Pakistan
’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) seems to have become a synonym for international terrorism. Combining its philosophy of “jehad” with espionage, subversion, sabotage and psychological warfare, it has acquired notoriety comparable to the CIA and KGB during the Cold War.
Working against
India
, the ISI had abetted the Naga and Mizo secessionists in
East Pakistan
(now
Bangladesh
); the ISI helped them to obtain safe passage through northwest
Burma
to
China
. It took centre-stage from 1965 by creating a ‘Kashmir Cell’ to ‘defreeze the stalemate in
Kashmir
’. This led to the 1965 War. But its resounding success truly came from the combined CIA-ISI operations in
Afghanistan
(1979-88). Since then it has been at the helm of affairs and become the ‘kingmaker’ in
Pakistan
; it has also expanded its sway over
Afghanistan
by controlling the newly created Taliban, whose activities are believed to include
Algeria
,
Chechnya
, and many Asian countries.
In
India
, the ISI increased its activities from 1984 onwards after Operation Blue Star, which spread into
Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) simultaneously and surreptitiously. It is now the main instrument of the Pak-promoted proxy war in
Kashmir
. It has also spread its tentacles inside
India
after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992. The recent revelation by Home Minister, LK Advani, about the Aligarh-based Student Islamic Movement (SIMI) has raised hackles. SIMI, with its nuclei in several metropolitan cities, is said to be ISI-backed. If true, its debilitating effect cannot be underestimated in an open, democratic country like ours.
While
Pakistan
and
Pakistan
occupied
Kashmir
(PoK) have provided sanctuaries to the secessionists and fundamentalists in J&K, what is posing an equal threat to Indian security from the ISI is confirmed information of its widespread activities launched from
Nepal
and
Bangladesh
.
Because
Nepal
had encouraged Chinese Communist activities since the 1950s,
Pakistan
benefited from its collusion with
China
, and has successfully established bases for its ISI operations in
Nepal
against
India
. Consequently,
Pakistan
has a large programme of proselytization in the Terai, and is targeting the ex-Gorkha servicemen of the Indian Army. Several cases have surfaced. In March this year the First Secretary of the
Pakistan
embassy in
Kathmandu
was apprehended for sabotage and deported. The Chinese are not active in
Nepal
but their activities are covert. It is believed that the Maoist guerilla movement, which has terrorised
Nepal
since 1996 and controls most of
Western Nepal
, enjoys Chinese support and financing.
Since the birth of
Bangladesh
,
Pakistan
’s strategy has been to turn it into an anti-Indian and an Islamic republic. Due to the political instability prevalent in
Bangladesh
, it has been possible for the ISI to revive its old bases in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and encourage the Islamic fundamentalists focussing on the Jamati-Islami. Some of the local ‘Bihari Muslims’ have been employed as ISI agents. The threat which the ISI could project from
Bangladesh
to the North East, especially the volatile
Assam
and Meghalaya, is substantial. The Ministry of Defence, in its annual report for 2000, has revealed that: “ISI has been trying to exploit some areas of
Nepal
and
Bangladesh
for launching subversive activities in
India
... this is a cause of serious concern”.
The extent, reach and effectiveness of the ISI show that it has a very sound financial base for its operations. There are several donors like Organization of Islamic Countries,
China
and so on, but its substantial fund raising is attributed to the money that it raises by drug trafficking from
Asia
’s largest producers of heroin and synthetic drugs.
Afghanistan
and NWFP are poppy-rich; Indian opium also finds its way into
Pakistan
. Because
India
is on the contraband smuggling route, this increases Indian vulnerability.
The final question is, why does our intelligence and security agencies not ‘clip’ ISI’s wing? It can, provided it takes the battle to its logical conclusion inside
Pakistan
.