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#1462, 16 August 2004
 
Tigers After a Tiger: Why the LTTE Wants to Eliminate Karuna?
N Manoharan
Research Officer, IPCS
 

Since March 2004, the Karuna factor has emerged as a new dimension in the messy ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The LTTE is hunting for Karuna, but the Sri Lankan government is covertly shielding him. For Tigers, eliminating Karuna is vital for various reasons.

 

Firstly, Karuna’s estrangement from the LTTE has raised certain fundamental doubts on the nature of the negotiations for reaching a final settlement of the ethnic question; it highlighted the differences between the Jaffna and the Batticaloa Tamils. The socio-economic under-development of the eastern Tamils has political undercurrents. Since Karuna citied this as the sole reason for his decision to operate independently of the Wanni leadership for which he had public support in the East, the Government has reviewed its assumption that Sri Lankan Tamils are a single monolithic group. This means that the concept of ‘homeland’, comprising northern and eastern regions of the Island, put out by the LTTE, is in shambles. Even if the LTTE agrees to settle for autonomy (which it claims to be doing now), it is doubtful whether the Government would agree to hand over the entire Tamil ‘autonomous’ territory to the Tigers.

 

Secondly, and linked to the first, the Karuna factor has weakened the LTTE’s case for being the ‘sole representative’ of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Karuna faction believes that the LTTE only represents the Jaffna Tamils, hence the grievances of the Batticaloa Tamils were always ignored. He claims therefore to represent the interests of the people in the East. It is on this plank that he is planning to enter into active politics. If that succeeds, according to the LTTE, the gulf between the eastern and northern Tamils would further widen, resulting in an erosion of support for the Tigers, both men and material.

 

Thirdly, if some of the revelations made by Karuna are to be believed, the past six rounds of negotiations between the UNF government and the LTTE was a farce. Karuna admitted that during his trip to Thailand for a round of talks he met “KP” – the LTTE’s points man in charge of arms and financial linkages – regarding arms transfers to the LTTE bases in Sri Lanka. Karuna also revealed that the strategy of the LTTE would be to augment its strength during the ceasefire respite. Given his long association with the Tigers, there could be many more cats to come out of the bag, which could have serious politico-military implications for the LTTE.

 

No wonder the LTTE is desperate to remove Karuna from the scene. The Tigers are trying to grapple with the Karuna faction in two ways – military and political. Militarily, they have indulged in decimating Karuna loyalists wherever they are through their ‘hit squads’. Since Karuna may have been getting assistance from the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE is not in a position to lay hands on its rivals in government controlled areas. The intelligence wing, therefore, has been put to optimum use to identify the dissenting cadres. The assistance of the village headmen is sought wherever they are not identifiable. In urban areas like Colombo, the LTTE’s ‘sleeping cells’ have been activated to assist the ‘hit squads’. It is not willing to spare those who are helping Karuna and his loyalists. Gunning down of ‘PLOTE’ Mohan in broad light in Colombo and the suicide attempt on EPDP leader, Dougles Devananda, are classic cases. A price tag of Rs 2.25 million has been placed on Karuna’s head. It has also been revealed that Tiger families that attack safe houses where colleagues of Karuna Amman reside will be paid Rs 50,000 for each house attacked. The strategy of ‘divide and kill’ is also being followed to penetrate the Karuna faction that has spilled over and formed groups all over the Island. Overall, the scene appears to have reverted to the mid-1980s when the LTTE was on an elimination spree to eradicate all other militant groups to emerge as the ‘sole representative’ of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

 

On the political front, the LTTE has warned Colombo that resumption of war is imminent unless the government stops helping Karuna and his associates. And this has become a major hindrance to the resumption of the peace process. Simultaneously, the LTTE has asked the TNA MPs to launch a campaign in parliament and elsewhere to ensure that Karuna is not recognized as another representative of the Tamils.

 

In the process, the ceasefire agreement is being disregarded. Many ceasefire violations have taken place, surprisingly without its breach, largely due to the international monitors. Nonetheless, the peace process has now reached a stage where there is “little reason for optimism”; and the “frozen war has started melting on the edges.”

 
Article by same Author
IPCS Debate: The UNHRC Resolution on Sri Lanka

Devolution in Sri Lanka: The Latest Take

‘Taming the Tigers’: Reintegration of Surrendered LTTE Cadres

Fishing in Troubled Waters: Indian Fishermen and India-Sri Lanka Relations

Alternative Strategies for Indo-Sri Lankan Relations: Passenger Ferry Service

Sri Lanka: UN Panel and Sovereignty Issues

Sri Lanka: One Year after the War, Where is Ethnic Reconciliation?

Sri Lanka: Why Sustain the ‘State of Exception’?

Upcoming Parliamentary Elections and the Future of Sri Lanka

Challenges Before the President

Ghosts of War Haunt Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka: Clash of ‘War Heroes’

Cross-border Nationalism

Where is the “Northern Spring” in Sri Lanka?

Will the LTTE Rise Again?

Post-LTTE Sri Lanka: Demilitarization as a First Step towards Peace

Post-LTTE: India’s Policy Options on Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Issue

Sri Lanka: Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace

Sri Lanka in 2008: A Tale of Two Fires

The LTTE: 'Determined to Fight, but Ready for Peace'

Eelam War IV: Military Strategies of the LTTE

Eelam War IV: Strategy of the Government of Sri Lanka

Fishing in Troubled Waters: Tamil Nadu Fishermen and India-Sri Lanka Relations

Eastern Provincial Council Elections: A First Step Towards Final Settlement?

Local Polls in Batticaloa: How Significant?

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