Northeast - Articles

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ended a three-day visit to Manipur and Assam on 22 November with a clear message that the UPA Government in New Delhi could talk peace with insurgent groups, but would not let terror hold development initiatives to ransom.

The Prime Minister succeeded in demonstrating that he was a leader with a difference by refusing to describe whatever projects he has conceded or funds he has allocated to the two states as part of a 'package'. After all, Dr Singh is aware that due to poor implementation of the earlier packages announced by his predecessors, the region has become skeptical to what has come to be known as 'PM's packages.'

"I am not here to buy the loyalty of people by announcing packages or allocating funds. I have come to understand the problems and address them sincerely," the Prime Minister said in carefully drafted speeches. But then, between Manipur and Assam, Dr Singh has given his government's commitment to execute projects worth more than Rs 12,000 crore. The message here cannot be missed – the UPA Government was bent on taking the insurgency-wracked parts of the Northeast to the path of development. Dr Singh's visit did give an idea of the Congress-led Union Government's approach towards the problem of insurgency and separatism in the Northeast. New Delhi would not be bogged down by insurgency and ethnic strife and will continue to push towards economic regeneration and progress. In other words, New Delhi would simultaneously tackle the twin menace of militancy and economic stagnation.

By not referring to rebel groups like the ULFA or the frontline Meitei outfits in Manipur even once by name during his dozen-odd public speeches and appearances, the Prime Minister sought to send out a signal that insurgency was not the only thing high on his agenda. In fact, Dr Singh appears to have deliberately sought to underplay the issue of insurgency during his visit to two of the worst militancy-ravaged states in the region.

Rather, Dr Singh made a deliberate attempt to strike a chord with the people in both Manipur and Assam and win them over. He did succeed in this endeavour when he handed over the Kangla Fort in Imphal, the symbol of Manipuri pride and nationalism, to the people of Manipur. Ever since the British defeated the local ruler in 1891, the Kangla Fort had been under occupation, first by the British, and then by the Assam Rifles. He also reiterated his promise to see whether the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act could be replaced by a more 'humane law.' In Assam, the Prime Minister called upon the "youths of the State" to help their "own Prime Minister" in building a new and resurgent Assam and promised to look into all their "legitimate grievances".

Dr Singh made it clear that "Assam is an integral part of India, and there should be no doubt in that regard." This was a clear message to the outlawed ULFA that while New Delhi was ready to initiate peace talks with the group, it cannot hold discussions on its key demand of sovereignty. The ULFA has since reiterated that discussion on sovereignty was a must if the two sides are to sit for peace negotiations. The rebel group carried out three bomb attacks in different parts of Assam on 25 November, injuring at least six people. The attacks coincided with the ULFA's annual 'protest day' on 27 November, held to vent its ire on the Army offensive that first began in the State against its cadres on 27 November 1990.

On his part, the Prime Minister had indicated that counter-insurgency operations would not end although the process of establishing contacts with the ULFA has been set in motion through Indira Goswami, a prominent Assamese novelist based in New Delhi. He said that Bangladesh and Myanmar were being persuaded to assist in dealing with Indian rebels operating from their territory. According to him, Myanmar has come up with a positive response, while Bangladesh has not. But he was hopeful of Dhaka's cooperation in the near future. These remarks goes to suggest that the Government was not thinking of a halt to the military offensive against the ULFA and other Northeast rebels, despite efforts at talking peace with them.

The Prime Minister  agreed  to talk on other contentious issues in states like Assam. For instance, he agreed to implement the Assam Accord, signed in 1985, in 'letter and spirit,' and admitted that there was illegal infiltration from Bangladesh, an issue that Congress top guns usually tries to avoid. On the whole, the Prime Minister sought to ignore the militants, downplay insurgency, but made sure he addressed the 'genuine grievances' of the people. Otherwise, he would not have agreed to review the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act or promise to implement the Assam Accord in 'letter and spirit.'