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#401, 7 August 2000
 
Recent Developments in Kashmir – I: Hizbul Cease-fire - Why?
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

The Chief Commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM), Abdul Majid Dar, has announced a unilateral cease-fire, and expressed his willingness to enter into negotiations with the Indian government. This was approved by its Supreme Commander, Syed Salahuddin.

 

 

The cease-fire announcement was a surprise. Why did the HuM, which had rejected dialogue with the government earlier, now have decided to announce a unilateral cease-fire? 

 

 

It is believed firstly, that the US pressure is behind the announcement. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), who is close to the HuM was in the US recently, meeting various government officials. However the Qazi on his return to Pakistan denounced the cease-fire as amounting to “betrayal”. The JI also severed its ties with the HuM. Though the US pressure worked in making the APHC agree to a dialogue, it is doubtful whether the US has any influence over  militant groups like the HuM.

 

 

Secondly the HuM has fallen out of ISI’s favour. The sudden popularity of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, a new militant outfit floated by Moulana Azhar Masood, could be due to the ISI deciding to prop up a new outfit to replace the HuM. The ISI has always preferred groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen as they were amenable to the ISI manipulations. HuM’s closeness to the Jamaat-e-Islami was a problem in ISI-Hizbul relations. In fact, Syed Salahuddin had problems with the ISI earlier and, at one point of time, the ISI even tried to remove Salahuddin from the leadership. Without the ISI’s active help, in terms of providing funds, arms and training, it would be difficult for any militant outfit to carryout an armed struggle against the Indian security forces in Kashmir

 

 

A third reason for the cease-fire could be the differences that have arisen between the HuM and other militant groups especially the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. The HuM’s objective is limited to Kashmir and their struggle is limited to India , with Kashmir as the end objective. The other two groups have a pan-Islamic agenda and Kashmir is only the means to establish an Islamic Caliphate from Algeria to Philippines . Besides differences in ideology, the HuM have problems with the other groups in terms of their routine activities in Kashmir . Since the HuM is mainly composed of Kashmiris, they are sympathetic to the local population, where as the other groups, being composed mainly of foreign militants, do not care for the local population. There were incidents in which the foreign militants were involved in arson, loot, rape and killing of the local Kashmiris. Besides, with the introduction of foreign mercenaries, the Hizbul felt its role was diminishing, as foreign militants were calling the shots and local militants had to act merely as couriers for arms and money or as guides. Consequently, the HuM’s break with the other militant groups was expected. 

 

 

Fourthly, the most important reason for the Hizbul suggesting the cease-fire, is its rejection of violence as a means to find a solution for the problems of the local population. They are thoroughly dis-satisfied with the militants, and approved from the improving conditions since 1997. The Kargil war last year interrupted the returning peace to the valley and the subsequent attack by the militants on the Security forces and installations affected the law and order situation, however these events were not endorsed by the local population nor did it increase the popularity of the militant groups. In fact, events such as the Chittisinghpora massacre in which more than 30 people belonging to the Sikh community were killed had a negative impact. Majid Dar, who announced the cease-fire made this very clear, when he said that the announcement was the result of “grass root surveys” that the Hizbul had conducted in the last two months.

 

 

Finally, two recent events have culminated in the HuM deciding to enter a dialogue. First, the ongoing efforts for a dialogue between the Indian government and the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and second the rejection of Farooq Abdullah’s autonomy proposal by the Centre. After the Centre rejected the autonomy proposals, there were no major reactions from the local population. Knowing that there is also no support for secession among the locals, the Hizbul would have felt the need to change in their strategy. At the same time, indications from the Centre that it wanted to initiate a dialogue with various elements inside Kashmir would also have encouraged the HuM to adopt a new approach.

 

 

Thus, the differences between the other militant groups in terms of ideology and strategy, rejection of militancy by the local population and the Centre’s willingness to have a dialogue with various parties involved the conflict have resulted in the Hizbul announcing their cease-fire. 

 

 

 

 
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