Jammu & Kashmir - Articles

On 28 February 2006, twenty-five members of the Salva Judum (People's Movement) were killed by Naxalites in the Dantewada district in South Bastar, Chattisgarh. In Jammu and Kashmir, there have been a series of attacks on Village Defence Committee (VDC) members, which has become more pronounced in the last two years.

The Salva Judum is indirectly funded but, directly supported by the State. The movement started in 2004 in the Dantewada district of Chattisgarh; the local tribal population organized themselves by guarding important places and roads, which are prone to Naxalite attacks. The political parties, including the BJP and Congress, support this movement. The VDCs in Jammu and Kashmir have become an integral part of counter-militancy operations with local population living in remote areas being armed and trained to defend themselves.

What is the rationale behind the State supporting these movements? Both are organized in remote areas - Salva Judum in the tribal areas of Chattisgarh and the VDCs are largely formed in the tribal belts of the Pir Panjal ranges. The reach of the State in these areas has diminished over the years; in some cases it was never established in the first place, and they remained outside the developmental process. These areas were neither connected by roads nor supplied with electricity, and continue to remain unconnected. For example, it is only after the Operation Sarp Vinash in late 2003 in the Hill Kaka area that the State felt the need for proper roads, at least to counter attacks by the militants. The tribal areas of Chattisgarh, Orissa and Jharakhand face the same problem.

After militancy and violence erupted in these regions, the State finds it difficult to reach the spot in an emergency. The people live in a State of constant fear, given the inability of the State to protect them. While they may not join militancy or a Naxal group, they are often forced to support these non-State actors, as the State does not exist in these areas. How can the local population be helped, if they do not want to join any violent movement? How can they fight the militants and Naxalites? This is the challenge. Hence, the State has decided to mobilize and arm the people against the insurgents, which raise many questions. Is this a right approach? Would mobilizing the locals solve the problem or create new ones in the future? Is there an alternative? Undoubtedly, the approach has positive aspects, but the negative ones also need consideration from the long term perspective.

First, involving the people enlarges the conflict canvas. With civilians becoming a part of the conflict, they can become the primary target for the Naxalites and militants. Their violence now includes civilians, apart from the State's institutions and personnel.

Second, arming and training the local population militarizes society by increasing the flow of arms from legal and illegal channels. There is a greater danger of the militants or Naxalites taking these weapons away from these people. If the local police stations and check posts can be raided to seize weapons and ammunitions, how could civilians protect their weapons? The government is aware of this problem; hence it only provides older weapons, mostly the vintage .303 rifles. This can worsen the problem; an unarmed local is less likely to be targeted than a poorly armed one.

Third, the State is abdicating its duty to protect its citizens by asking them to defend themselves. Instead of enlarging its writ, by making the State's presence felt in remote areas through civil governance and military reach, this is a negative and defeatist approach, essentially highlighting its inability to protect its citizens.

Fourth, bringing civilians directly into the firing line, often leads to their displacement, which happened in Kashmir and is now happening in Chattisgarh. As the Salva Judum spreads, one might witness more displacement, creating greater problems for the State, in terms of providing rehabilitation, maintaining camps, etc.

On the other hand, arming the local population does lead to a certain level of militarization, but in a conflict situation this is unavoidable. Without effective local participation, no movement can succeed. In Andhra Pradesh, arming the locals was seen as essential to provide self confidence and send a message to the Naxalites that the local population cannot be taken for granted.

However, this policy of arming the local population should be made part of a larger social-economic package, including options to persuade the Naxalites and militants to give up arms. Development and governance are two serious options, which the State must pay attention to, and not remain high only on rhetoric. Unless the State moves in, the militants will not move out. The Salva Judum or the VDCs cannot provide a stand alone 'policy'. They should form part of a short-term strategy within a larger long-term policy.