LTTE Operations and Attacks: A method to the madness
RR Vinod
An
analysis of the violent attacks involving the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) of Sri Lanka clearly brings out a pattern, be it in eliminating Tamil
political leaders, militant opponents, Sri Lankan leaders or security personnel.
It is seen that whenever a strong challenger from any of the above categories
appears on the scene, he or she is targeted by the Tigers.
At
a time when they were just one among the several Tamil militant groups fighting
the Sri Lankan government, their ambition to be recognized as the sole representative
of the Sri Lankan Tamils led them to begin a ruthless fratricidal war against
the leaders and members of the EPRLF, the TELO and the PLOTE in the mid eighties.
The justification for this was that these rival groups were 'quislings' of the
Indian agencies and /or petty criminals who would sell the ideal of Tamil Eelam
for their petty gains and could therefore not be trusted. Rival militant Tamil
leaders killed by the LTTE include Sri Sabarattinam, Padmanabha and Uma Maheswaran.
The Tigers have made several attempts to target Douglas Devananda, leader of
the EPDP and a minister in the present government. Similarly Tamil political
leader Appapillai Amirthalingam, one time mentor of LTTE supremo Prabhakaran,
was also brutally murdered in Colombo by LTTE cadres for opposing the LTTE.
Lakhsman Kadirgamar, the high profile foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, had done
great damage to the LTTE's cause through sauve and relentless diplomacy against
the Tigers. For the Tigers, he was a Tamil 'traitor' and was duly targeted.
Nothing
would stop the Tiger leader from eliminating these rivals, for he feared that a
rival power center would be an obstacle in his scheme to get Eelam. Prabhakaran
is on record stating that he was told by his advisers not to fight with India
when the IPKF was sent there, but he decided to go ahead and fight for he was
unwilling to compromise the aim to get Eelam. To him, the question was not whether
the opponent was more powerful, the question was whether they had the will to
stand and fight for their 'cause'.
In
this quest, the LTTE targeted strong political and security leaders who
came on the scene in Sri Lanka and who took a tough stand on this issue. The
first in this line of political leaders was Ranjan Wijeratne, Sri Lanka's Defense
Minister, who was killed in an explosion in March 1991, about two months before
the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi. Wijeratne had vowed to finish the Tigers.
Lalith Athulath Mudali was yet another Sri Lankan leader who was targeted by
the LTTE. He had also taken a hard line in the conflict against the Tigers.
Similarly Presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake was also assassinated by
suspected Tiger killers. President Premadasa was assassinated by the Tigers
even though he had at one time entered into a dialogue with the LTTE. For the
LTTE, the dialogue with Premadas was only a tactic in their strategy to get
rid of the IPKF and they succeeded in this. The IPKF left on 24 March 1990,
and the LTTE's Eelam War II commenced on 10 June.
Chandrika Kumaratunga also tried negotiating with the Tigers when she first
assumed power. For the Tigers, it seems, dialogue with Colombo is only a step
in their scheme to get Eelam. Fruitless dialogues can always later be displayed
as proof of their desire for a peaceful resolution of the ethnic problem. When
Kumaratunga finally decided to go to war, the Tigers almost succeeded in assassinating
her through a suicide attack.
Among
senior Sri Lankan security leaders Gen Denzil Kobbekaduwa was the most
respected. Renowned for his operations against the Tigers and breaking the Tigers'
siege of the Elephant pass in 1991, he was assassinated through an IED. Major
General Vijaya Wimalaratne and Rear Admiral Mohan Jayamaha were also killed
along with General Kobbekadwa in the mine explosion.
Admiral
Clancy Fernando was another high profile target that the Tigers assassinated
through a suicide attack. General Fonseka, also known for his tough and no-nonsense
approach was targeted by the LTTE and was fortunate to survive a suicide attack
by the Tigers this year.
All
suicide missions of the Tigers were launched by Pottu Omman's Black Tigers,
and were intended to bring them strategic gains. Cases involving the Black Tigers
could not be prosecuted for want of legally admissible evidence. The Tigers
were therefore able to present themselves before the West, with support from their
sympathizers, as freedom fighters having nothing to do with terrorism. It was
only after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the path breaking investigations
of the Special Investigation Team of the Central Bureau of Investigations, that
the Tigers could be prosecuted in a court of law and brought to book through
due process of law. India proscribed the organization in May 1992, and today
quite a number of countries have followed suit. Such action has not however
deterred the Tigers from doing what they are known to do best - murder and mayhem,
and continue to target strong rivals through suicide operations.