributing aid directly. One could understand Karzai’s frustrations; he would prefer his officials sharing a larger booty and distributing it among themselves. More importantly, it will also make him and his kitchen cabinet more important, for they will be seen as the reservoir of aid. Perhaps, Karzai believes, he can buy loyalty.

Again from a historical perspective, this may be counterproductive and least helpful in the nation building process. With the legal institutions in tatters and no sign of courts questioning and enforcing accountability, one is likely to see more corruption. In fact, the complete ownership of the Afghan government by Karzai, in 2014 with little checks and balances, and lack of effective legal mechanisms will only result in the government becoming a reservoir of corruption. Karzai’s administration is simply not in the position to ‘own the government’ by 2014. Unfortunately, he seems to have convinced the international community otherwise; one is likely to see more alienation of the common man.

“Abandon Afghanistan Project” of the International Community
Finally, the international community is anxious to leave Afghanistan as early as possible. There is absolutely no use in criticizing the US alone; the international community has neither the patience nor the will (political and military) to ensure a stable Afghanistan. One is not sure, whether Karzai is making all those statements, because he wants to or because he has no other option. Perhaps, the reluctance of the international community is forcing him to deal with the devil(s) in Afghanistan.

What has been achieved in Afghanistan since 9/11, in the last ten years, that the international community is willing to leave Afghanistan today? Has the al Qaeda network been neutralized? Has the Taliban lost its fighting capacity? Does the local population support Karzai’s government and is it willing to take part in the governance process? Are the differences between various ethnic communities within Afghanistan addressed?  Are the regional neighbours – Pakistan, India, Iran and Central Asia willing to work ‘together’ in Afghanistan?

Let us not abandon Afghanistan once again. Let us not fall into Karzai’s trap or make him our scapegoat. Afghanistan needs a larger engagement for a sustained period of time. There is no example in the human history where a nation was built in less than a decade. It is certainly impossible to conceive of the same in Afghanistan.

(This is a part of a series on Af-Pak region; forthcoming articles will focus on issues relating to the Afghan National Army, Chinese investments and the Afghan-Pakistan transit agreement)

Other Articles in the series

Af-Pak Diary-I: Is Karzai’s Endgame changing vis-à-vis Pakistan?
Af-Pak Diary-II: Should India also talk to the Taliban?