On 30 July 2004, a
suicide bomb attack was carried out against Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan's Finance
Minister and Prime Minister-in-waiting. The attack occurred when Aziz was
finishing his election campaign in Jabbar, a village ten kilometers away from
Fateh Jang in Attock constituency, from where he is contesting. The suicide
bomber propelled himself towards Aziz?s car, but exploded before his target
could sit inside. The attack narrowly missed Aziz but took the lives of nine
others, including the driver. Aziz is another prominent leader to escape a
suicide bomb attack; Chandrika Kumaratunge and General Musharraf are other
prominent leaders to have survived suicide attacks in December 1999 and December
2003 respectively.
The recent history of
suicide attacks reveals that such targets in South Asia have symbolic value -
political, military or religious. Suicide attacks based on political
considerations are carried out to prevent a person from assuming top offices in
the country like Rajiv Gandhi and Chandrika Kumaratunge; suicide attacks for
military considerations were aimed at demoralizing the troops, questioning
state?s legitimacy, besides creating fear and instability as in the cases in
Kashmir; and suicide attacks based on religious considerations originate from
narrow sectarian perceptions as in Quetta or Karachi. While the first kind of
attacks is aimed at an individual, the second and third categories are aimed at
groups representing the state or a particular community.
The attack on Shaukat
Aziz, clearly falls in the first category aimed at preventing him from becoming
the Prime Minister. As Ejaz Haider, has described, Aziz is seen as the 'civilian
alter ego' of Musharraf. The militants believe that if the former becomes the
PM, it would strengthen latter?s current policies both inside and outside
Pakistan. The attempt on Aziz should therefore be seen as a follow up of earlier
failed attempts on General Musharraf. Hence, it cannot be a retaliation to
avenge the capture of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani in Islamabad on 26 July, who is an
al Qaeda operator.
Are there any
similarities between the suicide attacks carried out in Pakistan since December
2003? Apart from suicide attacks of sectarian nature, there are two major
differences in the suicide attacks carried out in Pakistan against individuals.
First, this is the first time a civilian leader was targeted by the suicide
bomb. The earlier three attempts were directed against the military leaderships
- twice General Musharraf and later the Corps Commander, Karachi. The second
difference is over methodology. Every group indulging in suicide attacks devises
its own techniques. For example, the Black Tigers of the LTTE always target
their victims through a single human bomb. The fidayeens target the Indian
military establishment in groups. The earlier attacks in Pakistan in which the
targets were General Musharraf and a Karachi Corps Commander, involved the use
of a car filled with explosives.
Who could have
carried out these attacks? Islambouli Brigades, a group believed to be linked to
al Qaeda, has claimed the responsibility in a statement published from Egypt.
Could they have done it alone? The attack on Aziz was carried out by an
individual, who had the explosives wrapped around his body. Could Aziz's bomber
be from the same group, which had carried out the earlier attacks? Or were they
associated with those sectarian organizations which have carried out suicide
attacks against the Shias? Has the al Qaeda 'outsourced' the suicide attack, to
local groups? The fact that the suicide bomber was wearing a shirt stitched by a
tailor from Attock indicates that the attack was probably carried out by a local
group.
Finally, election
campaigns have become a favorite season for suicide bombers. Rajiv Gandhi and
Chandrika Kumaratunge, were both targeted by suicide bombers during their
election campaigns. While the latter was lucky to escape, the former succumbed.
Since election campaigns are so intensive and involve reaching several places
quickly and there is enormous pressure on political leaders to 'reach out' to
the people, the suicide bombers may be finding occasions easy for breaching
security cordons.
While the local press
has been criticizing the authorities for their failure to provide adequate
security cover for the VIPs, the fact that the last four suicide attacks on high
profile individuals have failed indicates quite the contrary. Besides Aziz, Core
Commander of Karachi escaped a suicide attack earlier, and General Musharraf
himself was lucky twice. As in cases around the world, the security cover will
never be sufficient to prevent a determined suicide bomber from reaching their
target, which makes him or her the most lethal weapon in the terrorist arsenal.
These four cases should be treated as delineating the failure of these suicide
attacks rather than cases of inadequate security cover.