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#3265, 22 October 2010
 
Iran’s Role in the Taliban Negotiations: Q&A
Siddharth Ramana
Research Officer, IPCS
email: siddharth13@gmail.com
 

The Afghan government has initiated negotiations with the Taliban over the future of Afghanistan’s political landscape. Iran, an important regional player has also been invited to the dialogue process. According to Richard Holbrooke- the US special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan “We recognize that Iran, with its long, almost completely open border with Afghanistan and with a huge drug problem... has a role to play in the peaceful settlement of this situation in Afghanistan.”

What Is Iran’s primary interest in Afghanistan?
Iran’s primary interest in Afghanistan is the geopolitical strength it gains from exercising influence over Afghanistan, and rivaling this influence from Pakistan and the United States. Afghanistan can open another front in a potential conflict program against the United States over its nuclear weapons. It would also contribute to expanding the Shiite ascendancy of Iran which has grown in strength in West Asia, and expand its influence into Central and Southern Asia.

The country which most actively seeks to rival Iran in Afghanistan is Pakistan. It has been consistently advocating for negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban, with hopes that reconciliation would re-bolster its presence in the country. However, Iranian funding of the Taliban in recent years combined with rapprochement with formerly derisive groups have increased Iranian influence on these negotiations.

What are the groups over which Iran exercises some leverage?
American intelligence reports which were made available through the recent WikiLeaks logs, suggested that Iranian agents in 2005 had transferred $200,000 to aides of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a significant player in the Afghan insurgency. More recently in 2009, Iranian arms were transferred to Hekmatyar with the explicit mandate to target coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Hekmatyar, who was based in Iran, was ‘deported’ by Iran ostensibly to use his strong contacts in the region to undermine the Afghan government, facilitate the influx of Iranian agents in the country and open a front against American interests in the wider region, in case of a conflict over Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

However, Hekmatyar is also known to be a proponent of al Qaeda, and has had in the past worked with the Pakistani intelligence agencies which made him an unreliable and opportunist partner for Iran. While the tenuous links are supposedly continuing, the Iranians would have wanted to gain a more pervasive guerilla outfit to carry out its activities. 

Pakistan had instead used the Haqqani network, with its links to the al Qaeda, as its main resource in Afghanistan (it is widely accepted that the Haqqani network supported by the ISI was responsible for the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul among other attacks), before it had to abandon it owing to international scrutiny. Although deeply distrustful of the network's axis with groups known to be publicly hostile to Shiites, Iran established a working relationship with them based on the successful outcome of a hostage negotiation.

According to the Asia Times, efforts to retrieve an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Pakistan made use of contacts in Afghanistan to establish links with Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of veteran mujahid Jalaluddin Haqqani, who in turn kept in touch with the emissaries about a working alliance with Tehran. As a measure of goodwill, the Haqqani network in turn used its leverage with the Tehreek-e-Taliban & al Qaeda combine which was holding the diplomat to agree to an exchange of detained al Qaeda members in Iran for the diplomat. The successful release of the diplomat was cited by Iran's Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi as an indicator of the powerful dominance of  Iranian intelligence in the region.

Disturbingly however, the hostage situation allowed for years of mutual distrust to be addressed through dialogue between the Iranians and the Taliban, with the formalization of a working relationship with the Taliban being deemed to be in the interests of both Iran and the Taliban. This broke down a significant barrier between the two sides based on the religious-ideological divisiveness of Shiite Islam as practiced by Iran and Wahhabi-Sunni Islam practiced by the Taliban.

What are the profits for Iran in Afghanistan?
Iran’s profits can be seen through the prism of similar developments in West Asia, wherein the Muslim Brotherhood founded Hamas in the Gaza Strip is now effectively an Iranian proxy against Israel. The gains of an Iranian controlled Taliban to widen the profits from transit rights for Iranian gas, and promote Shiite ascendancy in Central Asia and South Asia are incalculable. Furthermore, the inroads such an alliance can make in the Tribal belts of Pakistan which are known to be favorable to the Taliban could lead to further rifts in the sectarian strife in the region.
 
What would Iran’s leverage in the negotiations be?
A factor which would work in the favor of Iran is the absence of Mullah Omar’s consent to the negotiations. While Pakistan has been promoting “moderate” voices in the Taliban to the table, the effective cadre strength of these leaders is questionable, compared to the warlord leaders over whom Iran exercises leverage.

 
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