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#360, 8 June 2000
 
Sri Lanka: Lions, Tigers and an Elephant
N Manoharan
Research Officer, IPCS
 

New Mahout

 

 

With the fall of Elephant Pass (EP) rapidly and surprisingly on April 22, the LTTE stands to achieve victory over the Sri Lankan army. Its fall was imminent since December 1999, when government troops started losing the mainland bases like Mullaitivu and Killanochi one after the other. The Tigers intensified their attacks in mid-April. They first targeted the eastern (coastal) portions of the EP; then they cut across to the west and destroyed several small camps along A-9 highway north of EP. The idea was to cut off the supply lines between EP and Jaffna peninsula. A thrust was then made by capturing Iyakachchi, a small Army defence post near EP, on April 19. The EP garrison was then besieged. After being without supplies or reinforcements for two days, the Army withdrew itself (two divisions) north towards Jaffna , abandoning the EP on April 22. 

 

 

The Army called it a "tactical and temporary withdrawl". It was justified to avoid more casualties, and to save Jaffna from falling into the hands of the LTTE. The new Army chief, Lt. Gen. Srilal Weerasooriya exudes confidence in being able to defend the cultural capital of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Army is now talking of EP as being "not the only location" to place its defenses. 

 

 

A Big Loss?

 

 

However, the loss of EP is undeniably the single biggest military setback for the government since the separatist war began in 1983. Huge arms, ammunition and other military supplies were left behind. Though the Army claims to have disabled the arms, no one is sure about the reliability of this claim, considering the past. The casualties of the Army were more than the LTTE, as more died due to dehydration than the actual fighting. Now, with the heavily fortified garrison to protect them, even from aerial bombings, the LTTE has an edge to launch their future offensives. Psychologically, the EP was a symbol of the government's power and prestige. There was a danger of its fall in 1991, but the Sri Lankan Army and Air Force managed to drive the Tigers back into the jungles after six weeks of intense fighting. The loss now is obviously a severe blow to the troops' morale. Politically, if the rebels go on to capture Jaffna , they would have a clear advantage in any future talks with the Government. For the people, the only land supply route is cut off. They have to depend on the sea or air. The people who can foresee hardships under the LTTE have already started leaving the peninsula. 

 

 

Meandering Mysteries

 

 

But, where was the Air Force when the rebels were choking the garrison? Why did the Navy not support the land forces through Jaffna Lagoon? What were the forces south of EP doing? When the Army was in trouble what made eight important ministers (including Defence and Foreign Affairs) and the leader of the opposition go abroad? At the critical juncture, why were there shuffles in the higher level of the Army hierarchy? While the rebels possess heavy 120-mm and 140-mm mortars, why did the Sri Lankan Army not bother to procure them? What made the Army ignore intelligence reports on the EP attack? How far are reports that a senior Army officer gave information regarding the EP Army camp to the Tigers true? These questions still remain mysteries.

 

 

An Elephant Trap

 

 

With the victory pendulum swinging to its side, the LTTE has been advancing towards Jaffna and Point Pedro, except for a brief lull when they offered a cease-fire to the government. Though the government rejected the offer saying that it was a part of the LTTE's "psychological warfare", the real reason was the expectation that the Tigers could not carry on their advance for more than five days. But the rebels have breached the Forward Defence Lines of the Army at Ariyalai. They claim to have captured the strategic Navatkuli bridge, barely three kilometers from Jaffna . With around 30,000 troops trapped in the peninsula, the government is desperately looking for military equipment and support to stem the advance of the Tigers. At the same time, the morale and strength of the Tigers cannot remain undiminished. In their advance towards Jaffna they seemed to have lost many cadres and are now recruiting children by force. If the Army is reinforced with arms and men, the fall of Jaffna can be prevented or, at least, postponed. But, for the time being, it is a tug-of-war with innocent people trapped in between.

 

 

 

 

 

 
Article by same Author
IPCS Debate: The UNHRC Resolution on Sri Lanka

Devolution in Sri Lanka: The Latest Take

‘Taming the Tigers’: Reintegration of Surrendered LTTE Cadres

Fishing in Troubled Waters: Indian Fishermen and India-Sri Lanka Relations

Alternative Strategies for Indo-Sri Lankan Relations: Passenger Ferry Service

Sri Lanka: UN Panel and Sovereignty Issues

Sri Lanka: One Year after the War, Where is Ethnic Reconciliation?

Sri Lanka: Why Sustain the ‘State of Exception’?

Upcoming Parliamentary Elections and the Future of Sri Lanka

Challenges Before the President

Ghosts of War Haunt Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka: Clash of ‘War Heroes’

Cross-border Nationalism

Where is the “Northern Spring” in Sri Lanka?

Will the LTTE Rise Again?

Post-LTTE Sri Lanka: Demilitarization as a First Step towards Peace

Post-LTTE: India’s Policy Options on Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Issue

Sri Lanka: Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace

Sri Lanka in 2008: A Tale of Two Fires

The LTTE: 'Determined to Fight, but Ready for Peace'

Eelam War IV: Military Strategies of the LTTE

Eelam War IV: Strategy of the Government of Sri Lanka

Fishing in Troubled Waters: Tamil Nadu Fishermen and India-Sri Lanka Relations

Eastern Provincial Council Elections: A First Step Towards Final Settlement?

Local Polls in Batticaloa: How Significant?

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