Jammu & Kashmir - Articles

    Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the most potent and intractable means of violence in the hands of terrorists in Kashmir. They have been able to cause maximum casualties on the security forces with these. The advantages of IEDs are 91) They can be planted at the place of terrorists’ choosing and exploded at the time of their choices (2) The IEDs destructive capabilities are stupendous. In Sri Lanka the LTTE had blown up tanks and armoured personnel carries with IEDs (3) They are extremely easy to improvise- the requirements being merely explosive, detonator, battery and electrical wire. (4) It can be detonated by remote control thus making gateway practically guaranteed (5) Retaliation by the security forces is likely to fall upon the residents in the vicinity of the explosion and is likely to be counter productive (6) Protection of network of roads markets, offices and residences consumes enormous number of man power and detracts from offensive operations. It may be mentioned in passing here that the IPKF in Sri Lanka incurred most of its casualties due to IEDs and could not find an answer till the end.
    Therefore, innovative methods and techniques should be considered to minimize our losses from the IEDs. These could be as follows. :- 

(1) Road Protection- Curiously our security forces have taken to considering walking on the road prior to the movement of convoys, looking for the tell tale signs of planting IEDs as road protection. Correctly, the sappers should sweep the road with their mine sweeping devices and sniffer dogs, while the infantry should carry out the task by dominating the road and vulnerable points from a distance of about five hundred meters i.e. practical battle rage of small arms. Artillery should register likely spots of assembly of the terrorists. Armed helicopters should be used to sweep the road before and during the movement of convoys. Signals should monitor message being passed on mobile phones.

(2) Timing of Convoys. In the Trincomalee Division in Sri Lanka we adopted night movement of convoys as normal practice there by hardly any one of our convoys suffered due to IED blasts. The point is that firstly the terrorist is chary of venturing out at night; secondly he is unable to observe with precision from a distance and can, therefore, go wrong in the choice of his target. 

(3) Patrolling and Ambushes. Very basic but ignored at times, Patrolling and ambushes can be most effective in combating planting of IEDs but it must be imaginatively planned and enthusiastically carried out taking care not to wake the troops weary in the process. The patrol programmes must be structured from bottom to top i.e. from platoon/company to brigade/ division and not the reverse because men on the ground know better. They should be given broad objectives. The way to achieve should be left to them. 

(4) Intelligence. Although it is cliché intelligence is always the key to any successful operation including against IEDs what is not a cliché is that intelligence comes out of money at the disposal of company and battalion commanders which is presently inadequate. We do not trust even our officers. They have nothing to buy information from the willing locals who risk their lives to give it to the security forces.  

    In short it is very difficult to combat the IEDs, but given will, money and imagination, it is possible to get it under the control.