Suicide Terrorism - Iraq 2006
Devyani Srivastava
Research Assistant, IPCS
e-mail: devyani@ipcs.org
The
suicide bombing campaign in Iraq became more lethal and frequent during 2006 as
the Sunni-led insurgency and Al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist groups intensified
their attacks on US-led troops, Iraq's Shia-dominated government, oil
installations, police forces, and civilians. For a nation with no history of
suicide attacks prior to the 2003 US-led coalition invasion, the intensification
of the campaign since 2003 establishes the objective of the suicide terrorism
campaign in clear terms as nothing short of a complete collapse of the current
system and perpetuation of sectarian violence. It reflects the intensity of
frustration and anger in a people that, despite their turbulent history of fight
against occupation, had so far refrained from resorting to this extreme measure.
In addition, it comes as a final blow to the US policy of regime change in Iraq
through military invasion, and has further complicated the process of nation
building.
The
main target has undoubtedly been the coalition military forces, particularly US
troops, thereby clearly reinforcing the prime objective of suicide attacks - to
compel the coalition to withdraw its military forces from territory that the
insurgents consider as their home, even as the UNSC extended the mandate
of the multinational forces in Iraq for another year in November 2006. Further,
a number of attacks on Iraqi forces, police officers, recruiting centres, and
ministers in the Shia-dominated government indicate the use of suicide terrorism
as a strategy to attack a government perceived to be under the control of the
US. Some of the most ghastly attacks on the security forces include one in Ramadi
on 5 January killing 70 soldiers, in Baghdad on 27 March killing 40 Iraqi soldiers,
in Baqouba on 11 June killing 8 soldiers at an army check post, and in Baghdad
on 13 November killing 35 Iraqi recruits.
There
were also large number of explosions in busy thoroughfares such as market areas,
mosques, shrines, and funeral processions. This is reflective of the increasing
level of sectarian violence in Iraq with most attacks being perpetrated by Sunni
Arabs in Shia enclaves, notably Najaf (site of the holiest Shia shrine),
Sadr city (stronghold of Shia rebel cleric Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army militiamen),
Kufa, Kerbala and Tal Afar districts of Baghdad. Major attacks include one by
Sunni Arabs using three suicide car bombs and two mortar rounds on the Sadr
city slum killing at least 160 people on 23 November, an attack on a Shia mosque
on 29 December killing 10, a suicide car bomber killing seven people in a crowded
market in the holy Shia city of Kerbala on 9 December, and a double suicide
attack killing 22 people at a market in a Shia district in the northern city
of Tal Afar.
A
study of the attacks reveal that among the two essential weapons of suicide
bombing, the use of a vehicle was dominant in attacks against civilians in
crowded areas and against patrolling convoys whereas the use of an explosive
belt directly attached to the human body was largely used in attacks on army
bases and checkpoints. The reason behind this is simple: the scale of damage
caused by car bombs exceeds that of human explosions, and thus, their use in
crowded areas. On the other hand, it is easier for human suicide bombers to
penetrate through army checkpoints and bases, than car loaded with explosives.
A
cursory glance at the attacks substantiates this, for it clearly establishes
that the attacks that proved to be the most lethal were the ones carried out in
open public areas like markets through suicide car bombs. Attacks in a market in Kirkuk on 13 June killed 36 people; in a Shia street market in Baghdad on
1 July killed 62 people; in Sadr slum city in Baghdad on 23 November killed
160 people; and an attack on Shia laborers in Baghdad on 12 December killed
71 people. Significantly, this stands in contrast to the trend in the suicide
attacks in 2005, with the most lethal attacks being those carried out against
security forces, such as an attack on a security force convoy on 5 January killing
21 people, an attack on police and army recruitment centre on 28 February killing
125 people, an attack on a police recruiting centre on 4 May killing 60 people,
and an attack on an army recruiting centre on 30 July killing 52 people.
It
is clear that sectarian violence caused the largest number of Iraqi civilian
casualties in 2006. Such attacks are believed to be the work of remnants of the Ba'ath regime, which, in turn contradicts the widely held perception that
suicide bombing is the main modus operandi of fundamentalist jihadis alone.
Moreover, the execution of Saddam Hussein is likely to accelerate sectarian
violence still further. This also establishes that conflict in Iraq is as much
about the struggle for power between minority radicals and majority moderates
as about opposition to western forces. These two facets, however, are not mutually
exclusive and can be said to form two sides of the same coin, for it is likely
that Sunni insurgents are dragging the Shias into a civil war in order to make
Iraq ungovernable for the Americans and to thus drive them out of Iraq.
Baghdad
remained the most severely hit by suicide attacks and this focus on the capital
further illustrates the objective of the insurgency to undermine confidence in
the government. The remaining attacks were evenly spread across Kurdish north
and Shia south.
It
is worth noting that a striking factor of suicide bombing in Iraq is the lack of
clarity on the origin and nationality of the suicide bombers. While members of
the Iraq National Congress claim that Iraqis do not undertake suicide bombings
due to their culture, insinuating thereby that the suicide bombings must be the
work of foreign jihadis that have infiltrated Iraq, the familiarity
of the targets chosen by suicide bombers throws doubt on this assertion.
The
growth of suicide terrorism in Iraq is a critical issue not only because of the
formidable challenges it poses for the US-led coalition and the Iraqi government
in controlling the spread of this phenomenon, but also because of its tremendous
psychological impact in perpetuating an atmosphere of fear and mistrust. As this
atmosphere threatens to shape the people's psyche for the worse, the
intensification of the campaign might have pushed the Iraq conflict further from
resolution.
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