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#1454, 6 August 2004

Suicide Attack on Shaukat Aziz: Some Preliminary Questions

D Suba Chandran
Assistant Director, IPCS

On 30 July 2004, a suicide bomb attack was carried out against Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan's Finance Minister and Prime Minister-in-waiting. The attack occurred when Aziz was finishing his election campaign in Jabbar, a village ten kilometers away from Fateh Jang in Attock constituency, from where he is contesting. The suicide bomber propelled himself towards Aziz?s car, but exploded before his target could sit inside. The attack narrowly missed Aziz but took the lives of nine others, including the driver. Aziz is another prominent leader to escape a suicide bomb attack; Chandrika Kumaratunge and General Musharraf are other prominent leaders to have survived suicide attacks in December 1999 and December 2003 respectively.

 

The recent history of suicide attacks reveals that such targets in South Asia have symbolic value - political, military or religious. Suicide attacks based on political considerations are carried out to prevent a person from assuming top offices in the country like Rajiv Gandhi and Chandrika Kumaratunge; suicide attacks for military considerations were aimed at demoralizing the troops, questioning state?s legitimacy, besides creating fear and instability as in the cases in Kashmir; and suicide attacks based on religious considerations originate from narrow sectarian perceptions as in Quetta or Karachi. While the first kind of attacks is aimed at an individual, the second and third categories are aimed at groups representing the state or a particular community.

 

The attack on Shaukat Aziz, clearly falls in the first category aimed at preventing him from becoming the Prime Minister. As Ejaz Haider, has described, Aziz is seen as the 'civilian alter ego' of Musharraf. The militants believe that if the former becomes the PM, it would strengthen latter?s current policies both inside and outside Pakistan. The attempt on Aziz should therefore be seen as a follow up of earlier failed attempts on General Musharraf. Hence, it cannot be a retaliation to avenge the capture of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani in Islamabad on 26 July, who is an al Qaeda operator.

 

Are there any similarities between the suicide attacks carried out in Pakistan since December 2003? Apart from suicide attacks of sectarian nature, there are two major differences in the suicide attacks carried out in Pakistan against individuals. First, this is the first time a civilian leader was targeted by the suicide bomb. The earlier three attempts were directed against the military leaderships - twice General Musharraf and later the Corps Commander, Karachi. The second difference is over methodology. Every group indulging in suicide attacks devises its own techniques. For example, the Black Tigers of the LTTE always target their victims through a single human bomb. The fidayeens target the Indian military establishment in groups. The earlier attacks in Pakistan in which the targets were General Musharraf and a Karachi Corps Commander, involved the use of a car filled with explosives.

 

Who could have carried out these attacks? Islambouli Brigades, a group believed to be linked to al Qaeda, has claimed the responsibility in a statement published from Egypt. Could they have done it alone? The attack on Aziz was carried out by an individual, who had the explosives wrapped around his body. Could Aziz's bomber be from the same group, which had carried out the earlier attacks? Or were they associated with those sectarian organizations which have carried out suicide attacks against the Shias? Has the al Qaeda 'outsourced' the suicide attack, to local groups? The fact that the suicide bomber was wearing a shirt stitched by a tailor from Attock indicates that the attack was probably carried out by a local group.

 

Finally, election campaigns have become a favorite season for suicide bombers. Rajiv Gandhi and Chandrika Kumaratunge, were both targeted by suicide bombers during their election campaigns. While the latter was lucky to escape, the former succumbed. Since election campaigns are so intensive and involve reaching several places quickly and there is enormous pressure on political leaders to 'reach out' to the people, the suicide bombers may be finding occasions easy for breaching security cordons.  

 

While the local press has been criticizing the authorities for their failure to provide adequate security cover for the VIPs, the fact that the last four suicide attacks on high profile individuals have failed indicates quite the contrary. Besides Aziz, Core Commander of Karachi escaped a suicide attack earlier, and General Musharraf himself was lucky twice. As in cases around the world, the security cover will never be sufficient to prevent a determined suicide bomber from reaching their target, which makes him or her the most lethal weapon in the terrorist arsenal. These four cases should be treated as delineating the failure of these suicide attacks rather than cases of inadequate security cover.

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