Sri Lanka - Articles

There was war. With the change of government in December 2001, there was a ceasefire, and the hope for peace. Consequently, with Norwegian mediation and sustained international pressure, there were peace talks. Six rounds were held till March 2003; but, talks have been suspended since 21 April. Though the ceasefire is on hold, uncertainty about it is conspicuous. There is a danger of events doing a full circle – a devastating war again. The present impasse revolves around three major issues:

High Security Zones

The LTTE demand for winding down high security zones from the Jaffna peninsula to “facilitate resettlement and rehabilitation” of IDPs. However, the Sri Lankan security forces have opposed such move as being “risky”. This demand by the Tigers is not out of humanitarian concerns, but to tilt the military balance in their favour in case peace talks break down. Thus, dismantling HSZs implies loosing the peninsula to the Tigers “by other means”. Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, appointed to look into the issue, has in his 8-page report, linked a phased winding down of HSZs to some confidence building measures, which includes the reciprocal placing of long-range weaponry under international monitoring by both sides, use of A-9 highway without mutual checks, placing small teams at designated places on both sides and training exercises with reciprocal advance notification. This compromise formula has been rejected by the LTTE in toto.

Implementation of rehabilitation and development programmes

According to the LTTE, over 15 development projects for the Northeast agreed to in various rounds of peace talks remain unimplemented, due to the “corrupt ministries” based in Colombo. Hence, a body is necessary that could speed-up rehabilitation and development. The government argues that it is not implementation, but the huge funds required for these cost-intense projects that is responsible for their dilatory progress. The funds pledged by the donor community are yet to arrive. More amounts would be available after the meeting of donor countries in Tokyo in June for which the LTTE’s participation is imperative. The donor community is insistent on only releasing funds in proportionate to progress in the peace talks. Hence, it is in the LTTE’s hands to get the funds by rejoining the process.

Sea Lanes

The LTTE wants its navy, “Sea Tigers”, to be recognised on par with the Sri Lankan Navy, and some part of the territorial waters in the northeast to be its exclusive preserve. This demand came after two incidents of “arms smuggling” by the LTTE were interdicted with casualties being incurred. Keeping the Sri Lankan Navy far from its supply routes is vital for the Tigers to augment its resources for a future war. But this solution would be suicidal for the government. The matter was referred to SLMM at the fifth round of talks, but due to the irreconcilability of both positions, the issue is now being studied by a former Indian Vice Admiral, P.J. Jacob to discover an amicable solution. This “involvement of Indian Generals and Admirals in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka” has irked the LTTE, which is Indophobic.

All the above demands of the LTTE have now been encapsulated into a single demandâ€â€�setting up of an Interim Administration (IA) in the Northeastern Province which would be (a) fully autonomous, (b) completely controlled by the LTTE and (c) entirely outside the present Constitution of Sri Lanka. All these should be assured in writing for them to take part in any peace process. From the LTTE’s view point, the UNP, during its election campaign itself, had agreed to form this Interim administration in the Northeast if voted to power. But no steps were taken on that front. The issue was raised by the Tigers in the very first round of peace talks in September 2002, but due to its controversial nature, was deferred till some CBMs were put in place. However, the government tried to dilute this issue by setting up an “emaciated body” like the Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SHIRN), which has achieved nothing so far.

Now the government is caught between the obdurate Tigers and aggressive Opposition, including the President. The LTTE is waiting for an opportunity to resume war, for which it is prepared, without gaining the wrath of the international community; the Opposition is all set to unseat the government on the pretext of “securing the national interests and sovereignty”. The only escape route available for the government is to appeal to the international community to rein in the Tigers. International pressure is the only hope.