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#1453, 6 August 2004
 
Manipur: Law versus Outlaws
Rani Pathak
Researcher, Centre for Development and Peace Studies, Guwahati
 

In the situation prevailing in Manipur, the armed forces believe that they require tough legal provisions to combat the separatists and restore a semblance of order. The security forces in Manipur are tasked primarily to carry out counter-insurgency operations. The Armed Forces (Assam & Manipur) Special Powers Act, 1958 gives them sweeping powers to deal with the ‘enemy’.

 

This legislation has been in force in Manipur since 1980, and  empowers “any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer, or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces,†in a disturbed area to either open fire, arrest or conduct search operations “without warrant†for “maintenance of public order.†Simply put, the Act provides for an Army soldier from the rank of a havildar onwards with the power to shoot and kill a person should the security force personnel be ‘convinced’ that this ultimate step is needed to control the situation.

 

One can argue for and against this Act. What is important to analyse is whether application of this tough anti-terror law in Manipur has succeeded in containing insurgency, or whether its use has been counterproductive. One needs to assess whether this Act and its use by the security forces have been actually making it easy for the insurgent groups to mobilize the masses by getting them out onto the streets to raise their voice against the security forces and the Indian State. For instance, on 15 July, a group of 40 Manipuri women shocked the nation by taking recourse to an unheard of form of protest in Imphal standing naked in front of the paramilitary Assam Rifles’ Sector 9 headquarters. They were demonstrating against the alleged death in custody of Thangjam Monorama Devi, which led to snowballing violence, with protesters defying curfew, clashing with the police and setting fire to government offices.

 

If reports are to be believed, Thangjam Manorama died in custody. Even if she actually was a PLA militant, the question remains whether the security forces were justified in killing. The answer obviously is no. Some reports in the media quoted Assam Rifles officials as claiming that she was shot when she “tried to flee on the pretext of responding to the call of nature.†This is a rather unconvincing explanation as the well-trained troops could easily have given chase and overpowered an unarmed woman who was in their custody.

 

Student and prominent civil society groups in the frontier State have been pressing for withdrawal of this ‘black law’ from Manipur. Neither the State Government nor the Centre has shown any sign of conceding their demands. Quite often, the Manipuris have been taking to the streets to vent their anger against this law. The latest turn of events has once again pushed the authorities to the wall. A beleaguered State Government has ordered a judicial probe, while the Assam Rifles has also instituted a court of enquiry. Meanwhile, the Assam Rifles contingent that was allegedly involved in picking up Manorama has been taken off active duty.

 

Manipur has as many as 17 active rebel groups and, despite this Act being in force, the insurgents are having a field day. In 2003, as many as 196 people were killed in insurgency-related violence in the State. Between January and June 2004, a total of 114 persons have been killed in similar circumstances in Manipur. In the light of these statistics, one wonders whether New Delhi would do well to withdraw the Act from Manipur. The Centre’s moves are awaited, but New Delhi appears to be out to placate the Manipuris by announcing that the Assam Rifles would move out of the historic Kangla Fort in Imphal to a new location. This has been a longstanding demand of local groups. Whether New Delhi will withdraw the Act is another matter.

 

There can be no two opinions that insurgency has to be put down with a firm hand and the rebels must respond to New Delhi’s repeated offers for peace talks. But, while combating the rebels, one needs to calculate whether the methods used and legal provisions taken recourse to are really effective in dealing with this situation. In Assam, for instance, violence by insurgents has come down to a great extent without the troops using or seeking to use the Armed Forces (Assam & Manipur) Special Powers Act.

 
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