Suicide Terrorism - Articles

Meeting the Challenge of the Kabul Blast

The dust has at last settled down from the dastardly terrorist attack on the Indian Embassy at Kabul on 7 July. The Embassy has started functioning normally and visas are being issued to Afghan applicants, whose future hopes are closely linked to their ability to pursue economic and educational opportunities in India. Senior officials from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs have visited the Embassy and taken stock of the situation. No doubt, defensive countermeasures have been strengthened. Outward normalcy prevails in the Mission to the extent possible under conditions of near total devastation.

On two issues there is no dispute. First, that the attack itself was perpetrated by a "foreign intelligence agency," which was later identified by the Indian National Security Adviser (NSA) as the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). It is likely that there is enough incontrovertible evidence for the NSA to have been so definite and we should take his word for it. Second, is India's determination to continue its vital humanitarian and reconstruction missions in Afghanistan. India has never been deterred by terrorism and its resilience is legendary. This was demonstrated way back in 1993 in Mumbai, when the Bombay Stock Exchange functioned normally on the next working day after the city had absorbed serial blasts killing nearly three hundred people.

However, on several other issues there is neither consensus nor agreement and policy seems absent. In the face of sustained assaults, is passive acceptance the only response? Would this not be an encouragement to terrorists to strike with impunity again and again? How best can the nation display its resolve to effectively deter future attacks?

It is often argued that terrorists are a faceless and an amorphous entity, an illusory target that cannot be identified and therefore, must not be attacked unless certified. But, in situations such as this, where credible intelligence strips away this anonymity, the terrorists have both a face and a personality. In such a situation a passive acceptance, while in the true traditions of Indian fatalism, is utterly opposed to real life pragmatism. Every such attack on India, especially on Indian territory abroad, which is not countered only encourages further attacks. This assumes additional significance especially when the al Qaeda and the ISI, appears to be firming up their plans to escalate in Kashmir after it "wins" in Afghanistan. A passive response, of strengthening the security of such establishments with additional special forces, while necessary, is patently inadequate.

In formulating the Indian response it is important to keep in mind that the Kabul attack is not the first and certainly will not be the last. With deteriorating security situation in the entire neighbourhood and not merely in the west, the possibilities of similar attacks will be high. In addition should there be a perception that 'India is a soft touch' the chances for these attacks will remain high. What must then India do?

First and foremost is developing a national resolve that no such terrorist attack on India will ever go unpunished. This will not be easy to evolve, especially in an India, where turning the other cheek and passive acceptance have become deeply ingrained in the national psyche. This is the 'Kandahar syndrome' and has several precedents going back at least to the kidnapping of Rubaiyya Sayeed in 1989. Confronted with such a situation our first response seems to be one of how quickly we can succumb to the terrorist demand. This passive attitude must change. There must be clear determination and national resolve that no single act of terrorism or hostage-taking must ever go unchallenged and without retaliation. All countries that have a vital stake in the security of its citizens and of national interests adopt this strategy and their numbers are many. India too must adopt this strategy, but with Indian characteristics. It must be clear that the response will be inevitable, appropriate and early.

India will need to create new structures and capabilities. While existing arrangements for overall control should suffice, enabling legislations for approval and sanctions may have to be refined. In a democracy such as in India the executive authority will have to be the highest political leadership but special supporting staff for planning and execution will have to be created. It will call for special and dedicated force, the nucleus of which will be found in India's several special forces.

The other response may well be of a sustained commitment to deploy additional forces in robust peacekeeping operations in affected countries of special concern to India. India has experience second to none in United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world. This will probably continue to be the model, but will need to be modified to suit different conditions. For example, a UN peacekeeping mandate may not suffice and coalition operations may have to be considered and support of host nation forces will be crucial.

Freedom and security are too precious to be allowed to be held hostage to terrorism. In the complex state of insecurity in the region, India's resolve must be firm and within the bounds of reciprocity.